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

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MEMOIRS

OF

A MINISTER OF STATE,

FROM THE YEAR 1840.

BY

F. GUIZOT,

AUTHOR OF 'THE LIFE OF OLIVER CROMWELL.'

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON.—THE FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS.

Page

My Personal Situation and Relations in the Cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840.—Political Friends.—Different principles and moving causes of Foreign Policy.—The Foreign Policy in harmony with the existing state and true tendencies of Civilization.—Character of the isolation of France after the Treaty of the 15th of July, 1840.—Debates on the Address in the two Chambers on the opening of the Session of 1840-1841.—Arrival of the Prince de Joinville at Cherbourg, bringing from St. Helena, in the frigate 'Belle Poule,' the remains of Napoleon.—Journey of the coffin from Havre to Paris.—State of minds on the route.—Ceremony of the Obsequies at the Invalides.—Conduct of the Government of July towards the Memory of the Emperor Napoleon.—Fortifications of Paris.—Vauban and Napoleon.—Preparatory Studies.—Various Systems of Fortification.—How the Final Resolution was taken.—Introduction, Debate, and Adoption of the Bill.—Opinion of Europe on this Measure 1

CHAPTER II.

AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.—CONVENTION OF JULY THE 13TH, 1841.

Situation of France after the Treaty of the 15th of July, 1840.—Character of her isolation and Armaments.—Dispositions of the European Cabinets.—Lord Palmerston's Dispatch of the 2nd of November, 1840.—Its Effect in France.—Capture of St. John d'Acre by the English.—Mehemet Ali is threatened in

Page

Egypt.—Mission of Baron Mounier to London.—Words of Prince Metternich.—Commodore Napier arrives before Alexandria, induces Mehemet Ali to treat, and concludes a Convention with him, which promises the Right of Inheritance in Egypt.—Anger of the Sultan and of Lord Ponsonby on receiving this intelligence.—The Napier Convention is disavowed at Constantinople, although approved in London.—Conference of the European Plenipotentiaries at Constantinople with Redschid Pacha.—Hatti Sheriff of the 13th February, 1841, which only grants to Mehemet Ali an incomplete and precarious inheritance of Egypt.—Interview of Lord Palmerston with Chekib Effendi.—Our expectant Attitude and Precautions.—Project of a Protocol and of a new Convention for the Re-entrance of France into the European Coalition.—Conditions which we attach to it.—I authorize Baron de Bourqueney to sign the two projected Acts provisionally, but not definitively.—Effort of Prince Metternich at Constantinople.—Change of Turkish Ministry.—New Hesitations of the Porte.—It finally gives way, and awards the hereditary rule in Egypt to Mehemet Ali by a New Firman of the 25th of May, 1841.—Fresh delay in London as to the Signature of the Protocol and Convention.—The Fall of the Whig Ministry appears imminent.—Mehemet Ali accepts the Firman of the 25th of May, 1841.—I authorize Baron de Bourqueney to sign the Convention.—It is signed on the 13th of July, 1841.—Summary of the Negotiation and its Results 37

CHAPTER III.

THE RIGHT OF SEARCH.

Lord Palmerston asks me to sign the New Treaty prepared in 1840, for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.—My Refusal and its Causes.—Accession of the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen.—I consent then (on the 20th of December, 1841) to sign the New Treaty.—First Debate in the Chamber of Deputies on this subject.—Amendment of M. Jacques Lefebvre on the Address.—True Cause of the state of minds.—I adjourn the Ratification of the New Treaty.—Attitude of the English Cabinet.—Ratifications are exchanged in London, between the other Powers, and the Protocol is left open for France.—Fresh Debates in the two Chambers against the Right of Search, and the Conventions of 1831 and 1833.—We definitively refuse to ratify the Treaty of the 20th of December, 1841.—Moderation and goodwill of Lord Aberdeen.—The Protocol of the 19th of February is closed, and the Treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, annulled for France.—At the Opening of the Session of 1843-1844, a paragraph inserted in the Address of the Chamber of Deputies expresses a wish for the Abolition of the Right of Search.—Why I do not immediately enter

Page

into Negotiation with the English Government on this Subject.—Visit of Queen Victoria to the Château d'Eu.—Its Effect in France and Europe.—I prepare the Negotiation for the Abolition of the Right of Search.—Dispositions of Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel.—Fresh Debates on this Subject in the Chambers at the Opening of the Session of 1844.—Visit of the Emperor Nicholas to England.—Visit of King Louis Philippe to Windsor.—I accompany him.—Negotiation entered upon for the Abolition of the Right of Search.—How can this Right be replaced for the Suppression of the Trade?—The Duke de Broglie and Dr. Lushington are appointed to examine this Question.—Their meeting in London.—New Plan Proposed.—It is adopted and replaces the Right of Search in Virtue of a Treaty concluded on the 25th of May, 1845.—Presentation, Adoption, and Promulgation of a Bill for the Execution of this Treaty 130

CHAPTER IV.

VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

(1840-1842.)

State of Syria after the Expulsion of Mehemet Ali.—War between the Druses and Maronites.—Powerlessness and Connivance of the Turkish Authorities.—My Steps in favour of the Maronite Christians.—Dispositions of Prince Metternich;—of Lord Aberdeen.—Baron de Bourqueney and Sir Stratford Canning at Constantinople.—Obstinate Resistance of the Porte to our Demands for the Christians.—Sarim Effendi.—Plan of Prince Metternich for the Government of the Libanus.—We adopt it, in the absence of a better.—The Porte ends by yielding.—My opinion on the Turks and their Future.—State of Greece in 1841.—Mission of M. Piscatory to Greece; its Object.—What I convey on this Subject to Lord Aberdeen.—He gives Analogous Instructions to Sir E. Lyons.—Our Anxiety and Attitude towards the Bey of Tunis.—Suspicions of the English Cabinet on this Subject.—My Instructions to Prince de Joinville.—Mission of M. Plichon.—Affairs of Algeria.—Situation of the Foreign Consuls in Algeria.—Views on the Future of France in Africa.—Factories established on the Western Coast of Africa.—The Eastern Coast of Africa and Madagascar.—Possession taken of the Isles of Mayotta and Nosibé.—Treaty with the Iman of Muscat.—Question of the Custom House Union between France and Belgium.—Negotiations on this Subject.—My opinion on the Question.—The Commercial Treaty of the 16th of July, 1843, and the 13th of December, 1845, with Belgium.—Affairs of Spain.—Rivalry and Obstinate Suspicion of England towards France in Spain.—Queen Christina in Paris.—Regency of Espartero.—Insurrection and Defeat of the Christinos.—Our General Policy in Spain.—M. de Salvandy is appointed Ambassador in Spain.—

Page

Reception given to him on his Journey.—Question of the Presentation of his Credentials.—Espartero refuses to allow him to present them to the Queen Isabella.—Attitude of Mr. Aston, the English Minister at Madrid.—M. de Salvandy returns to France.—Instructions from Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Aston.—Incident between France and Russia.—Count de Pahlen quits Paris on leave.—From what motive.—My Instructions to M. Casimir Périer, French Chargé d'Affaires in Russia.—Anger of the Emperor Nicholas.—Vain Attempts at Reconciliation.—Perseverance of King Louis Philippe.—The Ambassadors of France and Russia do not return to their Posts, and are replaced by Chargés d'Affaires 241

CHAPTER V.

VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS.

(1840-1842.)

Internal Position of the Cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840.—Philosophical and Political Ideas recognized and powerful as Means of Opposition.—Summary Analysis of those Ideas.—In what they are False, and from what Cause.—How they ought to have been combated.—Insufficiency of our Arms for that Struggle.—Outrage committed against the Duke of Aumale and the Princes his Brothers, on the 13th of September, 1841.—Entry of the Duke of Aumale and of the 17th Regiment of Light Infantry to the Court of the Tuileries.—Plot connected with the Outrage.—M. Hébert is appointed Attorney-General to the Royal Court of Paris.—Trial of Quénisset and his Accomplices before the Court of Peers.—Legislative Debates.—Laws on the Labour of Children in Manufactures;—On Expropriation on Account of Public Utility;—On Great Public Works;—On the General Network of Railways.—Propositions of M. Ganneron on Parliamentary Incompatibilities, and of M. Ducos on Electoral Reform.—Discussion and Rejection of these Propositions.—Operation of the Census for Personal and House Tax, and also for the Tax on Windows.—Disturbances on this Question.—Uneasiness of M. Humann.—He is firmly supported.—His sudden death.—He is replaced by M. Lacave-Laplagne.—General Bugeaud is appointed Governor-General of Algeria.—His Relations and Correspondence with me.—His First Campaigns.—Closing of the Session of 1841-1842 341

MEMOIRS

OF A

MINISTER OF STATE.

CHAPTER I.

THE OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON.—THE FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS.

MY PERSONAL SITUATION AND RELATIONS IN THE CABINET OF THE 29TH OF OCTOBER, 1840.—POLITICAL FRIENDS.—DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES AND MOVING CAUSES OF FOREIGN POLICY.—THE FOREIGN POLICY IN HARMONY WITH THE EXISTING STATE AND TRUE TENDENCIES OF CIVILIZATION.—CHARACTER OF THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE AFTER THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY, 1840.—DEBATES ON THE ADDRESS IN THE TWO CHAMBERS ON THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1840-1841.—ARRIVAL OF THE PRINCE DE JOINVILLE AT CHERBOURG, BRINGING FROM ST. HELENA, IN THE FRIGATE 'BELLE POULE,' THE REMAINS OF NAPOLEON.—JOURNEY OF THE COFFIN FROM HAVRE TO PARIS.—STATE OF MINDS ON THE ROUTE.—CEREMONY OF THE OBSEQUIES AT THE INVALIDES.—CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JULY TOWARDS THE MEMORY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS.—VAUBAN AND NAPOLEON.—PREPARATORY STUDIES.—VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF FORTIFICATION.—HOW THE FINAL RESOLUTION WAS TAKEN.—INTRODUCTION, DEBATE, AND ADOPTION OF THE BILL.—OPINION OF EUROPE ON THIS MEASURE.

WHEN the ministry of the 29th of October, 1840, formed itself, I fell into no illusion as to the difficulties, dangers, and vexations of the position I

accepted. As in 1831, we undertook to resist, on a question of peace or war, the national inclination. We began to admit that we had engaged too far in the cause of the Pacha of Egypt, that we had relied too much on his power of self-defence, and that the question had neither interest nor basis of sufficient importance to induce France to brave a European war. But although serious and sincere, this tardy return to sound judgment, in face of the abrupt apparition of the truth, was partial and painful. Those even who were most eager to adopt it, felt some uneasiness at their recent ardour, and a considerable portion of the public remained much moved by the reverses of Mehemet Ali, by the check which French policy had received, and irritated beyond measure, although not without cause, against the treaty of the 15th of July, and the proceedings which had accompanied its conclusion. The light which enlightens minds fails to appease passions, and an acknowledged error affords no consolation for a mortifying position. The adversaries of pacific reaction repudiated it the more vehemently, as they were no longer in a condition to indulge their warlike aspirations, and to answer for the results. I felt confident that in the coming struggle, the support of the true, legitimate, and leading interests of the country, would not be withheld from me; but once more I saw myself at issue with popular sentiments and prejudices, the force of which I acknowledged, while I opposed and considered them ill-founded.

There was, moreover, something of embarrassment in my personal position at the moment when I resumed the burden of power. I succeeded a cabinet with which I had been associated for eight months by remaining, according to its wish and under its direction, ambassador in London. For myself, and in my own most rigorous scruples, this embarrassment had no existence; I had clearly explained from the first day, upon what conditions and within what limits, whether in foreign or domestic affairs, I gave my adhesion to the ministry presided over by M. Thiers. As long as we confined ourselves within those bounds, I had loyally seconded and sustained his policy; but as soon as I saw the cabinet preparing to exceed the paths in which I had promised my concurrence, I apprised him that I could not follow in that direction, and after communicating my full opinion on the state of affairs, external and internal, I requested and received permission to repair to Paris at the opening of the Chambers, that I might be in a position to declare my views. In "My Embassy to England," I inserted in detail, with their proper dates, these reservations and their proofs. I had therefore punctiliously fulfilled my engagements, and was, when the new cabinet installed itself, in free possession of my liberty. But the public, within and without the Chambers, knew nothing of this private understanding between the preceding ministry and myself, nor of its vicissitudes; and as it had not been openly apparent, astonishment might readily arise, at

seeing me succeed, with a different policy, the government I had served. Appearances thus existed which nothing but a public statement of facts and situations could effectually dissipate.

Another circumstance, more closely personal still, affected me deeply. I foresaw that my acceptance of power, and the policy I intended to pursue, would lead to the loss of friends who were dear to me. We must have lived in the midst of the passions and contests of a free government to estimate the value and charm of political attachments. In that fiery arena where men hazard and engage, under the eyes of the world, their self-respect and reputation, as well as their fortunes, life is severe and painful; the combat is unsparing and incessant; successes are ever disputed and precarious, failures are signal and galling. In no position are the union of minds and the constancy of personal relations more necessary; in nothing do we more require the support of warm and faithful adherents, and the confidence that a vast measure of true sympathy mingles with the bitternesses and chances of that pitiless war. And when we have possessed these advantages, when we have long marched side by side with generous companions, great indeed is the vexation to see them separate and diverge into paths where the alienation becomes wider from day to day. In 1840, I had to endure this sorrow. The group of political friends, in the midst of whom I had lived until then, broke up permanently: MM. Duchâtel, Dumon, Villemain, Vitet, Hébert, Jouffroy, Renouard,

remained under the same flag with myself; but MM. de Rémusat and Jaubert, who had both sat in the cabinet of M. Thiers, MM. Piscatory and Duvergier de Hauranne, who had approved of and supported his measures to the end, entered, through very different impulses, and at very unequal depths, into the ranks of the opposition that awaited me.

Bossuet goes too far when he describes and fulminates with pious disdain against "the changing wills and deceitful words of politicians, the evasions of promises, the illusions of worldly friendships, which vanish with years and interests, and the profound obscurity of the heart of man, which never knows what it may desire, which often is only imperfectly aware of what it actually wants, and which is no less deceitful and concealed from itself than from others." This sublime painter of human weaknesses and of the errors of life, is too rigorous: all is not fluctuation in the wills of politicians, nor deceit in their words, nor evasion in their promises, nor illusion in their friendships. In the hearts and minds of men devoted to public life, there is more of seriousness, sincerity, and constancy than moralists allow; and not more with them than in the ranks of privacy do friendships entirely fade away with years and interests. In the ardour of political struggles, we demand from men more than we can or ought to expect. Because we require and thirst after strong sympathy, effectual attachment, and enduring union, we feel astonished and irritated when these supports break down. This

is to want freedom of mind and equitable judgment; for thus we forget the inevitable diversity of ideas and situations in proportion as events develop themselves and change, the irremediable insufficiency of realities to satisfy our desires, and all that there is of incomplete, imperfect, and fickle in our best and sincerest relations. These calamities of our nature are neither more common nor more controlling with politicians than with other men; and when they display themselves, the pangs they inflict neither efface the merits which produced sympathy, nor justify their oblivion.

I felt poignantly the grief of the separations I am now referring to; but that sentiment was speedily checked and surmounted by the urgency of the cause and the part I had to sustain. It forms the charm and peril of public life that the interests involved are so great and pressing that every other feeling bows down and disappears before their empire. To decide on peace or war, to give laws to nations, to secure or compromise their prosperity or their glory,—these noble labours absorb the entire soul, and carry thought to such an elevation that all which passes below appears insignificant or indifferent compared with the superior work in hand. I do not hesitate to say that the haughty coldness with which politicians are so often reproached, never infected me, and that my heart was ever open to the ordinary sympathies and regrets, the common joys and sorrows of life. But in the heat of action, in presence of the lead-

ing questions I had to solve, and under the influence of the ideas which occupied my mind, every other consideration and prepossession became secondary, and my personal regrets never reached the point of shaking or overthrowing my constancy.

Moreover, I always carried into public life the disposition of an optimist, ever ready or determined to hope for success. This tendency, at the outset, covers difficulties with a veil, and at a later period renders trials more easy of endurance.

Independently of these indirect considerations, I had superior and more decisive reasons for accepting and feeling gratified with the position into which I was about to enter. In the diplomatic complication which agitated Europe, I saw a brilliant opportunity of exercising and loudly proclaiming a foreign policy, extremely new and bold in fact, though moderate in appearance; the only foreign policy which in 1840 suited the peculiar position of France and her government, as also the only course in harmony with the guiding principles and permanent wants of the great scheme of civilization to which the world of to-day aspires and tends.

The spirit of conquest, of propagandism, and of system, have hitherto been the moving causes and masters of the foreign policy of States. The ambition of princes or peoples has sought its gratification in territorial aggrandisement. Religious or political faith has endeavoured to expand by imposing itself. Great heads of government have attempted to regulate

the destinies of nations according to profound combinations, the offspring rather of their own thought than the natural result of facts. Let us cast a glance over the history of international European relations. We shall see the spirit of conquest, or of armed propagandism, or of some systematic design upon the territorial organization of Europe, inspire and determine the foreign policy of governments. Let one or other of these impulses prevail, and governments have disposed arbitrarily of the fate of nations; war has ever been their indispensable mode of action.

I know that this course of things has been the fatal result of men's passions, and that in spite of those passions and the evils they have inflicted on nations, European civilization has continued to increase and prosper, and may increase and prosper still more. It is to the honour of the Christian world that evil does not stifle good. I know that the progress of civilization and public reason will not abolish human passions, and that, under their impulse, the spirit of conquest, of armed propagandism, and of system will ever maintain, in the foreign policy of States, their place and portion. But at the same time I hold for certain that these various incentives are no longer in harmony with the existing state of manners, ideas, interests, and social instincts, and that it is quite possible to-day to combat and restrain materially their empire. The extent and activity of industry and commerce, the necessity of consulting the general good, the habit of frequent, easy, prompt, and regular intercourse between

peoples, the invincible bias for free association, inquiry, discussion, and publicity,—these characteristic features of great modern society, already exercise, and will continue to exercise more and more, against the warlike or diplomatic fancies of foreign policy, a preponderating influence. People smile, not without reason, at the language and puerile confidence of the *Friends of Peace*, and of the *Peace Societies*; all the leading tendencies, all the most elevated hopes of humanity have their dreams, and their idle gaping advocates, as they have also their days of decline and defeat; but they no less pursue their course, and through all the chimeras of some, the doubts and mockeries of others, society becomes transformed, and policy, foreign and domestic, is compelled to transform itself with society. We have witnessed the most dazzling exploits of the spirit of conquest, the most impassioned efforts of the spirit of armed propagandism; we have seen territories and States moulded and re-moulded, unmade, remade, and unmade again at the pleasure of combinations more or less specious. What survives of all these violent and arbitrary works? They have fallen, like plants without roots, or edifices without foundation. And now, when analogous enterprises are attempted, scarcely have they made a few steps in advance, when they pause and hesitate, as if embarrassed by and doubtful of themselves. So little are they in accord with the real wants, the profound instincts of existing society, and with the persevering, though frequently disputed tendencies of modern civilization.

I say "the persevering though disputed tendencies." We are, in fact, in a singular crisis. At the same time that general ideas, public manners, social interests, and the combined harmony of our civilization, invoke internally, progress by peace and liberty; and externally, patient influence through respect for rights and examples of sound policy, instead of the improvident intervention of force;—at the same time, I repeat, our history since 1789, our endless succession of shocks, revolutions, and wars, have left us in a state of feverish agitation which renders peace insipid, and teaches us to find a blind gratification in the unexpected strokes of a hazardous policy. We are in prey to two opposing currents; one deep and regular, which carries us towards the definitive goal of our social state; the other superficial and disturbed, which throws us here and there in search of new adventures and unknown lands. Thus we float and alternate, between these two opposing directions, called towards the one by our sound sense and moral conviction, and enticed towards the other by our habits of routine, and freaks of imagination.

It was the merit and glory of the government of 1830, that from its first days, it did not hesitate, in presence of this alternative, to comprehend the true and superior spirit of modern civilization, and to adopt it as the rule of its conduct, despite the temptations and menaces of the spirit of armed propagandism and conquest. From 1830 to 1832 this sound and elevated policy triumphed in the struggle. In

1840, when the cabinet of the 29th of October was formed, it was again subjected to a new experiment. Our entire constitutional system, King, Chambers, and Country, were once more called upon to decide whether they would go to war without sufficient and legitimate motives, from routine and enthusiasm, and not for the public interest or necessity.

Notwithstanding the weight of the burden, I esteemed myself happy and honoured in becoming, under this contingency, the interpreter and defender of the policy which had my entire and inmost adhesion. I enjoy enterprises at once rational and difficult, and I know no greater pleasure in public life than that of struggling for a great truth still new and little understood. Nothing, in my eyes, was more important to my country than to escape from the ruts of a dangerous and shortsighted foreign policy, to enter upon paths more dignified and also more secure. During my residence in London, I had convinced myself that with the greater portion of the powers who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, the act was not influenced by any premeditated ill-will towards France and her government, and that despite the proceeding of which we complained, the English cabinet had never ceased to attach high value to its good understanding with France. Austria and Prussia had closely at heart the maintenance of peace. The Emperor Nicholas himself was not at all anxious that his unfriendly disposition should be compelled to assume a bolder aspect. Far therefore from ap-

prehending, in Europe, an attempt to aggravate and encourage, against us, the isolation in which we found ourselves, I had grounds for hoping that efforts would be made to end it, and that my presence in office might prove serviceable to this result. The firm and sincere support of King Louis Philippe was assured to me. Disposed, on the first impulse, not to combat, and sometimes even to adopt popular impressions, he speedily recognized their want of foresight and danger, and then resisted them with persevering courage. He had believed that Mehemet Ali could make a stronger defence, and that the English cabinet would not act without the co-operation of France. But even before he recovered from the double delusion, he foresaw that in this affair, the peace of Europe, the basis of his general policy, might, in the end, become compromised, and I satisfied myself that he was resolved not to drift upon that rock. He, at once, treated me with marked confidence and kindness that no one about him could misconstrue, and all refrained from exhibiting towards me the frivolous coldnesses and petty veiled hostilities, which constitute the impertinent pleasure of the hangers-on of a court. He imparted to me the slightest incidents, as they occurred, as also his own proceedings, wishing to do nothing without my knowledge and advice: "I have just received," he wrote to me on the 31st of October, 1840, "a letter of yesterday's date from King Leopold, who has put some questions to me which I want to answer by this day's post. Before doing so, however,

I should like to have a moment's conversation with you, and I pray you to come to me, if you can." And again, two days later, on the 2nd of November: "the articles in the 'Morning Chronicle,' the 'Times,' and 'Globe,' which I have just read, appear to me important, and I wish you would give me an opportunity of speaking with you without delay. I shall remain within until you arrive, that they may not have to look for me, and to occupy as little of your time as possible." He apprised me of the seeds of discord, of the jealousies or embarrassments which seemed to peep forth in the interior of the cabinet, and employed his utmost care to extinguish them. At the commencement, he had little to do, in this respect. My particular friends, MM. Duchâtel, Humann, and Villemain, filled the principal posts in the administration; Marshal Soult was content with his position, and urged no importunate pretensions; MM. Cunin-Gridaine and Martin (du Nord), represented faithfully that centre of the Chamber of Deputies, which had not followed me, in 1839, in the coalition against M. Molé, but which, in 1840, rallied frankly on my side, pressed by its anxiety for order and peace. I could reckon upon the harmony and common action of the cabinet, as on the support of the King.

At the opening of the session, in the debate on the addresses of both Chambers, in reply to the speech from the throne, the question was plainly stated: "Why has the cabinet of the 29th of October replaced that of the 1st of March?" asked M. Thiers;

"because the cabinet of the 1st of March thought that, under particular conditions, it might be necessary to declare war. What does the cabinet of the 1st of March bring with it? It brings certain peace." I replied on the instant: "The honourable M. Thiers has just said, 'under the ministry of the 29th of October, the question is settled, peace is certain.' The honourable member has only declared half the truth: under the ministry of the 1st of March war was certain. We were both in the right. The two policies confronting each other after the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, led, in fact, one to war, the other to peace." But after thus accepting for both, their true name, I hastened to add: "And now let us not mutually retort these words:—war at any price, peace at any price.—Let us do justice to each other. No, you were not the cabinet of war at any price, neither are we the cabinet of peace at any price. You were a cabinet of intelligent and bold spirits, who thought that the dignity, the interest, and the influence of France called for war in the existing position, and that France should prepare for it now, to be ready by the spring. Well; I thought, and I still think that you deceived yourselves; I believe that in the actual state of things, the interest and honour of France do not call for war; that the treaty of the 15th of July contains no plea for war. Herein lies the true and honest question between us, and the question we have to discuss to-day."

This was, in fact, the object of the debate. An-

other point, entirely personal to myself, was attached to it. Had I sufficiently foreseen the chances of the negotiation with which I was charged? Had I fully represented them to the cabinet of the 1st of March? Had I communicated my difference of opinion as soon as events, and the attitude assumed by the ministry, had excited it? Had I discharged all the duties of an ambassador while maintaining my independence as a deputy? In the preceding volume of these memoirs, when relating the details of my embassy, I have already named what I had to say in reply to these interrogatories. In both Chambers the debate turned essentially on my diplomatic correspondence; of this I have already published all that was important and characteristic; I have no occasion to repeat it here; I have openly recorded my opinion on the causes, as on the bearing of the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, and my personal conduct in the negotiation. My reasons, explanations, and quotations satisfied both Chambers. At the same time they felt and admitted that I neither could nor ought yet to speak of the events which were following their course in the East, and of the fresh negotiations to which they had given rise. On the 18th of November, and the 5th of December, 1840, a considerable and determined majority declared, in both Chambers, their sanction of the policy I was pursuing; and after the formal debate on the two addresses, the cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, felt itself firmly established.

While the policy of peace thus achieved a victory

through public and free discussion, the policy of war also obtained its triumph. On the 30th of November, 1840, at five in the morning, the frigate 'Belle Poule,' commanded by the Prince de Joinville, cast anchor before Cherbourg, bearing from St. Helena the remains of the Emperor Napoleon; and on the 3rd of December, in the midst of an ardent population crowding round the Prince de Joinville, who had disembarked the preceding evening, an unbeneficed priest, the Abbé Rauliné, a chaplain in the navy, said to him, with an emotion participated in by all present, "Will your Royal Highness permit the son of a labouring man, now a naval chaplain, to offer his respectful homage to the son of his king? Perhaps you will pardon me for uniting my feeble voice to the great national cry of France, and for anticipating the judgment of posterity which will assign to you the full credit due for your expedition to St. Helena, and will engrave your name by the side of that of the King, your august father, on the glorious coffin of the great Emperor. Honour to you, Prince! Honour to the monarch of whom you are the worthy son! The cry is not mine alone; I bring it to you freshly uttered by the mouths of two hundred brave invalids, confined, by the toils of service, within the naval hospital of Cherbourg. This is the *vivat* with which they yesterday greeted, in conjunction with the national cannon, your entry into our harbour." The invalids of Cherbourg, and their chaplain, thus truly reflected the public sentiment. At the first moment,

in presence of this generous sympathy on the part of the King, his sons, and his government, for great national reminiscences, all party hatred and personal rivalry were hushed; nothing was seen or heard but the justice rendered by all to all, to the living and the dead, to the victors and the vanquished, to Louis Philippe and Napoleon, to war and to peace. The 'Belle Poule' remained eight days in the port of Cherbourg, while on the road from Havre to Paris, and in Paris itself, preparations were making for the passage and reception of the coffin. We had determined, with the full sanction of the King, to invest this ceremony with the greatest possible solemnity, and to afford unfettered freedom to popular manifestations. On the 8th of December, in presence of all the authorities, the military and naval forces, the national guard of Cherbourg, and a numerous population, the coffin was transferred from the 'Belle Poule' to the steamer 'Normandie,' which immediately departed for Havre, escorted by two other men-of-war. A minor incident, little remembered at present, although mentioned by the journals of the time, attested, in this particular case, the universal concurrence of all generous sentiments. The French flag, which floated from the summit of the mainmast of the 'Normandie,' had been embroidered by English hands; it was the work of the ladies of St. Helena, presented by them to the Prince de Joinville, who promised that it should wave over the coffin of the illustrious prisoner given up by England to France, until Paris

was reached. Between Havre and Rouen, at Val de la Haye, the 'Normandie' was unable to proceed higher up the Seine; a flotilla of six small steamboats waited her arrival, and a second transfer took place. The vessel appointed to receive the coffin ('La Dorade,' No. 8) was pompously decorated. The Prince de Joinville, with appropriate tact, directed all ornaments to be withdrawn, and funeral appendages only to be substituted. His order was thus expressed: "The boat will be painted black; the imperial flag will be hoisted at the masthead; the coffin will be placed on the fore part of the deck, covered with the funeral-pall brought from St. Helena; incense will be burnt; the cross will be placed at the head; the priest will stand before the altar; myself and my staff behind; the sailors will be armed; a cannon fired astern, will announce the vessel bearing the mortal remains of the Emperor. There will be no other decoration." Thus arranged, the funeral procession ascended leisurely up the Seine, finding everywhere, in the fields as in the towns, the population flocking on both sides of the river. It was received in all places with grateful, curious, and respectful admiration, entirely divested of all party feeling. On the 14th of December, as it reached the waters of Neuilly, they remarked, on board the 'Dorade,' a group of four or five ladies assembled on the bank, who waved their handkerchiefs with animation. "It is my mother!" exclaimed the Prince de Joinville. It was, in fact, Queen Marie Amélie, the first to greet, with maternal

joy, her son on his entry into Paris, bearing from St. Helena the mortal remains of Napoleon.

On Tuesday, the 15th of December, before noon, the King, the Queen, the royal family, the Chambers, the ministers, with a serious and silent crowd, were assembled in the Church of the Invalides, under the dome and round the canopy, waiting the arrival of the funeral procession which had started at ten from the shore at Courbevoie, and advanced slowly between ranks of regular troops and national guards, preceded, surrounded, followed, and jostled, indescribably, by a whole people, eager to look upon and approach it. The cold was intense, the atmosphere frozen, the wind piercing; yet nothing checked or discouraged the vast concourse. Upon the whole, that human ocean was calm, divested of all political excitement, and intent upon the spectacle alone. Occasionally, from point to point, and at distinct intervals, in the midst of little groups, dispersed amongst the national guards and the crowd, some factious spirits had met designedly, and declared themselves by shouts of—*Down with Guizot! Down with the ministers! Down with the English! Down with the detached forts!* These cries were not taken up, and no one troubled himself to repress them; they burst forth freely and were lost in the air, without contagion or resistance; a symptom at the same time serious and vain of the contests to which France and her government were still reserved. At two o'clock the procession arrived before the iron gates of the Invalides; the clergy received it under

the portico; a mingled funeral and triumphal march announced its approach; the cannon boomed from without; the national guard presented arms; the pensioners closed ranks and drew sabres; the coffin entered, borne by soldiers and sailors; the Prince de Joinville headed the procession, sword in hand; the King advanced to meet him. "Sire," said the Prince, lowering the point of his weapon to the ground, "I present to you the body of the Emperor Napoleon." "I receive it in the name of France," replied the King; and taking from the hands of Marshal Soult the Emperor's sword, he delivered it to General Bertrand, with these words:—"General Bertrand, I desire you to place the Emperor's sword on his coffin." Then turning to General Gourgaud, he said, "General Gourgaud, place on the coffin the Emperor's hat." These duties performed, the King resumed his place, and the funeral service commenced. It lasted two hours, in the midst of a profound and universal silence which covered the many conflicting emotions excited by this grand spectacle in the souls of the spectators. At five o'clock the ceremony terminated; the King returned to the Tuileries, and the crowd dispersed tranquilly. That evening, the most perfect calm reigned throughout Paris.

I do not wish to speak of the past solely with the experience I have since acquired, and the convictions I at present entertain. I find, in a letter I addressed three days after, on the 18th of December, to one of my friends, Baron Mounier, at that time absent from

Paris, the faithful expression of the effect produced upon me at the moment when this incident occurred, and the judgment I then formed:—"Behold us, my dear friend," I wrote to him, "safely cleared from our second defile. Napoleon and a million of French people have found themselves in contact, under the fire of a conspiring press, and not a spark has been elicited. We are more in the right than we think. In spite of many evil appearances and actual weaknesses, this country desires order, peace, and good government. Our revolutionary squalls are factitious and transient. They would sweep all before them, were they not resisted; but when opposed, they stop, like those huge fires of straw kindled by children in the streets, but to which no one brings solid aliment. The spectacle of Tuesday was beautiful. It was purely a spectacle. Our adversaries had promised themselves two things—a riot against me, and a demonstration of warlike feeling. Both expectations failed. All was confined to a few cries evidently preconcerted, and not at all contagious. The disappointment is great, for the labour had been active. On Tuesday evening no one could have suspected what had occurred in the morning. Already it has ceased to be talked of. The general difficulties of the government subsist still, ever the same, and immense. The menacing incidents are dissipated; Mehemet Ali remains in Egypt, and Napoleon reposes at the Invalides."

My first impulse, on re-perusing this letter to-day,

is to smile mournfully at my confidence. The soul and the life of nations have infinite depths, into which day cannot penetrate, except by unforeseen explosions, and nothing is more deceptive as to what is concealed and in preparation there, than a superficial and momentary success. In December, 1840, on the arrival of the remains of Napoleon, things passed as I have just described them; a great memory and a grand spectacle; nothing more appeared, and the friends of liberty and peace were justified in believing that the imperial system was buried definitively in the coffin of the Emperor. I do not regret our mistake. It did not create the events which have revealed it. It is not because King Louis Philippe and his advisers re-erected the statue of Napoleon, and brought his remains from St. Helena, that the imperial name was found to be powerful in the midst of the social perturbation of 1848. The monarchy of 1830 would not have gained a day by showing itself jealous, fearful, and anxious to stifle the reminiscences of the Empire. And in this subordinate attempt, it would have lost the glory of the liberty it respected, and of the generosity it displayed towards its enemies. A glory which attaches to it after its reverses, and is also a power that death cannot assail.

Simultaneously with our brilliant accomplishment of the obsequies of Napoleon, we brought before the chambers another question, more political and less popular, raised also by the preceding cabinet, and left for our solution;—the question of the fortifications of

Paris. More than two centuries earlier, in the midst of the great wars of Louis XIV., Vauban had suggested it. Napoleon took it into consideration, even before he was compelled to defend the capital of France after having invaded nearly all those of continental Europe. The fear of rendering the inhabitants uneasy, and the incredible rapidity of events, prevented him, as he tells us himself in his 'Memoirs,' from carrying out this great idea. Under the Restoration, in 1818, Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, after having re-modelled the army, instructed a grand commission, called "Committee of Defence," to examine the condition of the fortresses, and to point out all that was required for the safety of the kingdom. After studying the subject for three years and a half, that commission delivered to the minister of war a report in which it insisted strongly on the necessity of fortifying Lyons and Paris. After the revolution of July, from 1830 to 1834, the idea was resumed; King Louis Philippe entered warmly into it; Marshal Soult put his hand to the work; operations commenced and funds were asked for from the Chambers, at first on a small scale and without display. But when, in 1833, by the demand of a special credit of thirty-five millions, the enterprise revealed itself in its full extent, economical objections and popular disquiet, manifested themselves; financiers bowed their heads despondingly; the citizens of Paris fluctuated between their patriotic zeal and the terrors of a siege. In the Chambers and in the daily papers, the opposition

took advantage of these various apprehensions and fomented them with ardour. The men of war, declared partisans of the measure, furnished the arms themselves; they were divided in opinion; some demanded for the defence of Paris, a strong enclosing wall continuous and bastioned; others, a certain number of detached forts, established at a distance from the city, according to the configuration of the ground, and which, they held, would be sufficient to cover the approaches. Both systems were supported by soldiers of high reputation. General Haxo and Marshal Clauzel were for the continuous enclosure; Generals Rogniat and Bernard, and Marshal Soult himself, recommended the detached forts. The opposition furiously attacked the last project, imputing to power the design of using the forts to overawe Paris, rather than to repulse a foreign foe. In the midst of this contest between theories and parties, the works remained suspended. In 1836, and to put an end to this agitated paralysis, Marshal Maison, at that time minister of war, instituted a second committee of defence, with instructions to examine thoroughly the two systems, and to propose a final decision. After another three years of deliberation and discussion, this commission pronounced both plans imperfect and inadequate, and that to make them efficacious they ought to be combined and rendered mutually available in a fixed proportion, according to the duties assigned to each. The treatise in which this new scheme, with the leading reasons for its adoption, was explained, reached

the hands of King Louis Philippe in May, 1840; and two months had scarcely elapsed before the treaty of the 15th of July induced its prompt execution.

The very day on which the signature of this treaty at London, was announced in the 'Moniteur' at Paris (the 27th of July, 1840), the Duke of Orleans summoned to St. Cloud one of his aides-de-camp, M. de Chabaud Latour, at that time a lieutenant-colonel in the engineers, whose character and ability he held in equal estimation: "Well," said he, "we have often talked of fortifying Paris; we are now at the foot of the wall; how do you think we ought to settle this question?" "Your Royal Highness," replied M. de Chabaud, "knows my opinion. To fortify Paris, we require a continuous enclosure with detached forts; an enclosure to prevent the enemy from penetrating through the large gaps of two or three thousand mètres between each fort; and forts to save the population from the horrors of a siege, and to render the circle of investment so extensive that it would become almost impossible, even to the most numerous armies." —"This is entirely my own view," replied the Prince; here are a map and a pencil; trace the enclosure." The young officer, who, since his return from Algeria in 1830, had been employed in the works commenced for the defence of Paris, and had made that subject his principal study, immediately traced the circuit which the enclosure ought approximately to follow. "Good," said the Duke; "now place the forts." M. de Chabaud marked fifteen positions on both banks

of the Seine, which appeared to him indispensable. "And now," added the Duke of Orleans, "bring this plan with you, and let us go to M. Thiers." Both repaired instantly to Auteuil, where M. Thiers then resided. M. de Chabaud then explained in detail to the president of the council the plan he had traced upon the chart, and which had been selected in 1836 by the committee of defence instituted by Marshal Maison, as the only complete and effective system. The three interlocutors discussed the sum total of expense, the permanency of the works, the number of hands they would require, and the employment of troops in their construction. "Can you draw up for me," said M. Thiers to the young officer, "a detailed plan, and what time will it require?"—"Six days, I think, will suffice."—"Take them; we have many preliminary questions to settle between this and then, touching this great affair; as soon as your plan is ready, we will lay it before the council."

Aided by all the ministerial documents collected from Vauban down to General Dode de la Brunerie, reporter of the Commission of 1836, M. de Chabaud Latour, at the expiration of six days, completed his task, traced the entire plan of the fortifications, enclosure, and forts, discussed the modes of execution, and calculated minutely the expense, which, according to him, ought not to exceed one hundred and forty millions. Before taking this statement to the Duke of Orleans, he requested his permission to submit it to Marshal Vaillant, at that date a brigadier-general,

commandant of the Polytechnic School, for a long time aide-de-camp to General Haxo, and already looked upon in the engineers as one of the most eminent officers of that arm. After minutely scrutinizing the work of the young lieutenant-colonel, "I am ready," said General Vaillant to him, "to sign this project with both hands; tell the Duke of Orleans so, and add, that I request, as a favour, for which I shall be profoundly grateful, to be called to co-operate, in any post he may select, in the execution of this thoroughly national undertaking, which has my entire conviction." Strong in this support, the Prince and his aide-de-camp returned to M. Thiers, who, without hesitation, approved of a work conformable with the ideas he had himself conceived and already expressed on the subject. The King's consent was the next step to accomplish. He was not yet convinced of the necessity of the continuous enclosure, and inclined to believe that the forts would suffice for the defence of Paris, to which opinion he ardently adhered. The subject was several times discussed in his presence, in cabinet councils and at special conferences. During this interval, the opposition journals, aware of the King's predilection for the system of forts, attacked it every morning, and vehemently advocated the continuous enclosure. At last, one day at St. Cloud, after a long conversation between the King, the Duke of Orleans, M. Thiers, General Cubières, at that time minister of war, and the young framer of the proposed plan, the King exclaimed, with the familiar gaiety

which often accompanied his resolutions: "Come, Chartres, we adopt your project. I know well, that to enable us to carry the point of the fortifications of Paris, they must cry in the streets, Down with Louis Philippe! The continuous enclosure for ever!"

The resolution once adopted, the speedy results are well known. Extraordinary credits were opened; many workmen and vast supplies were collected. General Dode de la Brunerie, the senior lieutenant-general of engineers, and president of the committee of fortifications, was appointed to superintend the undertaking. A scientific and experienced officer, as conscientious as able, and extremely careful of his personal dignity, while at the same time devoted to his duties as soldier and citizen, he only accepted this great mission after a severe examination of the scheme, its conditions and means, and a prudent selection of his co-operators. All applied themselves to the task without delay. When the cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, entered on office, the question of the fortifications of Paris was decided, the plan adopted, the works everywhere commenced, and carrying on with energy.

We accepted this inheritance without hesitation. I did not deceive myself as to its obligations. On very opposite grounds, the fortifications of Paris and the system adopted, displeased many of my own political friends, and of the most ardent followers of the opposition. The former saw therein a relic of the policy of the preceding cabinet, a chance of war through

the confidence which the partisans of war would thence derive, and all the dangers of a siege for Paris, should war break out. The latter became alarmed at the strength which power would thus acquire against popular movements in the capital. In the opinion of the first, a sort of challenge was offered to Europe; while the last considered that a great obstacle was raised to freedom of revolutions. In time of war, the continuous enclosure made Paris a prison; in time of peace, the detached forts were so many Bastilles by which the city was surrounded. Advocates for financial order were terrified at the enormous expense, impossible, as they said, to estimate or limit with exactness. These objections and obstacles found, even in the bosom of the cabinet, a dangerous support. M. Humann openly evinced his discontent, and Marshal Soult, when presenting the bill, expressly declared his persistent disapproval of the continuous enclosure. "I have never abandoned," he said, "the opinion I was called on to declare on this same question in 1831, 1832, and 1833; but I considered that the moment had not yet arrived for repeating it. Thus I have studiously laid it aside until the entire subject came before the Chamber. But I owe to it and to myself the declaration that I still reserve that early opinion which neither time nor circumstances have weakened."

To surmount these difficulties, two conditions were indispensable. Externally, and in our relations with Europe, it was necessary that the fortifications of Paris

should evidently bear the character of a defensive step, intended to prevent, much rather than to provoke war; and in harmony with the pacific policy we were maintaining. Internally, and in the Chambers, a complete concert on this point was essential, between the recent and the existing cabinet, and that they should mutually defend the measure against its different adversaries. On these terms alone could a majority be formed and the passing of the bill secured. The case involved a diplomatic and a parliamentary question, equally pressing and delicate.

To solve the first, I did not content myself with seizing, in the course of the debate, every opportunity that offered of thoroughly establishing the political bearing of the bill, and the moral effect which the fortification of Paris, once established, could not fail to produce in the interest of European peace. As soon as the law was voted in the Chamber of Deputies, I wrote to the representatives of France in Europe, especially to Count Bresson, the King's minister at Berlin, whom I knew to be zealous and skilful in disseminating through Germany our views and words: "Paris is half fortified. I have considered it highly important to attach to the bill its true and fundamental character, as a pledge of peace and an evidence of strength. This was necessary for our external relations, and also for the Chamber itself. If I had not convinced three-fourths of the conservative party that the measure harmonized with their policy as well as with ours, it would infallibly have fallen

through. Endeavour constantly in your language to maintain the physiognomy I am anxious to impress on it. Neither menace nor fear; neither agitating nor agitated; extremely pacific and extremely watchful. Let no act or word on your part derogate from this double character of our policy. This is our only method of recovering at the same time security and influence."

The parliamentary question caused us more embarrassment than the diplomatic one. This was not produced by any difficulty of concord, in the debate and vote, between the old and the new cabinet. M. Thiers and his colleagues were the original parties interested. Their resolutions and acts were what we required the Chambers to sanction. In adopting these resolutions and acts, and in the introduction of the bill which embodied them, we accepted the responsibility for ourselves, but without releasing its first proposers, and they were called upon, equally with us, to desire that the bill and its double system of fortifications should pass into law. This reciprocal position was perfectly understood and loyally accepted on both sides. M. Thiers and his colleagues resolutely supported the bill we as resolutely introduced. It was within the cabinet and from the attitude of its president that the embarrassment emanated. As we have seen, Marshal Soult, when presenting the bill, formally reserved his personal opinion against the continous enclosure and in favour of the detached forts alone. Participating in the Marshal's convictions, and perhaps also in com-

pliance with his secret desire, one of his intimate friends, General Schneider, his minister of war in the cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839, made this idea the object of a formal amendment, and proposed in the bill, the suppression of the continuous enclosure. The adversaries of that system eagerly seized this chance of ejecting the clause. A long discussion ensued, Marshal Soult entered into it to explain his position, while maintaining, on this point, his opinion against the bill he had himself presented. His explanations aggravated instead of dissipating the confusion of the debate. It might have been thought from what he said,—and the adversaries of the continuous enclosure laboured to impress the belief—that the President of the Council abandoned the bill to attack and would willingly see it mutilated. Suspicion pervaded the partisans of the continuous enclosure; the loyalty of the cabinet seemed questionable, and the fate of the bill became extremely doubtful. I rose and spoke on the instant; "I hold much more," I exclaimed, "to the clearness of situations than to that of ideas, and to consequences rather than to arguments in conduct. Let the Chamber permit me to declare; and let no one feel offended at my words, my full opinion on the subject now under consideration. The question is so serious that I must endeavour to place it, in its nudity, before the eyes of the Chamber. This is the only mode of bringing it to issue. The President of the Council, several years since, expressed on the means of fortifying Paris, an opinion entitled to the respect of

the Chamber and of France, for no one can, on such a question, define his ideas with so much authority. What has he recently done? He has yielded, in the cabinet, to the opinion of his colleagues; he has presented in the name of the King's government, the bill which, in the actual state of affairs, his colleagues have considered the best, and at the same time he has reserved the free expression of his old views, and respect for his personal antecedents. A debate springs up here on this subject. The President of the Council will, I am sure, allow me to say plainly, it is not surprising that he should fail to bring to this tribune the same tactical skill he has so often exhibited elsewhere; it is not to be wondered at that he should be less practised here than elsewhere in delivering and winning battles. It has happened to men more accustomed to the tribune than the President of the Council, to find themselves in the position in which he now finds himself. Mr. Pitt and Mr. Canning have often spoken against measures proposed by the ministry to which they belonged; they have not only reserved their opinions, but have formally combated the propositions of their cabinet. Mr. Pitt and Mr. Canning were exclusively parliamentary men, practised in extricating themselves from the difficulties of such positions. The President of the Council has sought and found his glory in other fields. His conduct to-day is perfectly simple. In maintaining his former opinion, he has merely exercised a right consecrated by the institutions and habits of free countries. But the bill

which he has presented in the name of the government remains entire. It is always the government bill. The cabinet supports it, the President of the Council himself supports it, as the thought, the act, the permanent intention of the cabinet. He has just now read it again. I support it in my turn. I persist in saying that, in the conviction of the King's government the entire bill is the best mode, technically the most effective, and politically the only effective mode, of settling the great question now in debate."

On returning to my bench, I said to M. Duchâtel, who sat beside me: "I think the bill is safe."—"Yes," he whispered in my ear, "you have saved the bill, but you may have killed the cabinet."—"Make yourself easy," I replied; "the Marshal is somewhat susceptible, but he cares more for the duration of the cabinet than for the rejection of the continuous enclosure." General Schneider's amendment was thrown out, and all doubt disappeared as to the passing of the bill. I called on the Marshal the same evening, and found him alone with the duchess, playing at Patience. "My dear President," I said, "I feel convinced that you understood and approved what I said this morning; if General Schneider's amendment had passed, our bill was lost and the cabinet along with it." He replied with sly gravity, "You manœuvred excellently; you have delivered the government from a great embarrassment. On leaving the chamber, I went to the King, and complimented him on the result. I repeat the same to you." I found, in fact, when I returned home,

a note from the King couched thus:—"My dear minister, I am impatient to congratulate you on the brilliant success you obtained to-day, and to thank you, in addition, for the great service you have rendered to France and to myself. I am happy to add that the Marshal, who brought me the details, participates in my satisfaction."

Either from nature, or habits of command, Marshal Soult in government affairs, and as respected his own position, had great instincts which supplied the place of what he sometimes wanted in elevation of mind and sustained dignity.

Abroad, the adoption of the fortifications of Paris produced the full effect, and precisely the quality of effect we desired. Count Bresson wrote to me from Berlin on the 5th of February, 1841; "You will be gratified by hearing what they say of you in all quarters, and the good wishes formed for the success of the administration to which you belong. That these wishes will not prove barren, your triumph in the debate on the bill for the fortifications of Paris is a pledge. You have indeed made the triumph *your own*, and, unless I deceive myself radically, you have rendered an incalculable service to our country. I have less right than any one to constitute myself a judge of systems; but I see clearly that the course we have adopted overthrows many calculations and baffles many hopes. The worst-intentioned go so far as to say, 'Why allow them to turn to advantage the five years necessary for the accomplishment of their

work? We must prevent them.' But these impetuous suggestions find no access to the men who direct the cabinet here. Your words, moreover, have calmed a portion of their uneasiness; the only desire is that you may remain long in a position to reduce them personally to practice." And on the 14th of February following, at the moment when the bill introduced on the 1st of February to the Chamber of Peers seemed likely to encounter serious resistance there; "I do not believe," M. Bresson wrote again, "that the Chamber of Peers can refuse to France a guarantee of *peace and strength*, so materially owing to you. I shall continue to repeat until my voice fails me, that the fortifications, more than anything else, are calculated to produce an effect abroad, to restrain foreign aggression, and to give freedom and ease to the exercise of our just influence."

In 1844, during the visit in which I accompanied King Louis Philippe to Windsor Castle, the Duke of Wellington said to me one day: "Your fortifications of Paris have closed that era of wars of invasion and rapid marches on capitals which Napoleon opened. They have almost effected for you what the Ocean has done for us. If the sovereigns of Europe believed me on this point, they would all do the same. I know not whether wars would, in consequence, be less long or deadly, but beyond doubt they would be less revolutionary. By this example you have rendered a great service to the security of States and to European order."

CHAPTER II.

AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.—CONVENTION OF JULY THE 13TH, 1841.

SITUATION OF FRANCE AFTER THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY, 1840.—CHARACTER OF HER ISOLATION AND ARMAMENTS.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CABINETS.—LORD PALMERSTON'S DISPATCH OF THE 2ND OF NOVEMBER, 1840.—ITS EFFECT IN FRANCE.—CAPTURE OF ST. JOHN D'ACRE BY THE ENGLISH.—MEHEMET ALI IS THREATENED IN EGYPT.—MISSION OF BARON MOUNIER TO LONDON.—WORDS OF PRINCE METTERNICH.—COMMODORE NAPIER ARRIVES BEFORE ALEXANDRIA, INDUCES MEHEMET ALI TO TREAT, AND CONCLUDES A CONVENTION WITH HIM, WHICH PROMISES THE RIGHT OF INHERITANCE IN EGYPT.—ANGER OF THE SULTAN AND OF LORD PONSONBY ON RECEIVING THIS INTELLIGENCE.—THE NAPIER CONVENTION IS DISAVOWED AT CONSTANTINOPLE, ALTHOUGH APPROVED IN LONDON.—CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT CONSTANTINOPLE WITH REDSCHID PACHA.—HATTI SHERIFF OF THE 13TH FEBRUARY, 1841, WHICH ONLY GRANTS TO MEHEMET ALI AN INCOMPLETE AND PRECARIOUS INHERITANCE OF EGYPT.—INTERVIEW OF LORD PALMERSTON WITH CHEKIB EFFENDI.—OUR EXPECTANT ATTITUDE AND PRECAUTIONS.—PROJECT OF A PROTOCOL AND OF A NEW CONVENTION FOR THE RE-ENTRANCE OF FRANCE INTO THE EUROPEAN COALITION.—CONDITIONS WHICH WE ATTACH TO IT.—I AUTHORIZE BARON DE BOURQUENEY TO SIGN THE TWO PROJECTED ACTS PROVISIONALLY, BUT NOT DEFINITIVELY.—EFFORT OF PRINCE METTERNICH AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—CHANGE OF TURKISH MINISTRY.—NEW HESITATIONS OF THE PORTE.—IT FINALLY GIVES WAY, AND AWARDS THE HEREDITARY RULE IN EGYPT TO MEHEMET ALI BY A NEW FIRMAN OF THE 25TH OF MAY, 1841.—FRESH DELAY IN LONDON AS TO THE SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL AND CONVENTION.—THE FALL OF THE WHIG MINIS-

TRY APPEARS IMMINENT.—MEHEMET ALI ACCEPTS THE FIRMAN OF THE 25TH OF MAY, 1841.—I AUTHORIZE BARON DE BOURQUENEY TO SIGN THE CONVENTION.—IT IS SIGNED ON THE 13TH OF JULY, 1841. —SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATION AND ITS RESULTS.

WHILE we were discussing the addresses in the Chambers, and receiving at the Invalides the coffin of Napoleon, the execution of the treaty of the 13th of July pursued its course in the East, and we assumed in Europe the position which that treaty had assigned to us. I lost no time in my correspondence with our foreign agents in clearly laying down that position, and the attitude it prescribed to them. I wrote thus on the 10th of December, 1840, to Count de Sainte-Aulaire, the King's ambassador at Vienna:—"Of all that has passed, two facts remain for us—our isolation and our armaments. By the isolation frankly accepted, we gain some dignity and much liberty. That liberty is advantageous to us, and will become more so every day; for, as regards the other Powers, success will be followed by embarrassments, disagreements, and jealousies; and in proportion as all these arrive they will bring to all a desire for reconciliation with us. We shall see this desire manifest itself. Isolation is not a state to be deliberately selected, or in which to continue for ever; but when we are there, let us remain tranquil until we can emerge from it with advantage.

"We have no intention of separating ourselves from the general affairs of Europe. We are convinced that it is to our interest to mingle with them,

and for the benefit of all that we should do so. They have done without us; we must let them feel and say that we are wanted again. In the state of Europe, I believe that great affairs of necessity require the concurrence of all leading governments. Neither isolation, nor the fractional division and formation of separate camps is good policy for any. There are superior interests which for a long time will demand European concert and unity; and there can be neither concert nor unity in Europe while France is excluded.

"I have just fought for peace. In my idea, beyond the maintenance of peace I have always had in perspective the re-establishment of European concert. But we shall wait for it; and to wait with security and convenience we have completed our armaments.

"They were necesssary. Our material, our cavalry, artillery, arsenals, and fortresses were not in a satisfactory condition. They will be so henceforth, and will continue such as we may deem suitable. The permanent part of our military establishment, that which is not formed suddenly, will emerge from this crisis essentially improved.

"As to our strength in men, we shall keep it up to the present mark as long as the actual situation continues.

"The more I reflect, the more I satisfy myself, my dear friend, that this is the only course and attitude that becomes us. The King is thoroughly convinced of it. Act so that it may be well understood in Vienna. This, for the moment, is the only instruc-

tion I send also to Berlin, London, and St. Petersburgh."

We had not to wait long without seeing how much these two facts, the isolation and armaments of France, disturbed and weighed on Europe. The new cabinet was scarcely formed, when in Vienna, in Berlin, and even in London, politicians began to seek some method of promptly terminating the position. The cessation of intimate relations between France and England suited Prince Metternich, provided that it did not go so far as to menace the peace of Europe; and although determined not to separate himself from the English cabinet, he was far more desirous to check than to follow Lord Palmerston. He directed the Austrian ambassador, Prince Esterhazy, to return to London, charging him to adhere strictly to the treaty of the 15th of July, and at the same time to soften its consequences. These were dreaded even more at Berlin than at Vienna, and Baron de Bülow, who had left London on leave, returned suddenly with instructions aided by his own personal desire, to use his utmost activity and ability for the speedy return of France to European concert. Amongst the members of the English cabinet, who, from the commencement of the affair, had exhibited a more sincere than effectual disposition for the French alliance, there were some, Lord Clarendon in particular, who were eager and anxious in seconding the pacific efforts of the German diplomatists. "The cabinet recently formed in Paris," they said, "cannot last but by a sacrifice on

the part of the powers who have signed the treaty of the 15th of July."—"Yes," replied Baron de Bourqueney, to whom I had entrusted in London this delicate negotiation, "France requires a concession unconnected with this treaty." But what concession could be made to the Pacha of Egypt, to give satisfaction to France? Various expedients were suggested. Such, for instance, as the island of Candia left to Mehemet Ali, the pachalic of Tripoli given to one of his sons, the suspension of hostilities, and the territorial *status quo* in Syria until the issue of new negotiations. While the debates in the French Chambers were in progress, the diplomatists assembled in London employed themselves with more solicitude than hope in their attempts at reconciliation. M. de Bourqueney supplied me with a highly intelligent account of their goings and comings, their interviews and overtures. I replied: "Two sentiments are involved here, the desire of peace and the national honour. The feeling of France, I say of France and not of the turbulent and factious, is, that she has been treated lightly; that her alliance, her friendship, and her co-operation have been inconsiderately sacrificed, without sufficient motive, for a secondary interest. Herein lies the leading mischief produced by the treaty of the 15th of July, and the great obstacle to the policy of peace. To cure this evil, to remove this obstacle, it must be proved to France that she has deceived herself; that much value is attached to her alliance, friendship, and co-operation,

and that a sacrifice will be made in evidence of this. It is not the amount, but the fact of the sacrifice, that signifies.

"Let something be offered, distinct from the convention of the 15th of July, with the desire of restoring a good understanding with France, and with the wish of seeing her, once more, in concert: peace may then be preserved, and general harmony re-established in Europe. If this is represented to you as practicable, I am ready to take the necessary steps to accomplish the object, and to incur the responsibility; but I wish to make no movement without knowing that such an end is within scope of attainment. The policy of agreement is preferable to the policy of isolation, if agreement really exists: but should it mean only abandonment on our part, isolation is to be preferred. At all events, these are, in my opinion, your two rules of conduct: to treat really with Lord Palmerston and not against him; to neglect nothing that may influence the atmosphere in which Lord Palmerston lives to act upon him in accordance with our views. The result depends on him."

At this precise juncture, a new incident, emanating from Lord Palmerston, rendered reconciliation more difficult. It is well known that on the 8th of October, 1840, M. Thiers, in his last communication to the English cabinet, had declared that "France, disposed to take part in any admissible arrangement that should be based on the double guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and the Viceroy of Egypt, could not con-

sent to the execution of the decree of forfeiture pronounced against Mehemet Ali on the 14th of September at Constantinople." It is also known that, on the 15th of October, prompted by the impression which this declaration on the part of the French government had made on his colleagues and himself. Lord Palmerston instructed Lord Ponsonby to arrange with the representatives of Austria, Prussia and Russia, at Constantinople, that they should conjointly and strenuously recommend the Sultan, not only to reinstate Mehemet Ali as Pacha of Egypt, but to give him also the hereditary investiture of that pachalic, in conformity with the conditions specified in the treaty of the 15th of July, provided he signified his submission to the Sultan, and pledged himself to restore the Turkish fleet, as also to withdraw his troops from all Syria, from Adana, and the Holy Cities. After this step of the English government, I felt myself fully authorized when assuming, on the 29th of October, the direction of foreign affairs, to consider the hereditary establishment of Mehemet Ali in Egypt as settled, provided he complied with the prescribed conditions. But, on the 5th of November, Lord Granville communicated to me a dispatch from Lord Palmerston, dated on the 2nd, which seemed to have for its object the removal of that conviction. Lord Palmerston reverted to M. Thiers's dispatch of the preceding 8th of October, discussed its arguments, and laid down "that the Sultan, as sovereign of the Turkish empire, had the sole right of

deciding to which of his subjects he would confide the government of any specific portion of his states; that the foreign powers, whatever might be their ideas on this subject, could only offer the Sultan advice, and that none of them had any right to fetter him in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and essential attributes of independent sovereignty." This, in principle, was to annul the counsel which Lord Palmerston had given to the Porte, and to provoke the Sultan to maintain the absolute forfeiture of Mehemet Ali, which fifteen days before he had been urged to recall.

Lord Palmerston did not confine himself to the simple communication of his dispatch to me; it was published on the 10th of November in the 'Morning Chronicle.' The effect in France was lamentable. I wrote thus to Baron de Bourqueney, on the 14th of November:—"This document is looked upon here as a veiled retractation of the step taken, less than a month since, with the Porte, to engage it not to persist in the deposition of Mehemet Ali. I resist this idea; I maintain that Lord Palmerston has only meant, as he says in conclusion, to consider a question of principles, and to declare explicitly his own. But the effect is still not the less produced. Our adversaries take advantage of it, and our friends are disturbed. This is the first communication Lord Palmerston has addressed to the new cabinet. How does it differ from what he would have written to our predecessors? Why has this dispatch been pub-

lished in the 'Morning Chronicle,' and with so much eagerness? Signify, my dear Baron, both to the English cabinet and to our friends in London the sentiment I now express, and the mischief that has been done to us."

M. de Bourqueney felt no embarrassment in sharply communicating my complaint. Lord Palmerston's dispatch had excited amongst the friends of peace in London nearly as much surprise and blame as in Paris. People asked themselves whether it did not exhibit the mere mania of controversy, and whether that mania concealed the desire of consummating the ruin of Mehemet Ali, and of breaking down every species of accommodation. "I have just left Lord Palmerston," M. de Bourqueney replied to me on the 18th of November; "he began by apologizing for the date of his dispatch of the 2nd. 'I regret extremely,' he said, 'that my answer to M. Thiers's dispatch of the 8th of October should have been, of necessity, addressed to his successor; but you know how my time is occupied. Days passed by, the cabinet of M. Thiers retired, and my reply reached the hands of M. Guizot. I assure you my intention in writing it was good; I thought it necessary, even in the interest of the policy of conciliation, to refute some of the arguments in the dispatch of the 8th of October, because those arguments, passing as accepted by us, would encourage the prolongation of the strife we anxiously desire to terminate. But, believe me, my preceding declarations subsist still; I retract none

of them; Mehemet Ali is yet free to preserve hereditary rule in Egypt. If a different conclusion has been drawn from my dispatch of the 2nd of November, I disavow it.'"

I was then, and still remain, convinced that this disavowal was sincere. Nothing is more rare in politics than simple resolutions, and the exclusive pursuit of a single end, without deduction or complaisance for secret desires which exceed the real and avowed purpose. Lord Palmerston did not premeditate the utter ruin of Mehemet Ali; his serious intention amounted only to confirming and strengthening at Constantinople and in the East, the position of England, by weakening a rival subject of the Sultan, and a favourite client of France. But when a chance of the entire destruction of Mehemet Ali presented itself to his mind, he did not reject it frankly, and thus gave himself the air of encouraging it. Moreover, he could not resolve to pass by the arguments of an adversary, without opposing his own, and he voluntarily accepted a political embarrassment to obtain a logical success. He wrote his dispatch of the 2nd of November without caring to sustain or harm me, to support, in general thesis, against M. Thiers, who had fallen, the Sultan's rights of sovereignty, and also to incline Mehemet Ali to submission, by giving him a glimpse of the extreme peril which might reach him if he remained contumacious.

He might have spared himself this appearance of ill feeling, and reserved intentions. The events he had

foreseen, served him better than the arguments he took pleasure in displaying. While the diplomatists in London wearied themselves in hunting out some combination which, terminating the isolation of France, might equally end their inquietudes, the insurrection in Syria, fomented by Lord Palmerston, burst out against Mehemet Ali. The Emir Beschir, recently Governor of the Libanus in the pacha's name, abandoned the Egyptian cause without saving himself by his defection. Saïda, Tyre, and Tripoli surrendered at sight of the English squadron, and the Turkish troops disembarked. Ibrahim Pacha and his demoralized army fell back into the interior. Finally, on the 3rd of November, after resisting for a few hours, St. John d'Acre fell into the power of Admiral Stopford; and on receipt of this news Prince Metternich wrote as follows to Baron de Neumann, still accredited in London, on the Egyptian question:—

"Let France no longer retain her delusion as to Syria; it is irrevocably and entirely gone; we must think of Egypt; mischief increases on that side; not a moment should be lost in persuading Mehemet Ali to submission."

The only effect this intelligence produced in London was to increase Lord Palmerston's confidence in himself, his ascendancy over his colleagues, and to end the petty labour undertaken to bring about some concessions extraneous to the treaty of the 15th of July. "M. de Bülow is thrown from his saddle," M. de Bourqueney wrote on the 8th of November;

"he told me this morning that he expects from Berlin, within a few days, a dispatch analogous to that of M. de Metternich. You may judge by this that he considers his mission at an end." The Lord Mayor of London gave a grand dinner on the 9th of November, to which the ministers and foreign diplomatists were invited. Sir Robert Peel, who was present, leaned over to Baron de Bourqueney and said, in a low tone, "Events move on rapidly in Syria. They say Egypt is to be attacked. This makes me very anxious on the European question." In Paris, the surprise equalled and aggravated the uneasiness. The weakness of Mehemet Ali in Syria was an unexpected revelation, presaging a similar result in Egypt. A clever man who had resided some time in the East, M. Aphonse Royer, wrote as follows to me on November 16, from Constantinople:—"It is impossible not to ask oneself, with heart-breaking anguish, how it has happened that the French government, which employs so many agents, at such an enormous expense, in all these countries, should not have known, before acting, the physical and moral state of Egypt and Syria. Has it believed in an Arabian empire, enthroned by a Turkish pacha, and in the affection of the Arabs for a government constructed upon the old Turkish system, under which the natives cannot obtain the most insignificant command, or the meanest employment? Has it thought that to work a country like a colonial farm was the way to civilize it? Has it never been presented with a picture of the suffer-

ings of this wretched people, amongst whom mothers deprive their children of one eye, to exonerate them from statute labour? And when the Christians of the Libanus, who had risen against their oppressors, implored mercy after their defeat, and were only answered by monstrous executions, how has it happened that their groans and their anguish have been transformed into a concert of praises in the official reports transmitted to the French ministry? This would be conceivable if the King's government drew its information from the same sources with the French journals, which are directly supplied from Alexandria, by express order of Mehemet Ali. The viceroy has the talent of conciliating, by his anxious, delicate attentions and amiable manners, every one from whom he can expect a verbal or written eulogium. All travellers of any note who have passed through Egypt, have submitted to this influence. The most clear-sighted and conscientious suppress their judgment. When we speak of the prodigies effected by the genius of Mehemet Ali, this is apparently not the least."

In presence of these errors, and under the fear of seeing more proclaimed, several of my friends in the Chambers, amongst others the Chancellor Pasquier, the Duke Decazes, Count Gasparin, M. Barthe, and M. Laplagne-Barris asked themselves and me whether it would not be well for one amongst them, without official mission or diplomatic character, to pass some weeks in London, to observe the disposition of minds,

to converse freely with men of influence, and thus to estimate, without prejudice or routine, the chances of the future. I did not imagine that such a visit could in any manner alter the information I had received from Baron de Bourqueney, or the ideas I had formed of the actual state of things; but I had no reason, on my own account, for refusing to accede to it, and I knew M. de Bourqueney sufficiently well to feel quite sure that the trifling annoyance it might give him, would neither affect his judgment nor his zeal. I therefore entertained the proposition, and requested Baron Mounier, one of my most judicious and independent political supporters, to undertake this mission of free observation. He consented, with friendly readiness, and left Paris for London on the 21st of November, to verify my information and presentiments.

Far from dissipating, his observations confirmed them. In the English cabinet, and amongst its adherents, he found the sincerest partisans of peace convinced that it could only be secured by the submission of Mehemet Ali to the terms of the treaty of the 15th of July. "How can you expect," said Mr. Macaulay, at that time Secretary of War, "that we should not follow up what we have commenced? By continuing hostilities, Mehemet Ali would have on his side the chance of reconquering Syria. If we had not on ours, that of wresting Egypt from him, there would be neither equality, justice, nor policy. The pacha cannot be permitted to suspend or commence war at

his choice. He must give up the Turkish fleet, and confine his pretensions solely to Egypt." The anxieties of the continental diplomatists confirmed the language of the English ministers. "Prince Esterhazy is much impressed by the necessity of opposing an obstacle to the controlling influence of events," M. Mounier wrote to me on the 29th of November. "He assured me, yesterday evening that he was going to make strong efforts to obtain a positive declaration that no attempt would be directed against Egypt unless its necessity and suitableness were previously recognized by all the cabinets who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July." Prince Metternich wrote in this sense to the ambassador, and in the clearest manner. "We must anticipate the case," said his dispatch, "in which Syria being delivered, Mehemet Ali might still refuse to submit. The *quid faciendum* then is still to be sought for."

While this question was under debate in London, Prince Metternich said to Count de Sainte Aulaire at Vienna, "Assure M. Guizot that we shall endeavour to confine all to Syria. Of the consent of England I feel certain; but explaining myself at this date, on account of Austria only, I declare to you that she will abstain from any attack on Egypt, and entirely out of respect for France. If M. Guizot considers that any advantage would be gained by making this fact known in the Chambers, he may announce it with the certainty of not being contradicted by me."

The English admirals had already saved the diplo-

matists from the embarrassment which prepossessed Prince Metternich. On the 25th of November, Commodore Napier, with a part of Admiral Stopford's squadron, suddenly appeared before Alexandria, and addressed the following letter to Boghos Bey, Mehemet Ali's chief adviser:—"The pacha knows certainly that the European powers are anxious to secure to him the hereditary government of Egypt. Will his Highness permit an old sailor to suggest to him an easy method of reconciliation with the Sultan? Let him promptly and freely, without imposing any conditions, send back the Ottoman fleet and withdraw his troops from Syria; the miseries of war will then cease; his Highness will find ample employment and satisfaction, during the last years of his life, in cultivating the arts, and probably in laying a base for the re-establishment of the throne of the Ptolemies. After what has passed in Syria, his Highness ought readily to foresee how little he can do where the people are dissatisfied with his government. Within a month, 6000 Turks and a handful of sailors have taken Beyrout and Saïda, beaten the Egyptians in three actions, secured 10,000 prisoners or deserters, and occasioned the forced evacuation of the ports and of the passes of the Taurus and Libanus; and all this in face of an army of 30,000 men. Three weeks after, Acre, the key of Syria, submitted to the allied fleets; should his Highness resolve to continue hostilities, allow me to ask if he feels sure of retaining Egypt? I am a great admirer of his Highness, and would much ra-

ther be his friend than his enemy. I take the liberty of representing to him, that if he refuses to reconcile himself with the Sultan, he can only hope to preserve Egypt for a very short time. . . . A general discontent prevails here amongst the inhabitants and the sailors; his Highness's vice-admiral and several of his officers have already abandoned him, and are on board my fleet. The Syrian soldiers in Egypt are anxious to return home. The pay of the Egyptian troops is greatly in arrear, and they are without bread to support their families. Let his Highness reflect on the danger he will incur, if his soldiers are promised, on his fall, to be delivered from his service. Who can say that Egypt would be invulnerable? Alexandria may be taken as Acre was, and his Highness, who may now become the founder of a dynasty, would be reduced to the rank of an ordinary pacha."

After a correspondence of some hours, all the propositions of Commodore Napier were acceded to. Mehemet Ali pledged himself to send back the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, as soon as the powers assured to him the hereditary government of Egypt. An Egyptian envoy was instantly dispatched in an English man-of-war, with orders to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate Syria with his whole army. A formal convention ratified these arrangements. The submission of Mehemet Ali was complete, and the treaty of the 15th of July received its full execution.

This intelligence reached London on the 8th of

December, and produced all the effect that could be expected. It was the accomplishment of Lord Palmerston's predictions, and the triumph of his policy. The diplomatists, his allies, exchanged congratulations, not without surprise; they asked themselves, what cause could have determined this action at once menacing and pacific of the English fleet, and thus anticipated the issue? Had Commodore Napier acted in compliance with the orders of his cabinet, or in concert with Admiral Stopford, or solely on his own spontaneous impulse? "I cannot think," I wrote to M. de Bourqueney, "that Napier had instructions to engage the pacha to *re-establish the throne of the Ptolemies*, or to threaten the bombardment of Alexandria. If a French agent had used the first phrase, Lord Palmerston would have exclaimed against this contempt of the Sultan's rights; and if Napier had executed his threat, I should have been justified in saying that Lord Palmerston had broken faith with me, for he had plainly pledged his word that no act or commencement of an act should take place against Egypt without a fresh deliberation of the powers who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July. I attach no importance to these petty complaints, or to recriminations against accomplished facts; but I take notice of all irregularities, and of all inconsistent and ill-considered proceedings; and it is well to let it be known that we pay attention to them."

I foresaw that the result thus obtained would be speedily represented to us as definitive, and calling for

the cessation of our armed isolation, and that we should be asked to recognize it. I at once took precautions to ward off these advances, and to establish plainly the position we intended to maintain. On the 18th of December I wrote to Baron de Bourqueney; "We have remained strangers to the treaty of the 15th of July, that is to say, to the settlement of relations between the Sultan and the pacha, through the intervention of Europe. Neither the territorial basis, nor the coercive mode of that settlement, accorded with our views. There is no reason why they should be more suitable to us after than before. We are not materially opposed to the fact; but we cannot associate ourselves with it, to accord our homage and guarantee. We shall still remain, therefore, unconnected with the treaty of the 15th of July, and the coalition which signed it, in all that touches the relations of the Sultan and the pacha. This is a duty we owe to ourselves as a stringent consequence and an act of simple dignity.

"But supposing the treaty of the 15th of July to be carried out, and settled, the leading point remains of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The relative position of the Sultan and the pacha of Egypt forms, in respect to the Ottoman Empire, an internal question on which we thought differently from our allies and separated from them. The relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe constitute an external, general, and permanent question, with which we are always inclined to co-operate, and

which cannot be effectually or definitively settled without our concurrence.

"By the side of this great external and European consideration, may be still placed an internal and Ottoman question, that of the guarantees to be given to Syria on returning under the Sultan's dominion, especially to the Christian population of the Libanus: and on this question we are also ready to resume our position.

"Far, therefore, from wishing to persist in our isolation, we have ever in view the re-establishment of European concert, and we know through what portals, wide or narrow, we are able to rejoin it.

"We know also that our re-entry is desired, and that the desire is judicious. Our isolation is of no value to any one. It compels us, for our own safety, and to satisfy public feeling in France, to keep up our present armaments. We have arrested them at the limit they had reached when the present cabinet was formed. The preceding ministry wished to increase them; we have declared that we shall not do so; but to enable us to reduce our existing armaments, our position must be changed so as equally to change and calm down the public mind. I speak here of the well-disposed of the conservative party, who while the present state of things last, would not agree to the reduction of the existing pacific armaments, more readily than they would have sanctioned the excessive and warlike armaments called for by the preceding cabinet.

"I repeat that our present armaments are purely precautionary and pacific. The very existence of this

cabinet is an evident and permanent proof that they are so. But the scale proves it also. It gives us only what we had in 1831, 1832, and 1833,—from 400 to 450,000 men. And then we had not 70,000 men in Africa.

"There is nothing, therefore, either in the idea or amount of those armaments to excite uneasiness, and we have no intention of prolonging indefinitely, and without necessity, a state of things so onerous. But while the situation which has produced it continues, we accept the consequences. Let a suitable door be opened to us by which to emerge from this state, and we shall evince no obstinate desire of remaining in it."

Facts soon afforded evidence that I was right in considering the Egyptian question as not definitively settled, and in still pausing before I abandoned the position we had assumed. As soon as the convention concluded on the 27th of November between Sir Charles Napier and the pacha became known at Constantinople, through the envoy dispatched by the commodore to Lord Ponsonby, and a letter from Mehemet Ali himself to the Grand Vizier, much anger displayed itself in the divan; participated in and supported by Lord Ponsonby, who wrote immediately to Lord Palmerston, on the 8th of December. "Your Lordship has received the commodore's report. All that I have to tell you is, that the Porte has expressly declared the convention null and void, and that my colleagues and myself have accorded with this declaration. I need not add that no government

in the position of the Ottoman Porte could for a single moment allow an individual to treat on their account, with a power considered, either in right or fact, as a rebel. Her Majesty's ambassador has no authority whatever to recognize the act of one who has received no power from her Majesty's government; and the ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, are in precisely the same position with myself." On the same day, Redschid Pacha announced to the Turkish ambassador in London, and to the envoys of the four powers at Constantinople, the determination of the Porte: "How," said he, "can we, after all that has passed, confide authority again to such a man as Mehemet Ali? Nevertheless, and although the Sultan has no intention of granting anything, of his own will, to Mehemet Ali, in case of a request on the part of the allied powers, perhaps, in deference to them, some temporary favour might be extended to him. But would it be possible to-day to return to the important question of hereditary rule, that great concession of the treaty of alliance, already rejected by him? And how could the great powers reconcile that concession, henceforward, with the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which forms the principal object of their solicitude? Consequently, the Sublime Porte protests, in the most formal manner, by this declaration, against the convention concluded on the 27th of November by Commodore Napier;—a convention which it is called upon to regard, and does regard as null, and as not having taken place."

A few days later, the French dragoman at Constantinople, M. Cor, a man of experience and credit, being in conversation with Redschid Pacha on this convention, recommended him not to confound the form and substantial bearing of the act: "You have a right," he said, "to protest against the form; but in its bearing, the act is generally approved; it may lead to a reconciliation between France and the contracting powers to the treaty of the 15th of July; the Porte might have to repent of its conduct towards France, its most ancient ally; the self-respect of France is engaged in the question, and some means must be found of inducing her to re-entertain it." "The Sublime Porte," replied Redschid Pacha, "finds the substance of the convention quite as contrary to the interest of his Highness the Sultan, as the form is objectionable. You say that we must frame an act in which France may participate; we have only two things to suggest, both diametrically opposed to the policy France has adopted—the entire and absolute submission of Mehemet Ali, as a subject, not as a vassal, or his destruction. How can you pretend to be anxious for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire when you seek its dismemberment? If you are so bent on preserving Mehemet Ali, appoint him governor of one of your own provinces."

The Turkish anger, and, above all, the haughty discontent of Lord Ponsonby, embarrassed Lord Palmerston not a little, but without controlling his resolutions. As soon as he was made acquainted with

the conduct of Sir Charles Napier, he signified his approval, declaring, however, that Sir Charles had acted without instructions, and adding this reserve, that the powers who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July, could not pledge themselves to secure the hereditary rule in Egypt to Mehemet Ali, which they recommended the Porte to concede to him. At the same time he communicated his approval of the convention of the 27th of November, and the reserve he attached to it, to Lord Ponsonby. On the 15th of December, speaking with M. de Bourqueney on the obstinacy of the Porte in insisting on the deposition of Mehemet Ali: "The Porte," he said, "must now listen to us; we have done enough for it." The dispatches he received from Vienna confirmed this disposition. On the 3rd of January, 1841, Lord Beauvale wrote: "Prince Metternich has instructed me to tell your Lordship, that if the Porte hesitates to accept the recommendation of the powers engaging it to confer on Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, the Austrian court cannot consent that the allies should suffer themselves to be compromised by this hesitation. Prince Metternich feels convinced that the Porte will yield to the advice of its allies if they urge it firmly and conjointly." And again, some days later, on the 17th of January: "The dispatches of the internuncio, M. de Stürmer, announce that the commissioners to Alexandria are not empowered to give any pledge for the hereditary succession in the family of Mehemet Ali, and that

they will delay as much as possible their arrival in that port, to afford time for the military operations against Ibrahim Pacha and the insurrection in Egypt to take effect. On receiving this intelligence, Prince Metternich has acquainted Prince Esterhazy with the firm resolution of Austria to obtain the hereditary succession for Mehemet Ali, adding that the refusal of the Porte would determine Austria to withdraw her moral and material support from the Sultan. Copies of these dispatches will be forwarded to-day to the internuncio at Constantinople, that he may regulate his conduct accordingly."

Great perplexity existed at Constantinople. Unable to act alone, and for himself, the Sultan saw his allies divided and uncertain. Lord Ponsonby was evidently more hostile to Mehemet Ali than his chief, Lord Palmerston; who in turn, was less disposed than Prince Metternich to support the vanquished pacha. Prussia followed Austria step by step; Russia fluctuated between the Germanic powers and England; and absent France weighed upon the minds of all, as much as by her presence she might have influenced their deliberations. In the hope of escaping from this embarrassment, Redschid Pacha, on the 20th of December, 1840, assembled in congress, at his own palace, the representatives of the four powers who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July; and after repeating the memorandum by which, on the 14th of November preceding, their governments had counselled the Porte to grant to Mehemet Ali the

hereditary investiture of the pachalic of Egypt, provided he submitted without delay to the required conditions, he said: "The Sultan has commanded me to ask you whether Mehemet Ali, by his letter of the 11th of December to the Grand Vizier, has conformed to the spirit of this memorandum, and whether his submission ought to be received as real." On this positive question, Lord Ponsonby refused as positively to explain himself. "I think," he said, "it rests with the Sultan alone to decide this point. I see nothing, at present, that authorizes me to deliver an opinion." The Austrian internuncio, Baron Stürmer, who had received precise instructions from Vienna, was less brief and more decided, though not without circumlocution: "To relieve myself," he said, "from all personal responsibility, and to explain clearly the views of my government on this important question, I have thought fit to commit what I have to say to writing, and I shall now read it to the conference:—I have perused more than once, with the most scrupulous attention, the letter addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. I find nothing there to object to. The tone which reigns throughout seems to me to meet all reasonable considerations. It would have been desirable that the convention with Commodore Napier should not have been named; but we all agree that it would have been still better if that convention had never been concluded. And Mehemet Ali, by referring to it, has done no more than profit by an advantage gratuitously offered to him. In his letter, the

pacha declares his readiness to do all that is required of him, and in this sense his submission appears to me complete. I therefore recommend that this submission be accepted. I should reject, in every respect, any hesitation of the Porte to conform to the wishes of its allies. The most brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in Syria; these successes have not exceeded our calculations, anticipations, and hopes. Syria has been restored to the sceptre of his Highness, and the principal object of the alliance is thus accomplished. To go further enters not within the views of the allied powers; the conference of London has explicitly declared itself on this point. The Sublime Porte may undoubtedly have good reasons for desiring the complete overthrow of Mehemet Ali; but not being able to effect this alone, the burden of execution must fall upon its allies. Now, can the Porte desire, as the reward of their services, to plunge them into an enterprise which might imperil the general peace so ardently desired by all nations, and up to this period so fortunately maintained? Towards France, above all, the attention of our governments is at this moment directed; that power has a right to our respect and interest; and if the menacing and warlike attitude of M. Thiers's cabinet could not arrest us in our march towards the end we proposed and have attained, we are henceforward inclined to employ all our efforts in conciliating the ministry which has succeeded it, and whose language announces a wise, moderate, and peaceful policy. We ought, con-

sequently, to enter into its position, to take our share in the difficulties by which it is surrounded, and not expose it to the danger of being carried away, in spite of itself, into a false track. In the present state of minds in France, any unforeseen incident might overthrow everything; is it not, therefore, the interest of all, as it is just to all, to unite frankly with those who govern France, for the prevention of such a misfortune?"

The ministers of Prussia and Russia adopted, with some shades of difference, the opinion of the Austrian internuncio. The English ambassador repeated that he must wait the decision of the Sultan on the value of Mehemet Ali's submission, before giving the advice prescribed by the orders of his government. Redschid Pacha made vain efforts to lead the four plenipotentiaries to a more formal and unanimous declaration; and the conference broke up with nothing more conclusive than the last words of the Austrian internuncio, who once more repeated "how much it would have to be regretted if the Porte did not promptly conform to the wish expressed by the allied courts in the memorandum of the 14th of November."

Nearly three weeks after this conference, on the 7th of January, 1841, Baron Stürmer wrote to Lord Ponsonby: "If we could still have retained any doubts as to the real intentions of our governments, the dispatches I received yesterday from Prince Metternich are calculated to destroy them entirely. The Prince is impatient to know the sequel of his preceding instruc-

tions; he again repeats, in the most peremptory manner, that the four courts have decided that heirship in the functions of the government of Egypt shall be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali. I am going, therefore, to address a formal letter to Redschid Pacha, which I shall deliver to him myself, that I may verbally enforce all the necessary explanations. The ideas of your cabinet being absolutely identical with those of mine, I feel convinced you will explain yourself in the same sense to the Porte. I confess to you, it is not without some regret that I thus see evaporate the hope we entertained of beholding the power of Mehemet Ali destroyed, root and branch; but my part is finished, and I have now only to wait in silence the orders transmitted to me by my government, and to execute them scrupulously."

M. de Stürmer immediately took the step with Redschid Pacha that he had announced. The Russian minister, M. de Titow, declared that he should follow the example of the Austrian internuncio, and announced his intention to Lord Ponsonby. The English ambassador replied with ironical scorn: "Nothing can be more indifferent than the private opinion of any one of us on this question; it is the affair of our governments, for which we are not responsible. But it is quite another thing to act without orders, and this responsibility I shall not risk. I decline, therefore, to act in concert with you until I am authorized, by formal instructions, to adopt the course you propose. It has been said to me several times, by the best au-

thorities, by yourself, unless I mistake, that your government had not determined to insist on hereditary rule for Mehemet Ali, and at our conference, it did not appear that you were authorized to speak on this point. But that was not of recent date, and it is by no means impossible that more than one change may have since taken place in the opinion of your cabinet. What is error now, may have been truth formerly, and may become truth again, for in this matter there has been a continual fluctuation of circumstances. That my government has not yet sent me instructions can scarcely be for want of time, for such might have reached me, as soon as yours from Vienna.

Three days later, on the 10th of January, 1841, Lord Ponsonby wrote to Mr. Frederic Pisani, English dragoman at Constantinople: "You will inform his Excellency, the minister for foreign affairs, that I am ordered, in the name of the British government to recommend the Sublime Porte to accord hereditary rule in Egypt to Mehemet Ali." At the same time, in terms equally laconic, he announced to MM. de Stürmer and de Titow his instructions and proceeding.

In the face of all these hesitations, contradictions, and procrastinations of European diplomacy, it was quite natural that the Sultan and his advisers should hesitate also, and seek, either through vague words or repeated delays, to reject the cup so often presented to and withdrawn from their lips. After protesting against Sir Charles Napier's convention as null and of no effect, the divan had nevertheless resumed ne-

gotiations with Mehemet Ali, and the Grand Vizier, when sending Maslouim Bey, one of the chief officers of the Porte, to receive his submission, had written to him to say, that as soon as this was completed, "the Sultan would deign to reinstate him in the government of Egypt," but without mentioning right of inheritance. When Lord Ponsonby announced to the Porte that the British government advised that concession, the Sultan (on the 13th of February, 1841) issued the following hatti-sheriff: "In deference to the recommendation of the high allied powers, and with the expectation that my consent to the hereditary rule in question may settle the affair and contribute to the maintenance of general peace, I have resolved to confer again the government of Egypt on Mehemet Ali, with right of heirship, as soon as he actually makes submission in the manner that the council requires. . . . There is however this to be said; the experience of the past has rendered it necessary that our Sublime Porte should be placed in perfect security, on the part of Egypt, both for the present and the future; and this end can scarcely be attained unless by attaching to the succession strong conditions and necessary obligations. Feeling convinced that the same friendly solicitude of which the high allied powers have already given proofs will be exercised for this object also, I hasten to adopt their advice and to put it in execution. Let all zeal be employed in the necessary arrangements."

The hatti-sheriff was forwarded on the same day to

Mehemet Ali: but the promised zeal was wanting as before in its execution. The Porte still flattered itself it would escape, in the end, from exigencies which it considered not altogether inevitable. Satisfied with having obeyed their instructions, neither Lord Ponsonby nor Baron Stürmer pressed the Porte to hurry itself. With more adroitness, Mehemet Ali placed good faith and honest appearance on his side by immediately issuing the necessary orders for the return of the Turkish fleet and the evacuation of Syria. In London, Prince Esterhazy, Baron de Bülow, and even M. de Brünnow urged the final settlement of the Egyptian affair; and in the English cabinet, as well as with the public, the friends of peace expressed their uneasiness at seeing a weighty and precarious European question prolonged from no other motive than frivolous indecision or delays. Lord Palmerston felt the necessity of a conclusion. On the 28th of January, Chekib Effendi asked what he was to write to Redschid Pasha touching the hereditary establishment of Mehemet Ali in the pachalic of Egypt. "I have told him," Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby on the following day, "that I could not but admit the force of the objections raised against that concession. Certainly it would be much better for the Sultan and his Egyptian subjects, if he could preserve, in choosing the future rulers of Egypt, the liberty he possesses in selecting the governors of the other provinces of his empire. But in all affairs we must be contented with what is practicable, and not compromise an advantage gained

by running after something we cannot reach. It is clear that Mehemet Ali has submitted in the hope that he would obtain hereditary rule in Egypt. If this is now refused to him, what will be his course? A fresh revolt, or at least, an attitude of passive resistance. What will be the remedy? Such a state of things could not be suffered to continue indefinitely, for, if it continued, it would be equivalent to the separation of Egypt from the Turkish Empire. But the Sultan has not, at present, either maritime or military means sufficient to re-establish his authority in Egypt. He would therefore be obliged to apply to his allies. Now, the measures hitherto agreed upon between the four powers, in virtue of the treaty of July, are confined to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and to driving back the troops of Mehemet Ali within the limits of Egypt. If, therefore, the Sultan were to ask the four powers to lend him their aid, in an attack on Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a new deliberation of the conference would become necessary. 'Well then,' I said to Chekib, 'if the Sultan seeks the aid of the four powers as a consequence of his refusal to grant, according to their advice, the hereditary pachalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, I can tell you beforehand what the result of that deliberation will be. I know well that the four powers will refuse to aid the Sultan. What will happen next? For want of sufficient strength of his own, and after a vain attempt, the Sultan will be compelled to yield to Mehemet Ali with a bad grace what to-

day he may have the merit of conferring on him voluntarily; and thus, instead of performing, on the suggestion of the allies, an act of sovereign power, he will, in the eyes of the whole world, have the air of submitting to a concession, wrested from him by a subject.'

"'I shall not attempt,' I added, 'to represent as without importance or value what is incontestably a great sacrifice; I should fail to convince the Sultan. But I ask you to consider the immense amount of moral and physical force which your government has gained by the incidents of the last few months, and to remember that all the Sultan has won, Mehemet Ali has lost. Their relative positions are changed; if the Sultan knows how to profit by the stipulations of the treaty of July, if he understands thoroughly how to organize his army, his marine, and his finances, and to place them on a respectable footing, Mehemet Ali can never more be to him a source of danger or even of uneasiness. The Sultan has recovered, under his direct sovereignty, all Syria, Arabia, and Candia, territories which in military, financial, and religious points of view, are of the greatest importance, and for the possession of which, last year at this date, he would have made great sacrifices. Finally, remember that, faithfully carried out, the stipulation of the treaty of July which says that all the laws and treaties of the Empire are applicable to Egypt as to any other province, is a most essential guarantee for the sovereign authority of the Sultan.' I then requested Chekib

Effendi to urge his government strongly to end this affair without delay, for it is of extreme importance to all parties interested that it should be definitively settled as soon as possible.

"Chekib Effendi promised me that he would write in this sense to Redschid Pacha, and that he felt convinced the Sultan would yield to the advice of his allies."

Two days after this interview, the representatives of the four powers in London, addressed a detailed note to Chekib Effendi (forwarded by Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby), in which they recommended the Sultan "to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, requesting the Turkish envoy to submit the note and its considerations without delay, to his court, and calling upon the government of His Highness to devote to it their most serious attention." Three days after the arrival of this note at Constantinople, on the 13th of February, 1841, the Sultan definitively signed the firman which conferred on Mehemet Ali and his descendants the heirship of the pachalic of Egypt, specifying the conditions.

During the course of this negotiation and through all its fluctuations, we kept entirely aloof, resolved not to issue from our isolation as long as the treaty of the 15th of July was in action and the Egyptian question not finally closed. But since the act of Commodore Napier before Alexandria, and the approbation bestowed on it by Lord Palmerston, I felt satisfied that the heirship of Egypt would be granted to Mehemet Ali.

It had reached me through London that the passion of Lord Ponsonby against the pacha was scarcely displeasing to Lord Palmerston, and that the latter, while admitting his engagements with respect to the hereditary succession, allowed some glimpses to appear of an inclination to escape from them if opportunities offered. I attached no value to those rumours, and judging that the moment had arrived for signifying clearly the conduct we should hold when in course of time they would duly subside before facts, I wrote on the 13th of January, 1841, to Count de Sainte-Aulaire: "I cannot believe that the fantastic animosity of Lord Ponsonby can carry the day against Prince Metternich's prudence and Lord Palmerston's word. I am satisfied that the Porte will award to the pacha the heirship promised to him when his submission was obtained. Do not then on this point admit a doubt that I myself cannot entertain, and persist in looking upon the concession of the hereditary rule in Egypt as a settled point.

"When it is so declared, how shall we be situated, and what will remain to be done that Europe may derive, in the East, some profit from this shock, and resume her normal condition?

"On this point, we have nothing to do, no initiative to take. We are alone, we are at peace, and we wait. But you know also that while taking no part, after as before, in the treaty of the 15th of July, that is to say in the settlement of relations between the Sultan and the pacha, France is disposed to resume, in such East-

ern affairs as have a general interest for Europe, the place belonging to her, and also, on suitable overtures, to rejoin European concert.

"I stand alone in my cabinet, and in full liberty of mind. I trouble myself about no one. I look only at things as they are, to understand them clearly, and to judge what they advise or require. Unless I deceive myself, the following are the points of importance to regulate, as regards the East, and to regulate in common.

"1. The closing of both straits.

"2. The consecration of the principle admitted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in their notes of the 23rd, 24th, 26th of July, and 16th of August, 1839, in reply to the note of France of the 17th of July preceding; that is to say, the recognition of the *status quo* of the Ottoman Empire in its independence and integrity. This is what the five powers announced eighteen months ago at the commencement of the affair. They could and ought to establish, to-day, in common, what they declared from the first, and end as they began.

"3. The guarantees to be required from the Porte for the Christian populations of Syria, not only in its own, but in the general interest, Ottoman and European; for, if Syria falls back into anarchy, the Porte and Europe may in their turn be involved in the embarrassment.

"4. Certain stipulations in favour of Jerusalem. This idea has sprung up, and begins seriously to

occupy Christian minds. I know not exactly what may be possible, or under what forms and limitations European intervention is prepared to obtain for Jerusalem a degree of security and dignity; but the governments which lament, with reason, the enfeeblement of national faiths, ought of themselves, when occasion offers, to afford those faiths some palpable token of adhesion and interest. Let Europe and European policy resume a Christian aspect. No one estimates, at this epoch, all that order and power have to gain thereby.

"5. Finally, there are, with reference to commercial routes, whether between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, by the Isthmus of Suez, or between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, by Syria and the Euphrates, stipulations required of general liberty, and perhaps positive neutrality, of great interest to all Europe, and establishing, for the rapidly increasing intercourse between Europe and Asia, excellent principles, for which such a favourable opportunity may never again present itself.

"This is what occurs to me, my dear friend, when I leave my mind to its free scope. Take all this as I give it to you; show it, and speak of it as you may think proper. But, if I judge correctly, there is matter here to employ the five powers, and to terminate the affairs of the East, in common, by a general act deficient neither in greatness nor utility."

I made the first move by holding this language. The plenipotentiaries assembled in London expressed

their views less clearly. "I firmly believe," M. de Bourqueney wrote to me, "that they will come to us on the general question; but will they open ground as widely as we desire? Up to this time they are rather vague with me. I cannot, therefore, at present, specify to you profitably, thoughts which perhaps are not yet sufficiently defined themselves." I resolved not to suffer this obscurity as to the intentions and words of the allies to prepossess my mind. When we have formed no decision, it is best to wait and preserve in silence full liberty of action according to circumstances; but when we see distinctly the practicable and desirable course, it is wise to examine and explain it to ourselves; we thus escape difficulties and tendencies which, when suffered to approach, often lead to serious errors and dangers.

Under the pressure of the intelligence from the East, they, however, became anxious in London to draw the questions closer, and to seek their definite solution. I determined to send Count de Rohan Chabot to Alexandria to convey categorically to the pacha our intentions and advice. He had been attached to my embassy in England as second secretary; had acquitted himself well of his mission to St. Helena with Prince de Joinville, and his character and capacity had won my entire confidence. Before leaving for Egypt he made a hasty journey to London, where he was equally well known and esteemed, and after conferring with M. de Bourqueney, he reported to me in detail their common information and conjec-

tures on the approaching position there preparing for us. "In an interview of considerable length, Lord Palmerston," he said, "confined himself to the defence of his policy towards France, and to the discussion of that of the cabinet of the 1st of March; evidently resolved not to admit that anything on his part had justified the French uneasiness and irritation, and not to enter into the question which, nevertheless, appeared at every instant in his inmost thought,—the nature of the overture to be made to France. It is not, therefore, from what I was able to gather from him that I have formed my impression. It emanates rather from my conversations with MM. de Bülow, Esterhazy and Brünnow, and especially from what M. de Bourqueney has confided to me as the result of his own observations.

"All the members of the conference, M. de Brünnow alone excepted, are anxious that a courteous advance should shortly be made to France to induce her to resume her place in European concert, and that this advance should be followed by a general act concluded in conjunction with France, on the affairs of the East.

"When the internal question of the relations between the Sultan and the Pacha are considered by the divan as settled, the Porte should announce to the plenipotentiaries of the four powers at Constantinople that the object of the treaty of the 15th of July is accomplished. On this declaration reaching London, the conference would be convoked; it would

record the fact, and the secondary questions, to which France was no party, would be thus completely closed. It would then be determined to make an advance to the French government inviting it to consult, in concert with the allies, on the final solution of the general question. A protocol might be drawn up of this decision, and the natural organ of the conference, Lord Palmerston, would be instructed to communicate it to the French government.

"France being thus invited to resume her place in the conference, the following would be the nature and substance of the general act to be concluded.

"In the preamble would be repeated the expression of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, as the basis of the policy adopted by the powers. A first article would establish the principle of the closing of the straits. In a second, the Sultan would pledge himself not to grant firmans of admission to more than one man-of-war of each power at a time. A third article might contain some stipulations in favour of the Christian populations of Syria. Until now, Lord Palmerston has opposed this idea, saying that religious protections prepare political dismemberments; and the other members of the conference appear to incline to this opinion.

"On the question of the routes of communication with India, nothing has yet been said in London; but there would be no embarrassment in its introduction,

always taking care to avoid any suspicion of English policy, or of an attempt to succeed against it.

"Care also would be taken to abstain from any allusion that might recall the question in which France had refused to participate, and the success obtained without her co-operation.

"Nothing at present authorizes the hope of seeing the principle of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire recognized in a specific article. Lord Palmerston, satisfied with the part which Russia has acted in these last events, does not seem to insist strongly on the point. Prince Esterhazy and M. de Bülow will not urge it too far, feeling persuaded, for the moment, that the resistance of M. de Brünnow would be insurmountable. In his attitude and language, M. de Brünnow is far behind his court; he opposes the suggested advance to France, and the understanding with her. Nevertheless, they profess to believe in London that the cabinet of St. Petersburgh has not only said but written that it would associate itself with the common measure and general act, on condition that no special stipulation should appear touching the principle of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It is expected, finally, that with this limitation, M. de Brünnow will range with Lord Palmerston's opinion as soon as he sees that it is fixed."

From this picture of the dispositions of the plenipotentiaries in London, I had little difficulty in concluding that no effective solution of the general ques-

tions would issue from their deliberations, no great act of truly European policy. Evidently the courts of Vienna and Berlin, anxious for the peace of the continent, thought only of closing, well or ill, the Egyptian affair, and of concluding the perilous engagements, which, by the treaty of the 15th of July, they had been led to contract. The Emperor Nicholas found that he had done enough in abandoning his pretensions of exclusive preponderance at Constantinople, and by allowing the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to fall to the ground to break up the close friendship between England and France. He had no desire to go further, or to re-animate, at the expense of his own policy in the East, the influence of France once more added to European concert. Lord Palmerston wished to resume amicable intercourse with France, always provided that this reconciliation in no way reduced the complaisance lately testified by Russia towards England, and the sacrifices she had made. Before this recrudescence of personal passions and interests amongst the different powers, the general interest of Europe turned pale; the great questions of European future retired; neither the real independence of the Turks, nor the fate of the Christians in the East, nor the security and facility of commercial relations between Europe and Asia stood forward as objects of serious solicitude. Elevated and far-seeing policy no longer held its place. There was no eagerness but to be delivered from recent embarrassments without being compromised in any new design; and such was the im-

patience that M. de Bourqueney wrote thus on the 12th February; "Here is the danger in presence of which we stand. I do not believe, on the part of the conference, in an equal sincerity and ardour to obtain the *five signatures* on paper. If some find us cold, and others suspicious or exacting, they will content themselves with *four*. They will issue a protocol of closure, declaring that the conference has reached the term of its labours by the final accomplishment of the treaty of July; and all will then reduce itself to diplomatic action. They will not the less affirm that France has no longer a right to call herself isolated, and that her isolations ceased with the expiration of the treaty of July and the breaking up of the conference. The question of armed peace will follow. Remember the situation of June, 1840; there was also a moment when you felt that you were on the point of being outflanked by an agreement of *four*. I see the same danger beginning to peep out under another form. There was then a treaty to inaugurate; the question is now to bury one, but in such a manner as to render any other impossible!"

I did not conceal from myself the peril of this position, and the necessity of forestalling it. I replied to M. de Bourqueney. "We are not hastening eagerly towards the conclusion, which seems to be in progress, but if it is really at hand, I think with you, that it would certainly be puerile and might be injurious to keep it waiting.

"First of all, is the Turco-Egyptian question really

and completely terminated? The heirship is accorded, the Turkish fleet restored, and Syria evacuated. Is all settled also as to the mode of the pacha's administration in Egypt? Is no new regulation proposed beyond the general conditions announced in the note of the 30th of January last? This matter must not be prolonged after we have been told that all is over, and when we have ourselves acted in virtue of that declaration. Look well to this.

"If all is really at an end, as regards the Turco-Egyptian question, I am of opinion that the four powers should declare this by a protocol before inviting us to regulate together what may still require to be settled in the general relations of Europe with the Porte. This will have more weight than a declaration and direct invitation from the Porte to the European powers, including France. We thus remain more evidently unconnected with the treaty of the 15th of July; they do not address us until after proclaiming that the special object of that treaty is fulfilled. The four powers then come to us and their courteous step towards France has its full value.

"Now for the form. In substance and in general thesis, it is desirable that the act should be as consistent and plenary as possible; its true worth will consist in putting an end to the present state of universal tension, and in re-establishing European concert. But the importance of the special stipulations which the act will contain, must respond in a certain degree, to the political value of the act itself.

"Its first and incontestable merit, therefore, ought to be the annulment and replacing of preceding and particular acts or treaties relative to the Ottoman Empire, henceforward without object,—the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, as also that of the 15th of July, 1840.

"It would unquestionably be desirable that the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be the object of a special article and positive engagement. But I agree with you that, on this point, we must insist only on what we absolutely require and shall certainly obtain. If the common intention of the five powers is to be expressed in the preamble to the act, the drawing up of the preamble is of great importance. Take care to ascertain beforehand what may have been prepared.

"With respect to the Christian populations of Syria, I have lately written on that subject to M. de Sainte-Aulaire. M. de Metternich has also entered warmly into this idea, but considers it more immediately interesting to the two Catholic powers, France and Austria, and more likely to succeed by their united action at Constantinople than by a formal deliberation of the five powers in London. He has therefore signified to me his desire that this matter should be negotiated between Vienna and Paris, rather than at the conference. He may very possibly be in the right. I therefore do not think we should strongly urge this point. At the same time, it is desirable to mention it, and to ask whether, in case special stipulations should appear to be impracticable, the five powers ought not

to pledge themselves mutually to use their influence with the Porte to induce it to grant to these Christian populations pledges of justice and fair administration.

"The routes of communication between Europe and Asia, whether by the Isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea, or by Syria, the Euphrates, and the Persian Gulf, might well form the object of a formal stipulation which should guarantee their free use to all European nations, without special favour or privilege to any. The scope of this stipulation, and the nature of the guarantees, are matters for discussion, but in no case should they contain anything inconvenient or offensive to the contracting powers.

"I say nothing on the closing of the Straits, and the restrictions to be imposed on ships of war. There can be no contest on that point.

"You have here, my dear Baron, bases on which to regulate your conduct and language in the confidential preliminaries of this negotiation. Continue to show no eagerness or wish to anticipate, and also no hesitation or desire to retard."

Thus relieved from impediments, the negotiations advanced rapidly. As the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia appeared to be the most anxious, M. de Bourqueney communicated first with them, and discussed confidentially the bases of the protocol destined to close the Egyptian question, and of the new treaty for the restoration of European concert. Being informed by his allies of the dispositions of France,

Lord Palmerston said one evening to the Baron: "I am told we can now talk together."—"I am quite ready," replied M. de Bourqueney.—"To-morrow, then," rejoined Lord Palmerston; and the next day, February the 21st, 1841, the French envoy held a long conversation with the English minister, which he reported to me the same evening. "It was I," he wrote, "who spoke first. I said that my government being apprised from all quarters that the four powers considered the time arrived for proposing to it to enter in common upon some European act, had thought fit, in turn, to weigh the bearing and form of the act that might thus be carried out in concert. I gave your ideas as to the form, and passing to the substance, I pointed out the five points upon which I was instructed to insist, as comprising the essential elements of an act suitable to the importance of the object.

"Lord Palmerston replied at first by some general phrases on the sincere disposition of his cabinet, a disposition common to all the powers, to resume its normal relation with France. He accepted warmly the form of a step by the conference to announce to me the drawing up of a protocol, signifying that the Turco-Egyptian question was closed. He then adverted to the five points, which I had touched upon, as the bases of the prospective act.

"1. The guarantee of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be, he said, a stipulation at variance with the political doctrines of

England. Unless under exceptional and flagrant circumstances, it is our rule here not to enter into engagements at unlimited date, which save nothing, and only tend to encumber the future. With a special end, defined in object and duration, England has been led into an arrangement of this kind; but in a general and undefined treaty she could not consent to pledge herself to an abstract principle. We have thought of supplying a special arrangement by a phrase in the preamble of the projected act; for instance, by expressing the union of the powers *in the desire of securing the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.* But here again a serious difficulty presents itself. In its note of the 8th of October, 1840, the French ministry of that epoch gave to the principle of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire an interpretation which the other powers decline to admit. This principle became (by the avowal of the then existing cabinet) a position taken against one of the contracting powers to the treaty of the 15th of July. In an act of general reconciliation, could we insist on the insertion of a clause offensive to a particular power? And even if the four others urged it strongly, could it be possible to induce the consent of the fifth? This is not all. The note of the 8th of October goes even to maintain that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire demand the consideration of a sort of *partial and internal* independence, that of the pacha of Egypt. Here are, unquestionably, discord-

ant ideas, which we cannot submit to the trial of a new contradictory discussion. Nevertheless, without inserting in the treaty under consideration the exact words which have furnished a text for these bitter differences, we may find equivalents to lead all the powers towards the end they propose, by an act of general reconciliation.

"2. The closing of the two straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, is a principle equally acceptable to all the powers who desire, in good faith, to respect the independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is to the advantage of Europe to sanction it anew by a solemn act.

"3. The free enjoyment, by all the powers, of the great avenues of communication between Europe and Asia, would be looked upon (draw up the formula as you may) as an advantage specially and exclusively acquired by England. One of the heaviest reproaches hurled against her policy since the 15th of July, 1840, is that of having sought, through the Egyptian question, the monopoly of these communications. What end would it answer to extend this monopoly in principle to all the other powers? Which amongst them possesses an empire in India? People will say, and above all in France, that England had deceived her allies under a false semblance of disinterestedness. They will assert that she has pleaded for the insertion of an article profitable only to herself, and that she has made this the condition of her reconciliation with France. We possess no exclusive privilege. We

desire it not. Let all the world be free to ask and obtain what the spirit of enterprise of a simple individual has created. But there is no matter here for stipulation in a treaty.

"4. Advice to the Porte to secure to the Christian populations of Syria conditions of justice and fair administration, reflects honour on the power proposing it, and finds an echo from the others; but a treaty comports badly with the form of advice. We might conveniently with the drawing up of the general act, address a note to the Ottoman plenipotentiary from the five powers, suggesting to the Sultan the exercise of tolerance, and the protection of Christian rites.

"5. The treaty of the 18th of July, 1840, expires with the protocol of closure. The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi falls with the clause relative to the closing of the Straits. Russia, moreover, is solemnly pledged not to revive it, and this year it dies a natural death."

"You have here, Sir," added M. de Bourqueney, "a summary of Lord Palmerston's arguments on the five points submitted to our discussion. I shall not now repeat my replies. He ended a conference of two hours and a half with these words: 'I did not wish to employ my hand in drawing up of the final act, until after a conversation with you. I shall now commence it, and submit to you the draft.'"

I entered into no controversy on Lord Palmerston's reasonings; it would have been vain and futile. Evidently, the grand object I had shadowed out for the effectual settlement of the affairs of the East, Turkish

and Christian, and for the general policy of Europe, had no chance of success. The powers were solely preoccupied with their personal interest in the situation of the moment. Within these bounds, they offered France the satisfaction she required on her own account. They made the first overtures. They asked nothing which implicated, directly or indirectly, our sanction or concurrence in the treaty of the 15th of July. They came to us declaring that it was extinct. Finally, no allusion was made to disarmament. I wrote to Baron de Bourqueney: "These three points being opened, and they are so in the plan you transmit to me, our honour is quite safe, and the advantage of presuming our place in the councils of Europe is of far more consequence than the objection of a treaty somewhat meagre. This is the opinion of the King and the Council. Let the draft you mention be prepared and forwarded to us as a confidential communication, and I trust I shall return it to you with a favourable reply. To break up all coalition, apparent or real, unconnected with us; to check between England and Russia habits of intimacy rather too much prolonged; to bring back all the powers to their individual positions and natural interests; to emerge from a state of isolation, and to take the attitude of independence;—these are, in a diplomatic sense alone, results of considerable value, when purchased at the price of some irksome debates in the Chambers."

Five days after his long conversation with Lord

Palmerston, Baron de Bourqueney again wrote to me: "We have had fresh conferences. The protocol of closure and the final act have nearly received their last revision. The two documents can only be judged fairly, together; the first I consider good. To-morrow both will be communicated to me. I shall immediately dispatch a courier to bear them to you."

Instead of sending the documents as he promised, M. de Bourqueney, two days after, wrote thus:—A serious incident occurred yesterday, in the afternoon. Chekib Effendi refuses to make the declaration necessary to head the protocol of closure. Lord Palmerston has yielded to the reasons alleged by the Turkish plenipotentiary, and maintains that the protocol must wait for official advices that the firman for the hereditary investiture of Egypt, granted by the Sultan, has been accepted by the pacha. But he adds, that this formality does not peremptorily suspend our passing on to the signature of the general treaty, under reserve that the protocol shall be signed in the interval between the signature of the treaty and the exchange of ratifications. The plenipotentiaries of Prussia and Austria, on the other hand, maintain that we may dispense with the assent of Chekib Effendi and proceed at once to sign the protocol. The Russian plenipotentiary hesitates between the two camps. Things being in this position, I cannot consent to transmit to you the draft of the treaty without the document which serves as its complement and preface. We

have exhibited no eagerness in the negotiation; we ought not to do so for the issue. The incident will be disposed of to-morrow. I ask therefore a respite of twenty-four hours."

The incident neither was nor could be disposed of so rapidly as M. de Bourqueney expected. Two of the powers engaged in the negotiation, Austria and Prussia, ardently desired that the Egyptian question should be looked upon as closed, the treaty of the 15th of July as extinct, and that the conference of London, by making this official declaration, should restore them to their liberty. But the Porte desired not to release its allies from their engagements, until Mehemet Ali accepted with the concession of the heirship, the accompanying conditions, and until it felt thoroughly assured that it would no longer require the aid of Europe to coerce him. Lord Palmerston was determined to continue this aid as long as it might be necessary, and not to withdraw his patronage until, in consequence of the accorded succession, the pacha submitted to the Sultan. The Russian plenipotentiary was in no hurry that the question should reach its definitive solution, and that harmony should be re-established between France and the powers signing the treaty of the 15th of July.

In the midst of these contrarieties, it was quite in order, before proclaiming that the object of the treaty of the 15th of July was achieved, to wait certain intelligence that the solution given at Constantinople

was accepted at Alexandria, and that harmony was effectually restored between the pacha and his sovereign. To satisfy the Austrian and Russian plenipotentiaries, efforts were made in London, during eight days, to dispense with this official delay. The form of protocol intended to close the Egyptian question, and which Chekib Effendi had refused to sign, was altered, and divided into two distinct articles,—one, authorizing the return of the European consuls to Alexandria, implied that the treaty of the 15th of July had reached its term and object; the other, as a natural consequence, invited the French Government to sign the general treaty destined to regulate the relations of Turkey with Europe. With some difficulty, Chekib Effendi was persuaded to sign the first of these, and when both had received the commentaries of Prince Esterhazy, Baron de Bülow, and Lord Palmerston, on their bearing and value, Baron de Bourqueney considering them himself as satisfactory, forwarded them to me, saying: "The last tedious interruptions have been, this morning, definitively removed. Chekib Effendi has signed the protocol under a modification of no importance. I was immediately summoned to Lord Palmerston. I transmit herewith the documents. I assure you that our attitude here, during the last fortnight, has been highly dignified. There was a moment when it verged on rupture. Let me persist in asking from you the stage-effect of rapid acceptance. You have spoken the great word; we exchange isolation for independence."

After carefully examining the documents forwarded by M. de Bourqueney, I differed from his opinion, and resolved not to sign them without several alterations, two of which appeared to me indispensable. The King and the cabinet agreed with my view. I forthwith returned the three papers to M. de Bourqueney, indicating minutely the changes we desired. "I comprehend," I said to him, "the merit of what you call the stage-effect of immediate acceptance, and should have been pleased to have afforded you that gratification; but it was impossible. The strength of our position here consists in the unswerving maintenance of the three reserves I have constantly recommended. The second, which separates us absolutely from the treaty of the 15th of July, would be seriously compromised, if we accepted, in the protocol inviting us to re-enter European concert, the phrase which cuts that treaty into two parts, one temporary, the other permanent, presenting thus the new general convention we shall have to sign as a consequence of the second part of the preceding treaty; this would connect us with a shred of the first, to which, in its entirety, we mean to continue strangers. I am aware that we do not ourselves sign this protocol, and therefore we are no direct party to it. But it is presented to us; it is the act by which we are invited to re-enter European concert, and we accept the invitation; they owe it to us, to employ the form we consider suitable, when that form takes nothing from the position of others, nor from the permanent principle sought to be established.

If these alterations in the proposed act are admitted, as I hope they will be, I shall immediately forward our adhesion and your full powers. We have displayed no anxiety to negotiate; we have waited to be asked. It becomes us to be equally calm and dignified when matters approach conclusion, and since the drafts of these acts are confidentially transmitted to us, this evidently means that we are to make such observations on them as we may deem essential, and that these amendments will be admitted if in fact they are consistent.

In forwarding this letter, I added, with reference to vague intelligence from Alexandria: "You probably know already that the arrangement between the Sultan and the pacha is not so completely settled as was supposed. The unexpected restriction attached by the Porte to the principle of hereditary succession by reserving to itself the right of selecting amongst the sons of the pacha, and its pretension of substituting for the fixed tribute a share of the gross revenue of Egypt, may lead to many embarrassments. The pacha demurs, and calls for negotiation at Constantinople on these new conditions, which appear to him to exceed the meaning of the *separate act* annexed by the powers to the treaty of the 15th of July. I do not yet know what turn this incident may take."

Two days later, these rumours received full confirmation. On the 20th of February, 1841, Saïd Muhib Effendi, charged by the Sultan to bear to the pacha the firman of hereditary investiture, arrived

at Alexandria. He was received there with distinguished honours. The pacha's chief officers, in grand costume, waited his disembarkation. A regiment was under arms. The batteries of the ports and fleet saluted him. The men-of-war dressed with flags, the consulates displayed their national colours. The French and English corvettes in the harbour fired salutes of twenty-one guns. General satisfaction spread throughout the city. Mehemet Ali sent one of his dignitaries to receive Saïd Muhib Effendi at the foot of the great marble staircase of the seraglio, and awaited his entrance standing, in his grand audience-chamber. "After some indifferent conversation," the Turkish envoy wrote to the Porte, "his Highness asked for the firman of which I was the bearer. I handed it to him respectfully. He then made me read, first the letter of the grand vizier, and then the firman relative to the heirship. After which, he said, 'The publication of the conditions named in the firman would, in a country like this, cause disorders.' I replied, that so far from the publication of the firman leading to disorders, it was in itself a brilliant favour, of which the whole people, and those who heard it, would have reason to feel proud; and in conformity with my instructions, I used the utmost efforts of my tongue and judgment to bring him to better feelings, by the use of encouraging arguments and necessary threats. I represented that the nature of this affair required that the firman should be read in a solemn assembly, and conveyed

to the knowledge of the public. The pacha replied, 'May God preserve our Padisha and benefactor! I am the Sultan's slave. I am unable to evince to him sufficient gratitude for the favour of which I am the object, and it is my duty to execute promptly all his orders; but as the public reading of the firman at this moment offers some objections, we will speak of it later, and see what is to be done.' I then told him that the conditions in question were settled in concurrence with the high allied courts; that the will of his Highness the Sultan was positive on this point, and that the hereditary investiture depended on his, the pacha's compliance. But as his Highness had said we should see to all this later, Sami Bey, who was also present, interposed, saying, 'The Effendi is fatigued with his voyage, will your Highness allow him to repose?' At these words the audience broke up, and I repaired to the house of Sami Bey, which had been prepared to receive me."

In the evening a report spread through Alexandria that Mehemet Ali refused to accept the conditions attached by the firman to the heirship, and that Commodore Napier, who had dined with him, said they were inadmissible. "I repaired to the seraglio," M. Cochelet, our consul-general, wrote to me, "to satisfy myself of the facts. Mehemet Ali had dined in company with Commodore Napier, who left him as I arrived. The pacha received me with his usual kindness, but seemed moody. At first he preserved perfect silence. He then asked me if any

letters had reached me from Constantinople. I showed him one from M. de Pontois. 'You know nothing,' he said; 'the Porte grants me hereditary rule in Egypt under the condition of choosing itself my successor in my own family. What then becomes of my will?' I made no reply, and Mehemet Ali continued; 'All the children of Egypt have now returned; not one remains in Syria (he had that morning been apprised of the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at Damietta): it is for them to see whether they are willing to lose the fruits of all I have done for them. Selim Pacha, general of artillery, charged with the defence of Alexandria, was present at this audience. Mehemet Ali turned to him, saying, 'Thou art still young; thou knowest how to wield the sabre; thou shalt yet see me give thee lessons.' My countenance betrayed my embarrassment; I saw that Mehemet Ali looked at me, seeking to divine my thoughts, and I said to him, with gravity and sadness:—'Reflect well before rushing into a new struggle; I see that your Highness is engaged with Selim Pacha; I leave you to your affairs.' I went out with the first interpreter, Artim Bey, who told me that independently of the condition relative to the heirship, the Porte intended to take from Mehemet Ali the right of appointing the superior officers of the Egyptian army, from the rank of *Bimbashi*, or lieutenant-colonel. This is what has most enraged the pacha, next to taking from him the faculty of naming his successor. He knows that; in Turkey especially, the masses act only on the impulse

of their leaders, and the Porte, by naming all the bimbashis, kaïmakans, beys, and pachas, will entirely control the Egyptian army, and can employ it, equally with their own, to depose him at pleasure. He foresees the entire overthrow of his career, and of the fortunes of all the men he has seen spring up around him, educated at his expense, appointed by him to all the higher commands in the army, and looked upon, as he says, in the light of children. Now that they are all near him, under his eyes, and that the fear of losing their posts will reanimate their courage, he hopes to obtain from them what he expected in Syria from their devotedness. He wishes to preserve the right of establishing the order of succession in his family, to prevent ambition or jealousy from arming his sons against each other."

The firman decreed also that "whatever might be the annual amount of customs, tithes, taxes, and other revenues of Egypt, one quarter should be set aside, and paid over as tribute to the Porte, without deducting any expenses." Mehemet Ali, always with the most reverential forms, declared these three conditions unacceptable. "I endeavoured to persuade him," Saïd Muhib wrote, in his letters to Constantinople, "that it was most desirable for him to submit to the engagements proposed, but far from listening to me, he reiterated the same objections. I said once more, I have ventured to importune your Highness with many arguments for your own advantage, and the interests of your family, but all to no purpose.

You must now state precisely your intentions and desires to the Sublime Porte; we shall see the answer that will arrive.—I am the servant and slave of our master the Sultan. I will write the plain truth, accompanied by my prayer. Their Excellencies the ministers of the Sublime Porte know what justice is."

I wrote immediately to M. de Bourqueney: "I was right in telling you yesterday to look well to the ground of the position. Let us thoroughly assure ourselves that the difficulties are really smoothed, that the Egyptian question is, in effect, terminated, and let us take care not to pledge ourselves prematurely by accepting as accomplished, facts which are still in suspense.—I send you a copy of the dispatches I have just received from Constantinople and Alexandria. They require no comments. If I am correctly informed, Lord Ponsonby is at the bottom of all this; his direct and personal action in London itself is the key to the obstinacy of Chekib Effendi in refusing to sign the protocol of closing. I am assured that one of the German diplomatists has seen with his own eyes the written proof, and has transmitted it to his court. Whatever may be the result of this incident, more singular than improbable, it is certain that all is not settled between the Sultan and the pacha, and that new difficulties in which the hand of Lord Ponsonby can scarcely be mistaken, are about to spring up. Rest, therefore, on your oars. The effect of this intelligence is great here,—great with the public, greater still perhaps in the diplomatic world. The displeasure

of the Germans is excessive at seeing a question revive which they believed settled, and at the precise moment when they hoped to put a term to the general tension caused by this question in Europe. They speak almost openly of the bad faith of the interpretation given by the Turkish firman to the principle of heirship in Egypt; no one understood it in that sense, and the pacha is justified in saying that he should have been apprised of it before being called upon to restore the fleet and evacuate Syria. If there is bad faith as to the heirship, there is absurdity in imposing on the pacha, with respect to the army and the tribute, conditions which would give rise to perpetual conflicts between the Porte and him, and would incessantly threaten Europe with complications similar to those the weight of which we feel at this moment. The entire policy is equally void of honesty and prudence. I see but two issues to the situation it has produced. Either, the conference of London, unanimously embarrassed by this incident, will cause a serious effort to be made at Constantinople to destroy Lord Ponsonby's work and to incline the Sultan to grant better terms to the pacha;—or, disunion will pervade the conference, and the two German powers will withdraw from the affair, declaring that in their eyes it is terminated, and that they will mix themselves up with it no longer. I trust rather to the first result, and I think, at the same time, that if a determined effort is made at Constantinople to render the Sultan more rational and loyal, success will follow without difficulty. Be this

as it may, our position is invariable; in conduct, tranquil expectation; in language, careful but positive disapprobation. We meditate no interference in favour of the pacha. We make no attempt to bring on a settlement between him and the Sultan. Let the embarrassments of this position weigh upon those by whom they have been created. We shall continue strangers to them. Our action confines itself to suggesting, at Constantinople and Alexandria, moderate counsels, and in pointing out the dangers to which fresh complications might lead. At Vienna, at Berlin, and in London itself, the Turkish firman and the new difficulties it caused to spring up between the Porte and the pacha excited surprise overflowing with displeasure. The German plenipotentiaries gave full vent to their anger. Prince Metternich went quietly to work at Constantinople to compel the Porte to modify the dispositions against which the pacha remonstrated. Lord Palmerston, at first, seemed less disposed to second these remonstrances. In replying to the grand vizier, Mehemet Ali had extended his objections beyond the leading points, and manifested for the internal administration of Egypt, pretensions of independence which furnished at the outset, fresh arms to the polemics of Lord Palmerston and the hatred of Lord Ponsonby. Baron de Brünnow seized every opportunity of throwing into the negotiation which tended to restore cordiality between England and France, impediments and delays. But the desire of Europe to put an end to a tightened and perilous

position was stronger than personal passions and the petty dilatory efforts of some of the negotiators. On the 6th of April, M. de Bourqueney wrote: "Prince Esterhazy has received a courier from Vienna this morning. I have read his dispatches. Prince Metternich has no doubt that the hatti-sheriff will be modified, as regards the heirship, the tribute, and the appointment of ranks in the army. He sends to M. de Stürmer extremely reasonable instructions on these three points." Lord Palmerston, on his part, wrote thus on the 10th of April to Lord Ponsonby: "It is most important that the points in dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet should be settled as soon as possible. Her Majesty's government think that the objection raised by your Excellency in your dispatch of the 17th of March last, against all communication from the Sultan to Mehemet Ali, considering that such would have the air of negotiation, ought not to prevail over the extreme urgency of coming to a final settlement,—a settlement which cannot take place without such direct communications. On some of the points in question between the two parties, Mehemet Ali is in the right; on others he is evidently and decidedly wrong. The Sultan should modify, without delay, such portions of his firman as give rise to reasonable objections, and explain thoroughly why he cannot change the rest without deviating from the terms of the treaty of the 15th of July, and the opinion of the four powers. Your Excellency will urge the Porte to do this without loss of time."

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Even at St. Petersburgh, the animosity of the Emperor Nicholas against King Louis Philippe did not stifle his pacific prudence. He had no desire that we should believe in active malevolence on his part, and although ever hostile at the bottom, he took pains when the situation pressed, to appear easy and conciliatory.

Baron de Bourqueney kept me fully informed of all these internal agitations amongst the allied plenipotentiaries, and I noticed them without inquietude. Their attitude towards us left me no doubt as to their real and definitive dispositions. They hastened to insert the alterations I had required in their drafts of the protocol of closure and the new general treaty, and invited me to sign this last, modified with the first, according to our desire. I refused peremptorily, until the new difficulties between the Sultan and the pacha were removed, and the Egyptian question really settled. They then proposed that at least the two acts should be provisionally initialled, to record that we approved them, while waiting the moment for final signature. I authorized Baron de Bourqueney to consent to this, and Lord Palmerston, when told of it, evinced warm satisfaction. "I feel confident," he said, "that the affair has arranged itself at Constantinople, and that the Porte has given the explanations and granted the modifications required by the pacha; but the really important fact is the sanction given to-day by your government to the acts which will constitute the return of France to the councils of Europe. In a

matter so serious, we must not lose a day. I shall call you all together at seven o'clock." The conference met that same evening, and the two modified acts were provisionally signed, one by the five plenipotentiaries without France, the other including that of the French plenipotentiary with theirs. At a later hour in the evening, the Duke of Wellington, happening to meet Baron de Bourqueney, observed, with the satisfaction of a realized prophecy, "I always said, and I was the first to say it, that nothing solid could be done without France."

The German plenipotentiaries were so convinced of this that the conditional signatures failed to tranquillize them as to the future; they wished our definitive signature to end all debate on the matter. Fearing that the solution expected from Constantinople might be doubtful or tardy, they endeavoured to conclude all in London by exchanging with Chekib Effendi (who consented with much reluctance) notes declaring that the Egyptian question was closed, and that nothing remained in dispute between the Sultan and the pacha but a domestic point with which the powers had no wish to interfere further. Prince Esterhazy and Baron de Neumann then conjured M. de Bourqueney to obtain our consent to the final signature of the acts: "Take care in Paris," they said, "that you are not, by your delays, serving the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which desires no general treaty of *five*, and that of Lord Palmerston also, which with extreme reluctance gives up the guardianship of Tur-

key by *four*, for it is in fact their own." M. de Bourqueney was a little shaken by these anxieties and remonstrances. I persisted peremptorily in my refusal. "The latest news from Constantinople," I wrote to him, "indicate no change in the situation. I wait, and I shall most certainly continue to wait until a change occurs. We shall not be slow to acknowledge that the Turco-Egyptian question is closed, but that has not yet taken place. The last instructions from Prince Metternich to M. de Stürmer, and from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby will, I think, decide the final resolutions of the Porte; and as, at Alexandria, they are in a tranquil and conciliatory mood, they will probably receive concessions very moderately reasonable. But what you tell me yourself of a petty splenetic recrudescence of Lord Palmerston, proves that we have done well in taking our securities. It is not Austria and Prussia only that are to be relieved from embarrassment; it is we ourselves, and all the world with us. And that we may really escape from difficulty here, we must not run the risk of again falling into it in the East. Between Redschid Pacha, Lord Ponsonby, M. de Stürmer, the divan, the seraglio, written instructions and spoken words, concealed and opposing influences, there has been, of late, so much complication and confusion, that we are called upon to see very clearly before we declare that all is at an end."

The clear light we wanted appeared almost at the moment of our demanding it. The Marquis Louis

de Sainte-Aulaire, chargé d'affaires at Vienna, during the absence of his father on leave, wrote to me on the 30th of March, that, the evening before, the Turkish minister for foreign affairs had been dismissed by the Sultan, and replaced by Rifat Pacha, formerly ambassador from the Porte in Austria. Lord Ponsonby transmitted the same news the same day to Lord Palmerston. For some time M. de Pontois had informed me that this change was in preparation. Mr. Bulwer, chargé d'affaires for England, in Paris, during the illness of Lord Granville, acquainted Lord Palmerston on the 23rd of April that "the immediate cause was an insignificant quarrel between the grand vizier and the minister of commerce, Ahmed Fethi Pacha, who has also been dismissed; but the success of the action is attributed to the enemies of the new Turkish reforms, and also to the resistance opposed by Redschid to the modifications desired by the great powers in the hatti-sheriff relating to Egypt;—modifications necessary to a reconciliation between the Sultan and the pacha." The influence of Prince Metternich in this change was apparent. It prevailed more and more at Constantinople over that of Lord Ponsonby. "The latter has overshot his mark," said Prince Esterhazy to Baron de Bourqueney; "even Lord Palmerston begins to find it out, and to feel the necessity of disengaging himself, with us, from the local intrigues of Constantinople." As soon as he learnt the fall of Redschid Pacha, Prince Metternich forwarded to

Baron de Stürmer instructions somewhat pedantic and verbose, according to his habit, but, withal, extremely judicious, and concluding with this formal order:—"You will invite your colleagues of Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, to a meeting, and you will make known to them: 1. That the Emperor, our august master, being determined on his part to restrain himself within the limits of the resolutions passed in common by the plenipotentiaries of the four powers assembled in London, directs you to insist, with the divan, on the admission of the modifications which these same courts desire to see introduced, in the interest of the Porte itself, into certain articles of the firman of investiture of the pacha of Egypt. 2. That, in virtue of this decision, you are instructed to invite your colleagues to join with you in a common measure to be adopted, in this sense, with the Porte; that in case this union cannot be obtained, you are charged to take the step in question, with the divan, either alone, or with such of your colleagues as may join you. 3. That having acquitted yourself, towards the divan, of counsels conformable with the resolutions taken in the central locality of London, and in case of refusal on the part of his Highness the Sultan to acquiesce in the wishes of his allies, you have also to declare that his Highness being master of his decisions, his Imperial Majesty, on his part, should look upon as accomplished the task he had undertaken by the engagements contracted on the 15th of July, 1840, and that

he should henceforward consider himself restored to entire liberty of position and action."

The Porte had no disposition to reject such a peremptory notice. The new reis-effendi, Rifat Pacha, immediately dispatched orders to Chekib Effendi to refer to the conference in London on the modifications demanded in the firman of investiture of Mehemet Ali, and gave him at the same time powers sufficiently extensive to bind his own government according to the advice he might receive from the four powers. "Baron de Bülow," M. de Bourqueney wrote on the 27th of April, "has read a letter to me this morning which says that, on the 17th, they received at Vienna, intelligence from Constantinople dated on the 6th. Lord Ponsonby at last understands that it was desired in London that the Turco-Egyptian question should end at Constantinople, and he is now labouring to produce its conclusion. Better late than never, wrote M. de Werther to M. de Bülow; but we have reached the dénouement."

We are not yet so close to it as M. de Werther flattered himself. Chekib Effendi called for the opinion of the plenipotentiaries in London on the modifications demanded by the pacha in the firman of investiture. The conference replied that the succession ought to be fixed in the family of Mehemet Ali, according to the Oriental principle of seniority, which regulates that power passes in the direct line, through the male issue from elder to elder, amongst

the sons and grandsons. As to the tribute, it declared itself incompetent to name a figure, but expressed a wish that the amount should be fixed and regulated once for all, so as not to load the pacha with charges too heavy for his government. With respect to the appointment of ranks in the army, the conference thought that it behoved the Sultan to delegate to the ruler of Egypt the powers he might deem necessary, reserving to himself the right of extending or restraining those powers, according to experience and the requirements of the service. The questions seemed thus determined, but Chekib Effendi doubted whether he was sufficiently authorized to accept these solutions, by finally binding his government. The Porte wished to obtain from Europe, as the price of its concessions, an official guarantee of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The English cabinet was warmly attacked in Parliament by the Tories, and approached a crisis which threatened its existence. On the verge of the end the negotiation lagged and languished still, either from the will or position of the negotiators.

But while they hesitated in London, a peremptory decision took place at Constantinople. The Marquis de Sainte-Aulaire wrote to me from Vienna on the 6th of May: "A courier who arrived last night from Constantinople has brought to Prince Metternich the intelligence he impatiently expected of the modifications made by the Porte, in conformity with the demands of the allies, in the hatti-sheriff for the investiture of

Mehemet Ali. The heirship in the government of Egypt, with transmission in the order of pronogeniture from male to male, and the appointment of officers to the rank of full colonel inclusive, are granted to the pacha. The quota of tribute will be subsequently fixed (not on the casual revenue of the province) at a sum to be determined in common accord. This decision of the Sublime Porte has been recorded in a *memorandum* handed to the envoys of the powers at Constantinople, bearing date the 19th of April. M. de Metternich forwards it this evening to Paris and London.

"The joy displayed by the Prince at this news, which he considers the pledge of a *bonâ fide* conclusion, seems to me lively and sincere. He congratulates himself on having at last terminated this long and difficult affair. After receiving his instructions of the 26th of March (the prince informed me), M. de Stürmer addressed the most urgent remonstrances to the Porte, in which he was warmly supported by his colleagues of Russia and Prussia. But all their efforts were annulled by the contrary advice incessantly given to the divan by Lord Ponsonby. The instructions in virtue of which you act, said the English ambassador to his colleagues, are anterior to our last dispatches; they are framed under the exclusively Egyptian influence of Commodore Napier. Who knows whether the appeal addressed since by the Sultan to the exalted wisdom of the central conference in London may not cause them to be modified? Thus Lord Ponsonby paralysed the

effect of all the measures attempted by his associates. When the internuncio became more pressing, Rifat Pacha replied that he could do nothing, and that his influence in the divan was not great enough to obtain new concessions, as long as it was possible to entertain the hopes encouraged by the English ambassador. Finally, my instructions of the 2nd of April arrived. M. de Stürmer sought his colleagues, and informed them that he had received orders to proceed with three, or two, or alone. The envoys of Prussia and Russia expressed their determination to join him. An exact copy of the orders sent by Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, communicated here by Lord Beauvale, was, moreover, forwarded to M. de Stürmer, who used it, not to persuade, for that was impossible, but at least to silence his refractory colleague, who not wishing to be defeated, held aloof until the last moment. Nevertheless, the *quasi* collective step of the other envoys sufficed to determine the submission of the Porte, and thank God all is settled.

"Now then," added M. de Metternich, "the moment has arrived for France to convert the provisional signature into a definitive one. I have written to M. d'Appony to make this formal demand of M. Guizot, and I beg you also to write in the same sense. There is henceforth utility, and opportunity for all. But, besides the general interest, I avow that I consider myself, from to-day, as personally engaged in this question. I took upon myself to arrest the efforts (inopportune some weeks ago) addressed to your

minister to induce him to sign; I had the courage to blame the premature demand of our envoys fixing beforehand and spontaneously, the moment when the signature could be equitably called for and profitably accorded. Now that the time has arrived, if the signature is still refused, I shall be seriously compromised in all eyes by the moral responsibility I have assumed. I venture to say that I ought not to receive so bad a return, and that it must be admitted that nothing now opposes a definitive signature. There is no occasion to ask or wait what Mehemet Ali may say to the new concessions of the Porte. They are those he has asked for. The answer he will return to the Sultan may be dilatory, but must be good. In no case can it be bad, or amount to a refusal; this is not supposable. But he will show less eagerness in acceptance, if he is still permitted to think that he may gain by delay. It is highly important not to let him receive or retain this idea. Let us hasten to draw a line of separation between the past and the future. New difficulties must of course spring up every day; we do not build for eternity; but new difficulties, if they come, ought not to complicate themselves with the past of an old affair. When they present themselves we shall concert measures; each will see the course he ought to take; each will be free in his movements; we shall have to deal with a new transaction and not with the continuation of one we have already settled. I attach great value to this view of the question. Moreover, I feel confident that M. Guizot will participate in my

sentiment, and not hesitate to declare that what is finished is finished."

M. de Metternich estimated my disposition correctly I wrote to M. de Bourqueney without delay: "I have sent you the last intelligence from Vienna and Constantinople. I presume the conference will assemble immediately to take note of the modifications appended by the Sultan to his hatti-sheriff of the 13th of February, and that we shall now be asked to transform our provisional signature into a final one. We have no longer any grounds for refusal. The modifications granted are, for the most part, what Mehemet Ali demands; what still remains in debate is evidently of an internal nature, and ought to be settled between the Sultan and the pacha alone. We have therefore determined to sign when required. Your full powers are ready and will be forwarded without delay."

"But while I tell you we are ready to sign, I add that in the extremely close prospect of the retirement of the English cabinet, we should be as much, and more disposed to sign with its successors. This would have a better effect both in Paris and London. I need not tell you the reasons. Without therefore eluding in any manner the fulfilment of our promise, when claimed, do nothing to hasten this demand, and gain rather twenty-four hours if you can conveniently do so, and if the change from one cabinet to another, takes place, as I think probable, within that interval."

Two days later, on the 18th of May, M. de Bourqueney replied: "In expectation of your orders, I

had already taken the attitude you recommend, showing myself ready to keep our engagements with respect to the final signature, and avoiding all appearance of a disposition to elude either the substance or the form. Chekib Effendi has requested an appointment with Lord Palmerston. I doubt whether he can be received to-day. If he is, Lord Palmerston will not have time to open the conference; this meeting cannot take place before to-morrow; they must either write or speak to me. This brings us, at least, to Thursday. I may, without affectation, gain twenty-four hours more. It is therefore not probable that my demand for powers can reach you before Sunday the 23rd. I had already understood, and I comprehend still better to-day, the difficulties which this ministerial crisis in England adds to the exact appreciation of the moment we ought to select for exchanging our provisional consent to a final signature, and it is not without some degree of dread that I feel weighing on me so great a share of responsibility in such an important decision. Although I believe the existing cabinet is in agony, nothing proves that its convulsions may not last long enough to interdict the system of prolonged delays. I can undertake to gain days without risk; but I could not promise weeks without exciting suspicions to be reckoned with hereafter."

M. de Bourqueney was spared the trouble of gaining either days or weeks of delay. Called to Lord Palmerston on the 24th of May, he wrote thus on leaving

him: "I have only time for two lines. The moment has not arrived for final signature. The conversation with Lord Palmerston leaves me no doubt on this point. The *past is not sufficiently closed.* My courier will bring you explanations to-morrow."

The following day brought this intelligence: "The conference met the day before yesterday, the 23rd. Chekib Effendi, when communicating the *memorandum* by which the Porte has modified, according to the principal desires of the pacha, the firmân of investiture, announced that he had received the necessary powers for proceeding to the final signature of the two acts remaining in suspense from the 15th of March last. It had been settled that Lord Palmerston should invite me to call upon him on Monday, the 24th, should acquaint me with what had passed at the conference on the preceding evening, ask me if I was furnished with the necessary powers to sign the new general convention, and in case they had not yet arrived, request me to demand them from the King's government. I went yesterday to Lord Palmerston, who made his communication, and put his question. I replied that the King's government had not deviated from the ground it had taken on the day of the provisional signatures, which it had made subordinate to the accomplished fact of the closing of the Turco-Egyptian question. If the last events at Constantinople, I said, seem to you to establish this closing peremptorily, I do not doubt for a moment that my government will furnish me with the necessary powers

to sign the convention definitively. You remember, my lord, our conversation from the first day, in this same place; we shall do nothing as *five*, I told you, without a perfect assurance that either diplomatically or materially, nothing further was possible by *four*, as a sequel to the treaty of July. I remember those words, Lord Palmerston replied. I approved of them then, and I agree with them now. At the instance of some allied courts, I made the sacrifice of suppressing my personal opinion on the motives which seemed to me still to contend in favour of an adjournment of the final signature; but to-day when I am instructed to ask if you are ready to sign, you have a right to propose again the question you put to me at the beginning; you have a right to ask me if the treaty of the 15th of July is extinct in all its possible consequences; and although I believe it to be so in fact, as I expect daily to receive news that the last concessions of the divan have been accepted by the pacha, I feel bound to declare to you, as a man of honour, that a refusal on the part of Mehemet Ali would seem to me to place the powers who signed the treaty of July under the necessity of doing something to compel the acceptance, by the pacha, of the reasonable conditions which their action at Constantinople has contributed to secure for him. I believe, I am almost convinced that this will not happen; but a possibility suffices to prevent me, as a duty to myself, from engaging the responsibility of your government to its chambers, or yours to your government, by a signature prematurely founded on a

certainty which is not yet complete. You have, for two months, placed yourselves with us on ground perfectly loyal. I owed you in exchange the sincerity with which I now speak.

"All this was said in an amicable tone, to which I felt called upon to reply with the same confidence. 'Well, my lord,' I said, 'I expected to return home to ask the King's government to furnish me with the necessary powers for the signature of the new convention. I must now write that the moment for that proceeding has not yet arrived. My instructions have always been peremptory on this point,—the closure, the definitive closure of the past. The past is not closed while the shadow of a possibility remains to the contrary, as far as you are concerned.

"I was unwilling to accept without reserve Lord Palmerston's insinuation as to the possibility of a new intervention by *four* in the disputes between the Porte and the pacha. I expressed that I utterly rejected the idea of bringing back the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to a question so completely exhausted for them. 'The error of the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin,' replied Lord Palmerston, 'has consisted, for two months, in persuading themselves that they could terminate a question by declaring it terminated. Hence those diplomatic documents which have followed each other, and each of which was announced as the last. I believe, in fact, that we have reached the end; but I am not so completely certain as to lead you to participate my conviction, in honour,

when that certainty is the condition chosen by you and admitted by us, of your return to the councils of Europe. A few weeks, days, or perhaps hours, may dissipate these lingering clouds which still envelop the question. A little patience, and it will be completely disposed of. The affair thus settled, will be better settled for you and for us.'"

The anger of the German plenipotentiaries was extreme. "They rave," said M. de Bourqueney, "against Lord Palmerston, who, they affirm, wishes to leave the question open in London, to prevent its being closed at Constantinople or Alexandria. They add, that he disposes of their cabinets too lightly; that they will never lend themselves to any act whatever by *four*, from the day when we sign by *five;* and supposing Lord Palmerston should invite them to do so, his attempt would fail completely." Their colleagues at Paris held the same language to me; they could not comprehend Lord Palmerston's conduct; they sought its cause and object. Count Appony saw in it a fit of jealousy against Prince Metternich; Baron Arnim suspected some secret design of still keeping the East in trouble, and Europe in alarm. I thanked them for their sentiments, without relying on their efficacy. "The Germans," Baron de Bourqueney wrote, "talk much, but act little. M. de Bülow has sent a *memorandum* to Berlin, in which he lays down that the powers which signed the treaty of July are disengaged from all the obligations it imposed on them. This memorandum was at first intended for Lord

Palmerston; but M. de Bülow fears that Prince Esterhazy will hesitate to sign it until he receives instructions from Vienna. . . . I have never deceived myself on the weakness of these brave hearts. . . . I have just read a dispatch from Prince Metternich, which urges the immediate signature of the act of the 15th of March last, but which is feebly expressed; and I dislike this reserve that the refusal of Mehemet Ali would, in fact, constitute a new rebellion, and therefore a new European question."

There is a wide distinction between politicians formed under a free system, in the midst of its exigencies and combats, and those who have lived far from every public and luminous arena, in the exercise of a power exempt from control and responsibility. Both classes require for their task real superiority. Political life is difficult even in courts, and silent power cannot dispense with ability. But compelled to foresight and struggle, the heads of a free government learn to view things as they really are, whether they please or displease them; to keep an exact account of the conditions of success, and to meet firmly the trials they must go through. Illusions are almost impossible for them, and they can scarcely flatter themselves more than they are flattered. On the other hand, the ministers of absolute power, exempted from the necessity of proving every day to rigorous spectators that they are following a right course, and of vanquishing ardent adversaries at every step, are more complaisant to themselves, more ready

to admit hope or fear, and more impatient under difficulties and errors. Free government forms masculine habits and minds severe to themselves as to others; it unconditionally demands men. Absolute power admits and excites a much greater degree of lightness, caprice, inconsistency, and weakness, and the most eminent of its exponents preserve ample remnants of the dispositions of children.

Although I was fully persuaded of the friendly feeling of Prince Metternich in the Egyptian question, and of the importance of what he had done to hasten its conclusion, I scarcely reckoned more than M. de Bourqueney did on his energetic resistance to a strongly established wish of the English cabinet; and I instructed our envoy to thank Lord Palmerston on my part for the frankness of his last declaration, stating also my astonishment at his obstinacy in maintaining the treaty of the 15th July in vigour, against the formal desire of his principal allies. At the same time, I said to the English chargé d'affaires in Paris, "I distinctly note to you that it is not the French government which retards the signature of the new convention; it is the British cabinet, through its organ Lord Palmerston." Mr. Bulwer reported these words to his chief. M. de Bourqueney wrote in consequence: "Lord Palmerston has evinced considerable annoyance at this; he says he is held up to Europe as an obstacle to the general reconciliation, he, who has ever been ready to change his initials to a full signature, and that he only expressed honest scruples by placing himself in

our point of view. It rested with me then to sustain the contest with advantage, upon the facts; but to what would such a controversy tend? Let us cast aside petty recriminations. Lord Palmerston must reply to Mr. Bulwer, to release, he says, his personal responsibility." This incident led to long and subtle explanations on Lord Palmerston's part, which I gladly allowed to drop.

I now carried my solicitude to another quarter. I wrote to Count de Rohan Chabot, then on a mission extraordinary at Alexandria: "It is not without uneasiness that I see the Viceroy deviate from the tone of submission he had adopted towards the Porte, and assume a language which in some degree presents the air of equal treating with equal. This is precisely the appearance which, for his own interest, he ought most carefully to avoid. It was the cause or pretext of the alliance formed against him on the 15th of July, —an alliance which appeared to have reached the moment of dissolution when he declared his submission to the orders of the Sultan. If there is a means of reviving it, or rather of prolonging its existence, (for it still exists at this moment, although several states who were parties to it are evidently most desirous to disengage themselves,) it is unquestionably through the attempt of Mehemet Ali to set up fresh pretensions of independence with regard to his sovereign. Nothing could more effectually aid the views of the governments, which, less favourably disposed towards him or France, work secretly to retard the moment

when the return of the King's government to the councils of Europe will loudly proclaim that the treaty of the 15th of July exists no longer. The signature of the act intended to replace the relations of the powers on the footing on which they stood a year ago, is still adjourned, and the motive for this adjournment is precisely the dread of the resistance of Mehemet Ali to the wishes of the Porte, and of the complications which may result therefrom. The Viceroy, in his own pressing interest, must remove all cause or pretext for these real or pretended fears; and the only mode of effecting this, is by declaring himself fully satisfied with the *memorandum* of the Porte. This *memorandum* grants his most important and only essential demands. He obtains the substantial right of succession, the appointment to ranks in the Egyptian army, and the substitution of a fixed for a proportional tribute. It is true the amount of this tribute is not yet named; Mehemet Ali fears that it may be on a scale that he considers inadmissible, but nothing is decided on the subject. This is a point between the Sultan and the pacha, and the latter has himself indicated to you a mode of arrangement which is probably not the only one. The path of representations is open to him; he may reckon on the aid of circumstances, and on the necessity the Porte may be under of conciliating his support. What he must avoid is declaring beforehand an absolute refusal, which, placing him again in a state of revolt, would transform this purely domestic question into one of general policy,

would restore strength to the treaty of July at the moment of its expiration, and would compel the allied powers to interfere in details which they have acknowledged themselves incapable of regulating. It is of more consequence to Mehemet Ali than to any one else, that the exceptional situation created by this treaty should not be prolonged, and that each of the States who have signed it should resume its individual position and liberty of action. He ought therefore to be very careful of all that could oppose this result, and I cannot too strongly recommend you to give him, in this sense, the most urgent advice."

Mehemèt Ali was one of those aspiring ambitionists alternately chimerical and rational, obstinate and fatalistic, who push their fortune beyond all bounds, but who, on the eve of ruin, submit suddenly to the necessities they were unable to foresee. The Count de Chabot wrote on the 12th of June: "The Russian steamer 'Saleck' arrived at Alexandria on the evening of the 7th, having on board an envoy from the Porte, Kiamil Effendi, instructed to deliver to Saïd Muhib Effendi, the new hatti-sheriff of investiture, a letter from the grand vizier to Mehemet Ali, and the special firman which fixes the tribute at 80,000 purses, to date from the commencement of the year. On the 8th, Saïd Muhib Effendi and the new envoy waited upon the Viceroy to communicate these documents, and remained in conference with him the whole day. Mehemet Ali declared, at this interview, that the re-

sources of Egypt would not permit him to place at the Sultan's disposition so large a sum as 80,000 purses, and induced Saïd Muhib Effendi to receive again the firman which regulates the tribute; but he said that he no less considered the general question as terminated, and that the hatti-sheriff of investiture would be solemnly read with all the customary ceremonial. On the morning of the 10th, in fact, the Viceroy, surrounded by the chief dignitaries of Egypt, received the two Ottoman envoys in the great hall of his palace. Saïd Muhib Effendi having presented to him the hatti-sheriff, Mehemet Ali pressed it to his lips and forehead, and Sami Bey read it with a loud voice. The pacha was then invested with the decoration sent by the Sultan. Salvos of artillery from the forts and squadron, a general display of flags, and other public demonstrations, announced to the city the solemn promulgation of the imperial decree."

I immediately forwarded this intelligence by telegraph to Baron de Bourqueney.

It reached London in the midst of a flagrant universal crisis. On the 5th of June, on a motion of Sir Robert Peel, the House of Commons had declared that the Whig cabinet no longer retained its confidence. On the 23rd, Parliament was dissolved. The elections, nearly all over, secured to the Tories a strong majority. On the 29th, M. de Bourqueney wrote thus: "You are aware that I have been extremely reserved in my predictions; I dreaded even the responsibility of my own impressions when I feared

their influence on our great diplomatic affairs; to-day I think I can without rashness pronounce the fate of the present cabinet as decided in the new house. But will it retire before Parliament meets? I hear the Tories say that Sir Robert Peel will not consent to form the new ministry before that epoch. I require to know as soon as possible whether this internal situation ought to influence my diplomatic conduct. I do not conceal from myself the difficulty of adjourning all decision on our part for the seven or eight weeks during which the present cabinet may live. Prussia and Austria are not likely to assist us in this plan, and some mode must be thought of to induce them to accede to it. You wrote to me, six weeks ago, that you did not wish to sign with dying men. I replied then that their malady might last long enough to cause us much embarrassment. We now know its term. Decide."

I immediately replied by telegraph: "Do nothing to adjourn the final signature of the acts initialled, and sign the new general convention as soon as you are asked to do so, after the signing of the protocol of closure, as regards the Egyptian question."

"Your telegraphic dispatch of yesterday," M. de Bourqueney answered, "removes all uncertainty. I shall create no delay, nor allow any to be created that I can prevent. To-day I had occasion to see Lord Palmerston on another affair. I took advantage of my visit to show him the dispatch from Alexandria. He knows now that all is finished; but if it were

merely to justify his last delays, he will wait until complete and regular information is forwarded to himself. In other respects he was disposed to be amiable this morning, for without stating precisely what he still waited for, before the definitive signature, but arguing as if we had reached that point, he said; 'Believe me, I shall hail it as a truly welcome day when I add the last letters of my name to the first, in our general convention.'"

Eight days later, on the 10th of July, M. de Bourqueney wrote again: "I am stepping into my carriage for Windsor, where the Queen has just invited me most graciously to pass eight-and-forty hours. The Austrian courier arrived this morning, bearing official dispatches from Constantinople of the 22nd of June. It is probably I who may announce this to Lord Palmerston at Windsor. We shall sign, without doubt, in the course of the next week."

The Austrian courier, in fact, brought to Lord Palmerston the following laconic dispatch from Lord Ponsonby, dated the 21st of June: "Before this reaches London your Lordship will, no doubt, have known for some time that Mehemet Ali has accepted the firman. Nevertheless, I think it right to send, enclosed in this, the dispatch I have just received from Egypt announcing the satisfactory news."

Five days before, on the 16th of June, Lord Ponsonby had written to Lord Palmerston: "The French boat, which arrived on the 14th, brought letters saying that Mehemet Ali intends to refuse the new fir-

man. One of them is from a person well known as having the best information in Alexandria, When these letters were written, Mehemet Ali had not yet received the firman, but he was aware of its contents. He may modify his views before replying, and perhaps has reasons for expressing his intention of refusal. He will probably do something to gain time. I think, as I have always thought, that he will only execute the measures ordered by the Sultan, in compliance with the advice of the great powers."

Lord Ponsonby's opinion was of little importance this time; Lord Palmerston immediately dispatched to London the order to complete all the official formalities necessary for the full signature of the acts conditionally signed on the 15th of May preceding; and, on the 13th of July, M. de Bourqueney wrote to me: "The plenipotentiaries of the six courts were convoked yesterday at the Foreign Office. The plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Ottoman Porte, first affixed their signatures to the protocol of closure touching the Egyptian question, which was dated the 10th of July, the day on which intelligence arrived, through Constantinople, that Mehemet Ali had accepted the Sultan's new firman. The general convention for closing the straits was then signed by all of us, in the official order of the powers, bearing date the 13th of July, 1841. The delay for exchange of ratifications is fixed at two months."

The Egyptian question was settled. A question

raised, in 1840, much above its real importance, and in which, imperfectly informed as to facts, we had engaged ourselves much further than comported with the strength of the pacha, and the interest of France. I recapitulate the results of the solution it received in 1841, by the negotiation I have here related, and the convention by which it was wound up.

European peace was maintained; and in the bosom of peace, the precautionary armaments, levied by France in 1840, were maintained also; the fortifications of Paris were erected; the French government established itself in the isolation made for it by an insufficient estimate of its presence and opinion. Europe felt the weight of the void which absent France left in its councils, and evinced an anxiety for her recall. France declined returning until Europe advanced to invite her, after compelling the Porte to the concessions demanded by the pacha, and declaring that the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, was completely and for ever extinct.

Mehemet Ali, driven from Syria, and threatened in Egypt itself, was hereditarily established there, on equitable conditions; not by his own strength, but through consideration for France, and because the powers signing the treaty of the 15th of July, were disinclined to run the risk either of disunion or of giving birth to new complications.

By the convention of the 13th of July, 1841, the Porte was withdrawn from the exclusive protectorate of Russia, and placed within the sphere of the

general interests and common deliberations of Europe.

By these results, the check France had received, the fruit of her own error in the question, was limited and stayed; she resumed her position in Europe, and secured that of her client in Egypt. We had done and obtained, in the end, what we ought to have done and might have obtained in the beginning. This was all the success that the situation bequeathed to me in 1840 admitted. I did not conceal from myself that it was inadequate to satisfy the national sentiment carried away beyond truth and sound judgment. I foresaw that the convention of the 13th of July, 1841, and the negotiation which had led to it, would be the object of animated attacks. But, after what I had seen and learned during my embassy in England, I resumed office, fully determined never to subject the foreign policy of France to the chimeras and mistakes of the day. Some weeks after the closure of the Egyptian question, and with reference to vague overtures which had been made to us on the affairs of the East in general, I wrote to Count de Sainte-Aulaire, who, at my suggestion, had been appointed by the King his ambassador in London: "Let us neither elude nor seek anything. It is our habit to be confident, presuming, hasty. We intoxicate ourselves with our desires, as if they were always our right and in our power. We love appearance almost more than reality. I am convinced that, to re-establish and extend our influence in Europe, we ought to follow an

opposite mode. Everywhere, and on all occasions, I am determined to sacrifice the report to the fact, the appearance to the reality, the first moment to the last. We shall thus risk less, and gain more; and, finally, there is no dignity in any other course."

CHAPTER III.

THE RIGHT OF SEARCH.

LORD PALMERSTON ASKS ME TO SIGN THE NEW TREATY PREPARED IN 1840, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.—MY REFUSAL AND ITS CAUSES.—ACCESSION OF THE CABINET OF SIR ROBERT PEEL AND LORD ABERDEEN.—I CONSENT THEN (ON THE 20TH OF DECEMBER, 1841) TO SIGN THE NEW TREATY.—FIRST DEBATE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ON THIS SUBJECT.—AMENDMENT OF M. JACQUES LEFEBVRE ON THE ADDRESS.—TRUE CAUSE OF THE STATE OF MINDS.—I ADJOURN THE RATIFICATION OF THE NEW TREATY.—ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH CABINET.—RATIFICATIONS ARE EXCHANGED IN LONDON, BETWEEN THE OTHER POWERS, AND THE PROTOCOL IS LEFT OPEN FOR FRANCE.—FRESH DEBATES IN THE TWO CHAMBERS AGAINST THE RIGHT OF SEARCH, AND THE CONVENTIONS OF 1831 AND 1833.—WE DEFINITIVELY REFUSE TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF THE 20TH OF DECEMBER, 1841.—MODERATION AND GOODWILL OF LORD ABERDEEN.—THE PROTOCOL OF THE 19TH OF FEBRUARY IS CLOSED, AND THE TREATY OF THE 20TH OF DECEMBER, 1841, ANNULLED FOR FRANCE.—AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1843-1844, A PARAGRAPH INSERTED IN THE ADDRESS OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES EXPRESSES A WISH FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT OF SEARCH.—WHY I DO NOT IMMEDIATELY ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION WITH THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS SUBJECT.—VISIT OF QUEEN VICTORIA TO THE CHATEAU D'EU.—ITS EFFECT IN FRANCE AND EUROPE.—I PREPARE THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT OF SEARCH.—DISPOSITIONS OF LORD ABERDEEN AND SIR ROBERT PEEL.—FRESH DEBATES ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE CHAMBERS AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1844.—VISIT OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS TO ENGLAND.—VISIT OF KING LOUIS PHILIPPE TO WINDSOR.—I ACCOMPANY HIM.—NEGOTIATION ENTERED UPON FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT OF

SEARCH.—HOW CAN THIS RIGHT BE REPLACED FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE TRADE?—THE DUKE DE BROGLIE AND DR. LUSHINGTON ARE APPOINTED TO EXAMINE THIS QUESTION.—THEIR MEETING IN LONDON.—NEW PLAN PROPOSED.—IT IS ADOPTED AND REPLACES THE RIGHT OF SEARCH IN VIRTUE OF A TREATY CONCLUDED ON THE 25TH OF MAY, 1845.—PRESENTATION, ADOPTION, AND PROMULGATION OF A BILL FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS TREATY.

On the day of signing the convention of the 13th of July, 1841, the signatures were scarcely affixed, when Lord Palmerston spoke again to M. de Bourqueney of the treaty prepared, three years before, between the five great powers, to secure the more effectual repression of the slave trade, and which had remained in abeyance since 1840. He asked him to remind me of it, and to invite me to conclude that affair also. On the 20th of July, I replied to M. de Bourqueney; "I wish to tell you on this subject my real feeling and intention. For nine months I have carefully avoided, with Lord Palmerston, all petty debates. There have been no complaints, no recriminations, no trivial jealousies. In no instance have I exhibited temper or ill-will. I have transacted business simply, tranquilly, without yielding anything substantial, but keeping to main points, and throwing aside incidents and impediments. The political position required this. My opinion of Lord Palmerston justified it. I think highly of his understanding. I have confidence in his word. His manner of treating, though a little narrow and perverse, suits me. He is clear, prompt, and firm. I neither believe in his hatred to France or to the

King, nor in his imputed perfidies; and as to difficulties, I may say of the misunderstandings occasioned by his passionate love of argument, his disposition to shut himslf up in his own constructions, and to push them to extremes without seeing anything above, beyond, or on either side;—I am neither offended by, nor do I complain of them. This is the natural construction of his mind; we must accept it, and with a good grace when we treat with him. I therefore find within myself at the close of this long negotiation, nothing which indisposes me to terminate as soon as possible the pending affairs.

"But, while subordinating little things to great, I do not close my eyes to the small ones, neither do I forget the grievances which at the moment, I thought it unseasonable to notice. I have three of these against Lord Palmerston;—

"1. His dispatch of the 2nd of November, 1840. A bad proceeding towards the new cabinet and myself. A proceeding which I attribute to want of foresight and carelessness of the effect that dispatch might produce, and not to evil intentions; but the mischief was not the less real, and I felt it keenly, as every one remarked.

"2. On the 26th of April last, I instructed you to speak to Lord Palmerston on the state of South America, and of the propriety of France and England acting in concert to restore peace between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. You informed me on the 11th of May, that he had received the idea very favourably;

that you were confident, instructions in that sense would be speedily addressed to Mr. Mandeville, and you even asked the name of our chargé d'affaires at Buenos Ayres, to enable Mr. Mandeville to put himself in friendly and confidential relations with him, tending to give this double action, unity and efficacy. And yet, when called a short time after to this subject in the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston rejected all idea of concert with France, and spoke of the action of England between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video as entirely separated from, and foreign to ours.

"3. The speech he lately delivered, during the electoral contest, on the *hustings* at Tiverton. What would have been said in England, if, at Lisieux, speaking to the world at large, personified by my constituents, I had held similar language with respect to England, her government, and her armies? In this speech, Lord Palmerston compared the conduct of the English in India, and of the French in Algeria, in the following terms:*—

"'We brought within British influence, in one campaign, a vast extent of country larger than France, almost as big as half Europe; and the way in which this was done and the results which have followed are well deserving of the attention of the people of England. There is a contrast of which we may have reason to be proud, between the progress of our arms in the East, and the operations which a neigh-

* The entire speech from which I give this extract, was published in the 'Morning Chronicle' of the 30th of June, 1841.

bouring power, France, is now carrying on in Africa. The progress of the British arms in Asia has been marked by a scrupulous reference to justice, an inviolable respect for property, an abstinence from anything which could tend to wound the feelings and prejudices of the people; and the result is this, that I saw, not many weeks ago, a distinguished military officer who had just returned from the centre of Affghanistan, from a place called Candahar, which many of you perhaps never heard of, and he told me that he, accompanied by half-a-dozen attendants, but without any military escort, had ridden on horseback many hundreds of miles, through a country inhabited by wild and semi-barbarous tribes who, but two years ago, were arrayed in fierce hostility against the approach of the British arms; but that he had ridden through them all with as much safety as he could have ridden from Tiverton to John o' Groat's House; his name as a British officer being a passport through them all, because the English had respected their rights, and afforded them protection, and treated them with justice. Thence it is that an unarmed Englishman was safe in the midst of their wilds. The different system pursued in Africa by the French had been productive of very different results; there the French army, I am sorry to say, is tarnished by the character of their operations. They sally forth unawares on the villagers of the country; they put to death every man who cannot escape by flight, and they carry off into captivity the women and children. (Shame! shame!) They carry away every head of cattle, every sheep, and every horse, and they burn what they cannot carry off. The crop on the ground and the corn in the granaries are consumed by the fire of the invaders. (Shame!) What is the consequence? While in India our officers ride about unarmed and alone amidst the wildest tribes of the wilderness, there is not a

Frenchman in Africa who shows his face above a given spot, from the sentry at his post, who does not fall a victim to the wild and justifiable retaliation of the Arabs (hear, hear). They professed to colonize Algeria, but they are only encamped in military posts; and while we in India have the feelings of the people with us, in Africa every native is opposed to the French, and every heart burns with the desire of vengeance (hear, hear). I mention these things because it is right you should know them. They are an additional proof that, even in this world, Providence has decreed that injustice and violence shall meet with their appropriate punishment, and that justice and mercy shall also have their reward,' etc., etc.

"Upon all this, my dear Baron, I have no wish to build any ground of remonstrance, or to take any step. Nothing here would prevent me from concluding with Lord Palmerston the affairs in suspense, if the interest of our country required that I should do so. But all this exonerates me from anxiousness, from any act of supererogatory goodwill; it even demands a certain degree of coldness. I wish to do nothing unpleasant, nothing disagreeable. I shall adopt no unfriendly proceeding; I neither desire, nor am called upon to be particularly gracious. I wish to mark that I have observed what I have not acted on, and that I have felt, though I have not complained. With one who shows little amiability, complaint is not dignified; neither is carelessness more so. I ask only what is due to me; but I give nothing beyond what I receive.

"You see here, my dear Baron, the motives which

regulate my present conduct, and I ask you, in the relations you may yet have with Lord Palmerston, to modify upon what I now tell you, your own attitude and language, without rigidity, without affectation, but, at the same time, in a manner that must command notice. The shading is delicate, but you are fully capable of handling and of making it felt."

I required from M. de Bourqueney an attitude which accorded well with the judicious acuteness of his understanding, and something less with the naturally courteous and gentle features of his character.

He replied, "I comprehend perfectly the reasons which prevent you from seconding Lord Palmerston in his liquidation of the *Foreign Office*. I am preparing for a very anxious question on the slave trade. My answer will be vague, indicating neither concurrence, nor opposition. I shall confine myself within the limits you have so delicately fixed." And some days later, he added: "Lord Palmerston has asked me whether I have received an answer from your Excellency relative to the general convention for the suppression of the slave traffic. I answered that I had not yet received instructions on that head; but I avoided all allusion to the causes which retarded their transmission. 'I am compelled to be in rule,' Lord Palmerston said, 'and I am going to address an official note to you. The representatives of the three other courts hold their powers. It is France, who, in concert with us, has invited Austria, Prussia, and Russia to sign in common a general convention. The

three powers have replied to our invitation. Delay is no longer justifiable on your part or ours.' I then threw out some general remarks on the careful examination which the details of the convention would require, and on the delays that must be produced by the division of functions, in this matter, between the minister for foreign affairs, and the minister of marine. Lord Palmerston listened to me, but I failed to convince him. Mr. Bulwer will receive instructions analogous to the spirit and text of the note to be addressed to me, and the forwarding of which I should have vainly endeavoured to forestall."

I received both through M. de Bourquency and Mr. Bulwer, a formal demand from Lord Palmerston for the signature of the new convention. I replied officially, by the following dispatch which I instructed M. de Bourqueney to communicate to him: "I have received, with your letter of the 14th of this month, a copy of the note addressed to you by Lord Palmerston expressing his desire that the King's government should authorize you to sign immediately, with the plenipotentiaries of the other great powers, the plan of a general treaty drawn up in London, three years ago, for the more effectual suppression of the traffic in negroes. I need not tell you that in the object of this convention and in the sum total of its provisions, there neither does nor can exist any difference of opinion between the King's government and that of her Britannic Majesty. But some of the secondary clauses appear to require certain explanations which

will, I trust, anticipate the difficulties their execution might encounter. Public opinion is not less decided in France than in England against the infamous trade, the last traces of which it is now sought to obliterate. But it is not equally so unanimous on the fitness of some of the measures to be taken for the attainment of the object in question; and on this point there are still doubts and suspicions which call for removal. These difficulties are not insurmountable, and if more pressing questions had not recently absorbed our exclusive activity, if it had been possible to fix on this point the public attention distracted from it by other considerations, it is probable that we might have already triumphed over the obstacles to which I now allude. Be that as it may, Lord Palmerston will understand that it would be improvident on our part not to consider them, and that we cannot pledge ourselves to throw them aside so promptly as to be prepared to sign, without contingent delay, the convention to which, with reason, he attaches so much importance."

Lord Palmerston did not confine himself to his official request. He instructed his chargé d'affaires in Paris, to make a fresh application. "Mr. Bulwer," I wrote to M. de Bourqueney, "has been with me on the part of Lord Palmerston to repeat what his Lordship said to you, and also to press for our signature. As I perceive, from your last letters, that you have not thought it necessary to acquaint Lord Palmerston with my true motive, and that you have, as you tell

me, evaded the situation, I have now taken upon myself this trifling difficulty I told Mr. Bulwer candidly, that the immediate signature of the convention would not be thoroughly understood or well received here by everybody; that the minister of marine had objections to this extension of the right of search; that our public, on this point, entertained prejudices and jealousies; that the papers would cry out; that, as regarded myself, there was an obstacle to surmount, an incidental misunderstanding to arrange; and that to speak plainly, Lord Palmerston, on the 2nd of November last, had not been so courteous to me, and recently at Tiverton so complimentary to my country, that I should embarrass myself in Paris to procure for him a triumph in London.—And as I wish, I added, that you should see this matter precisely as it is, as I am very glad to show you the exact measure of my feelings and intentions towards Lord Palmerston, here is what I wrote to M. de Bourqueney three weeks ago.—I then read to him, nearly the whole of my private letter to you of the 20th of July. Mr. Bulwer took all this as a man of sense, and I feel satisfied that he has related our conversation to Lord Palmerston in such manner as to convey to him a just, and as I think, a useful impression. I have not done this, you know, from personal exigency or susceptibility, but because, in my opinion, the dignity of our relations commands it; and also because, after some time, and a very little time, I am convinced, they will gain not only in dignity but in security. When we know

well that we risk something by not being careful, we take care; and transactions of business become easier when we give them more thought and less fancy."

I did not deceive myself as to Mr. Bulwer's report of our interview, and its effect. A few days after I received from him this note:—

"My dear Monsieur Guizot,

"The enclosed from Lord Palmerston has just reached me. This is all he says on the subject of my letters. You will see that you are understood. At all events, I should esteem myself too happy if I could contribute in the least, in placing on the most amicable footing the relations between two men so well calculated to direct the affairs of the great nations to which they belong."

I here insert the letter from Lord Palmerston thus communicated to me.

"Carlton Terrace, 17th August, 1841.

"My dear Bulwer,

"I am very sorry to find, from your letter of last week, that you observed, in your conversation with M. Guizot, that there is an impression in his mind that, upon certain occasions which you mention, I appear not to have felt sufficient consideration for his ministerial position; and you would much oblige me, if you should have an opportunity of doing so, by endeavouring to assure him that nothing has been further from my intention than so to act. I have a great regard and esteem for M. Guizot; I admire his talents and I respect his character, and I have found him one of the most agreeable men in public affairs, because he takes large and philosophical views of things, discusses questions with clearness, and sifts them to the bottom, and seems always anxious to arrive

at the truth. It is very unlikely that I should have intentionally done anything that could be personally disagreeable to him.

"You say he mentioned three circumstances with regard to which he seemed to think I had taken a course unnecessarily embarrassing to him, and I will try to explain to you my course upon each occasion.

"First, he adverted to my note of the 2nd November last in reply to M. Thiers's note of the 8th of the preceding October. I certainly wish that I had been able to answer M. Thiers's note sooner, so that the reply would have been given to him instead of his successor; but I could not; I was overwhelmed with business of every sort and kind, and had no command of my time; I did not think however that the fact of M. Thiers having gone out of office was a reason for withholding my reply; the note of October contained important doctrines of public law which it was impossible for the British government to acquiesce in; and silence would have been construed as acquiescence. I considered it to be my indispensable duty, as minister of the crown, to place my answer upon record; and I will fairly own that, though I felt that M. Thiers might complain of my delay, and might have said that, by postponing my answer till he was out of office, I prevented him from making a reply, it did not occur to me at the time that M. Guizot would feel at all embarrassed by receiving my answer to his predecessor.

"When M. Guizot, as ambassador here, read me M. Thiers's note of the 8th October, he said, if I mistake not, that he was not going to discuss with me the arguments or the doctrines contained in it, and that he was not responsible for them. In fact I clearly perceived that M. Guizot saw through the numerous fallacies and false doctrines which that note contained. It appeared to me therefore that, as M. Guizot

could not intend to adopt the paradoxes of his predecessor, it would rather assist than embarrass him in establishing his own position, to have those paradoxes refuted; and that it was better that this should be done by me than that the ungracious task of refuting his predecessor should, by my neglect, devolve upon him.

"Secondly, M. Guizot mentioned my reply to a question in the House of Commons about the war between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. I understood the question which was put to me to be whether any agreement had been made between England and France to interpose by force to put an end to that war; and I said that no formal agreement of any kind had been made between the two governments; and certainly none of that kind had taken place, but that a formal application had been made some time before, by the government of Monte Video, for our mediation, and that we had instructed Mr. Mandeville to offer it to the other party, the Buenos Ayres government; I ought perhaps also to have mentioned the conversation which I had had with Baron de Bourqueney, and in which he proposed, on the part of his government, that our representatives at Buenos Ayres should communicate and assist each other in this matter; but in the hurry of reply, it did not occur to me that that conversation came within the reach of the question.

"With regard to what I said at Tiverton about the proceedings of the French troops in Africa, I may have judged wrong; but I chose that opportunity on purpose, thinking that it was the least objectionable way of endeavouring to promote the interests of humanity and, if possible, to put a check to proceedings which have long excited the regret of all those who attended to them; and it certainly did not occur to me to consider whether what I said might or might not be agreeable. That everything which I said of those

proceedings is true, is proved by the French newspapers, and even by the general orders of French generals. I felt that the English government could not with propriety say anything on the subject to the government of France; for a like reason I could not, in my place in Parliament, advert to it; but I thought that, when I was standing as an individual on the hustings before my constituents, I might use the liberty of speech belonging to the occasion, in order to draw public attention to proceedings which I think it would be for the honour of France to put an end to; and if the public discussion which my speech produced shall have the effect of putting an end to a thousandth part of the human misery which I dwelt upon, I am sure M. Guizot will forgive me for saying that I should not think that result too dearly purchased by giving offence to the oldest and dearest friend I may have in the world. But I am quite sure that M. Guizot regrets these proceedings as much as I can do; though I well know that, from the mechanism of government, a minister cannot always control departments over which he does not himself preside.

"We are now about to retire, and in ten days' time our successors will be in office. I sincerely hope that the French government may find them as anxious as we have been to maintain the closest possible union between France and England; more anxious, whatever may have been said or thought to the contrary, I am quite sure they cannot be.

"Yours sincerely."

I replied immediately to Mr. Bulwer: "I thank you for your frank communication of Lord Palmerston's letter. I had anticipated his reasons without considering them sound, and I confess that after reading his letter twice, I cannot pronounce them better. But I am much touched by the sentiments he ex-

presses towards me, and I hope he will preserve them. What I said to you the other day, I should not hesitate to repeat to himself, as I hold too high an opinion of his understanding and loyalty to think that he could be wounded by them."

In London, on the same day, the 19th of August, Baron de Bourqueney handed to Lord Palmerston our official refusal to sign, without delay, the new treaty. After assuming for a moment, and for the sake of decorum, the air of discussing the apparent motives of this refusal, Lord Palmerston said: "M. Guizot does not like the slave trade more than I do myself; I know his principles; they are mine also. It must be painful to him to retard the conclusion of an act, more effectually suppressive than any we have yet adopted. As to myself, it would certainly have been personally gratifying to me to crown, by the signature of a general treaty, ten years of labour and devotion to so good a cause; but I have only to produce the documents and lay the diplomatic notes on the table of the House, to prove to the whole world that, in all that depends on myself, I have brought the work as near as possible to its execution. I have nothing to reproach myself with, and no one else will have reason to reproach me."

In giving me an account of this interview, M. de Bourqueney added, "All this was spoken without acrimony. I allowed the subject to drop. Mr. Bulwer will receive a dispatch in reply to the one I communicated; all will then be said."

All was, in fact, said, from that day between Lord Palmerston and me; but after his fall, and when the Tory cabinet came into office, the situation was changed. "I am going to consult on the affair of the slave-trade," M. Thiers replied to me in 1840, when I informed him of the new project of convention; "I dread treaty upon treaty with people who have evinced so much ill-feeling towards us." This just motive for hesitation had disappeared. Unconnected with the proceedings which had wounded us, the new English ministers evinced the most friendly dispositions. Although I had not, at that time, established the ties of close friendship with Lord Aberdeen which were subsequently formed between us, I knew him to be animated with the best feelings towards me. "M. Guizot has all my good wishes," he wrote shortly after the accession of our cabinet, "and I shall be anxious to prove my esteem for him, should it ever be in my power to do so usefully and effectually." Between the two ministries there were motives of sympathy more profound than personal predilections. Sir Robert Peel and his colleagues were conservatives, become liberal; we were liberals become conservative. Whatever might be the difference of origin and position between the two cabinets, we held strongly similar ideas on the duties and conditions of government in the present state of European society; and starting from separate points, we marched towards the same goal by following similar tendencies. In these natural analogies of thought and inclination, there is a secret

power which acts upon men and draws them together, often without design and unknown to themselves.

At the commencement of October, 1841, Lord Aberdeen asked me, through M. de Sainte Aulaire, what were my intentions on the two treaties, one for the suppression of the slave trade, the other for the commercial relations of the two countries, which had been prepared under the preceding cabinet. He attached much value to the conclusion of both. I replied to M. de Sainte Aulaire: "As regards the negroes —presently. For the commercial treaty,—I wish to inform myself better. I am disposed to conclude it also; nevertheless you have done well to indicate additional reserve." The commercial negotiation was in fact adjourned; but towards the end of November, M. de Sainte Aulaire received his powers to sign the convention intended to render the suppression of negro traffic more general and effective.

For myself, I had warmly at heart this suppression undertaken at once in the spirit of philosophy and Christianity, and one of their most brilliant common glories. The two conventions negotiated in 1831 and 1833, with this object, between France and England, one by General Sebastiani, the other by the Duke de Broglie, had excited, at their origin, no remark; the opposition equally with the ministry, accepted them readily at that epoch, as necessary to the triumph of the liberal cause throughout the world. They had been in course of execution for ten years, during which time the reciprocal right of search they established,

had not given rise to numerous or serious complaints. I was not, as has been seen, without a presentiment of the difficulties that might spring up on this point; but I felt confident that liberal and humane feeling would surmount them. With the approbation of the King and council, I authorized without hesitation, the signature of the new treaty. It was affixed on the 20th of December, 1841, and the exchange of ratifications limited to the 19th of February following.

But as soon as the Chambers met, I saw that the contest would be more serious than we had imagined, and on the eve of the opening of the session I wrote thus to Count de Sainte Aulaire: "Understand clearly that the right of search for the suppression of the slave traffic is, in the Chamber of Deputies, a most important affair. I shall probably debate it to-morrow, and without yielding a point; I am perfectly decided; but the question has fallen in unluckily in the midst of our national susceptibilities, and I shall have occasion to support it with my whole weight, and to manage that weight judiciously. I cannot say whether it will be possible to ratify as soon as Lord Aberdeen desires. There are no means of totally excluding personal considerations from the general situation, and though Lord Palmerston has fallen, matters are not yet between the two countries as easy and gracious as during the time of our intimacy." The debate proved to be even more serious than I anticipated when writing this letter. M. Billault took the initiative, skilful in scrutinizing all the bearings of a subject,

in discovering the points of attack, and in introducing without labour, but somewhat lengthily, and in an incisive though not violent manner, a multitude of arguments, specious even when not powerful. He proposed, to the address of the Chamber, an amendment which attacked not only the new treaty still unratified, but the conventions in vigour since 1831 and 1833. M. Dupin followed him, with his clear, animated reasoning, his familiar eloquence and natural art of presenting his convictions under the flag of popular feeling and sound common sense. M. Thiers, a little embarrassed by the convention of 1833, concluded while he was minister of commerce, and without objection on his part, removed the question to another ground, and opposed the exercise of the right of search for the suppression of the slave traffic in the name of the maritime policy of France for the defence of neutral rights. M. Berryer and M. Odilon Barrot entered the arena in turn; the one with his rich, brilliant, and seductive eloquence, the other with gravity somewhat vague, and an anxious effort to maintain his aversion to the trade, in conjunction with his opposition to the means hitherto regarded as the most effectual for its suppression. Admiral Lalande, a consummate sailor, as much esteemed in the English service as in his own, expressed, with dexterous moderation, the natural antipathy of the French navy for the right of search accorded to the English ships, even in cases exclusively special and on the ground of retaliation. All these shades of the opposition, each

according to its rank and measure, united in a general assault on the conventions of 1831 and 1833, the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, and the cabinet in place. M. de Tracy, alone in his camp, had the courage to defend the conventions of 1831 and 1833 as indispensable to the suppression of the traffic, and to repulse the amendment of M. Billault in the name of the convictions and hopes which the liberal party had hitherto nourished.

But even more serious than this concurrence of the whole opposition, was the agitation it produced and the support it found in the conservative ranks. Our friends were in a majority in the committee on the address, and fell into no mistake as to the bearing of M. Billault's amendment, equally directed against the cabinet and the right of search; but in repelling it, they undertook to separate the two points of attack, and one amongst them, M. Jacques Lefebvre, proposed a second amendment which, while signifying their adhesion to the government and their approbation of its co-operating in the suppression of a criminal traffic, "expressed also their confidence that it would take care to preserve from all encroachment, the interests of our commerce and the independence of our flag."

Strongly impressed by this complication, and determined, on the one hand, not to abandon our principles and acts in regard to the suppression of the trade, and on the other, not to sacrifice to an incidental difficulty the maintenance of the general policy represented and

supported by the cabinet, I took part in the debate at renewed intervals; I replied to the attacks of M. Billault, M. Thiers, and M. Berryer, and the last day having arrived, I summed up the question and situation in these terms: "A case has been added to those which all civilized nations have placed without the liberty of the seas; this is all. Do not say there are no similar cases; you have yourselves proclaimed them from this tribune. You have spoken of piracy and contraband of war; you have admitted that according to the principles avowed by the nations most jealous in claiming the full liberty of the seas, according to the principles professed by France herself, contraband of war was interdicted, and that the right of searching neutrals was permitted, to arrest contraband of war. What the conventions of 1831 and 1833 did, was to consider human flesh as a contraband of war. They have done this, neither more nor less; they have assimilated the crime of the traffic in negroes to the accidental offence of carrying contraband of war. God forbid that the liberty of the seas should be compromised so lightly. The question no more concerns the liberty of the seas than the liberty of the United States; the seas remain free as before; there is only an additional crime registered in the code of nations, and there are nations who pledge themselves to suppress in common this crime denounced by all. On the day when all nations contract this same engagement, the crime of the traffic will disappear. And on that day the men who have followed up this noble

object through the storms of contending politics and the contests of parties, through ministerial jealousies and personal rivalries,—the men, I say, who shall have persevered in their design without allowing themselves to be shaken by accidents and obstacles,—these men will be honoured in the world, and I hope that my name may be enrolled with theirs.

"I have another duty to fulfil. I have defended, for the negroes, the cause of liberty and humanity. I have also to defend the cause of the prerogatives of the crown. When I name the prerogatives of the crown, I speak modestly, gentlemen, for I might well say, I defend the honour of my country. It belongs to the honour of a country to keep its word, and not to be led into a step it may perhaps disavow two or three years later. In 1838, in the month of December (I was not then in office), France and England together, and certainly after sound deliberation—for great governments and countries think before they act—France and England together, I say, proposed to Austria, Prussia and Russia, not to adhere simply to the conventions of 1831 and 1833, but to make a new treaty, the text of which they framed in conformity with the treaty now under discussion. After two or three years of negotiation and debate, the three powers have accepted the proposal, and the treaty is concluded. It is not yet ratified, I admit; and I am not amongst those who look upon ratification as a mere formality, to which no objection can be raised when a signature has once been given. Ratification is an

important and a free act; let me be the first to proclaim it so. The Chamber, therefore, can apply to this matter a new incident; it can, by the expression of its opinion, attach a serious embarrassment—no more, I affirm,—a serious embarrassment to the ratification. But in this difficulty, the liberty of the crown and its advisers remains entire; the liberty of ratifying or not ratifying the new treaty, whatever may have been the expression of the opinion of the Chamber. Without doubt, that opinion is a serious consideration which ought to weigh in the balance; but it is neither decisive, nor the only one we have to take into account. By the side of this consideration there are others, equally serious, for few things are more so than for a government to say to other powers, with whom it is in regular and amicable intercourse,—what we proposed to you three years ago, we decline to ratify to-day. You have accepted our offer; you have raised certain objections; you have required certain alterations; these objections have been admitted, these alterations have been made;—no matter, we refuse to ratify.

"I say, gentlemen, there is something in this which deeply affects the authority of our country's government, and the honour of our country itself. The authority of government, the honour of the country, the interest of the great cause now in debate before you, — surely these are powerful and controlling reasons which a minister would be highly culpable to forget. I repeat, in conclusion, that, let the vote

of the Chamber be what it may, the liberty of the King's government in the ratification of the new treaty remains entire. When it has to decide definitively, it will weigh all the considerations I have retailed to you, and act on its own responsibility. You will find us ready to accept the position."

The Chamber loudly approved my reservation of the privilege of the crown in the act of ratification; but, at the same time, it maintained the official expression of its wishes as opposed to the new treaty. The amendment of M. Jacques Lefebvre was carried almost unanimously. It was evident that the general feeling for the suppression of the slave trade no longer retained the intensity which, in 1831 and 1833, had led to the existing act without objection to the measures intended to accomplish it. No one disputed the principle; all were eager to denounce the traffic in the harshest terms as *culpable*, *criminal* and *infamous*; the most moderate in the reaction made it a point of duty to admit that the conventions of 1831 and 1833, while they were in force, had been loyally carried out; but no one would resign himself longer to the inconveniences they might lead to, and the effects they exacted. Their abuses were dreaded much more than their efficacy was desired. The passion of national jealousy had superseded the public impulse for the triumph of justice and humanity.

What, during eleven years, had been these abuses, at first so little heard of and so patiently borne? Had England exceeded the limits fixed by Article 3 of the

Convention of 1831, which prescribed that "in all cases, the cruisers of either of the two nations should not more than double those of the other"? Had the number of vessels visited been so numerous that commerce had materially suffered in consequence? Had the outcries against the exercise of the right of search been multiplied to excess? I ordered investigations on this subject, which produced the following results. The number of English cruisers commissioned to exercise the right of search, between 1833 and 1842, had not exceeded 152; that of the French amounted to 120. On the western coast of Africa, the theatre of the most active surveillance and traffic, the French cruisers had searched, in 1832, seven vessels, of which two were French and five English; in 1833, five; in 1835, two; in 1838, twenty-four, eight of which were English. The reports of the years 1834, 1836, 1837, 1839, and 1840, gave no specification of the number of searches within the French stations. As to the English cruisers, the years 1838 and 1839 were the only periods respecting which anything like correct details could be collected. In 1838, on the western coast of Africa, five French ships had been visited by the English cruisers, while eight English had been visited by the French; and in 1839, the English cruisers had searched eleven French vessels. Finally, as regarded the complaints of French commerce, excited by abuses of the right of search, an inspection of the archives of the ministries of foreign affairs and of the marine during the course of

these eleven years, detected only seventeen cases, five or six of which had obtained satisfaction; the others had been rejected as without foundation, or abandoned by the claimants themselves. These were undoubtedly facts to be regretted, but neither their number nor importance sufficed to explain such a clamorous outcry, or to justify the change of conduct required from the King's government.

The true cause of the state of minds lay elsewhere, and threatened dangers far more serious than any that could result from the right of search. The treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, and our check in the Egyptian question, had revived in France the old feelings of suspicion and hostility towards England. On this point, as on many others, we are in a labour of transition and transformation singularly difficult for governments, and critical for peoples. Ages roll on, but the facts which have occupied them do not disappear entirely, and the traces survive long after the extinction of their real causes and legitimate range.

French history, ancient and modern, teemed with our contests with England; the issue of the last was unfavourable to us, and left in the hearts of people and army a burning and bitter reminiscence. Nevertheless, times had changed. Both nations wanted peace. For both, peace was fertile in the progress of prosperity and happiness. To harmony of interests was added similarity of institutions. The spirit of liberty displayed itself on both sides of the Channel. The English nation and government had given to

France and the monarchy of July, brilliant evidences and solid proofs of sympathy. The two countries marched side by side in the great paths of liberal and pacific civilization. Ought we then to deviate from these, and compromise the glories and benefits of the new era, to resume our old conflicts, and obey the call of those national enmities so felicitously subdued for twenty-five years? This was the question which re-appeared in 1842, in connection with the right of search, after having been so recently raised and determined with regard to the affairs of Egypt. The suppression of the slave trade was not the only point at issue; the general policy which the cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, had mission to defend and practise, was included in the dispute.

Notwithstanding the difficulties and vexations I foresaw, I did not hesitate for a moment on the line of conduct to be held. I placed the maintenance of our general policy, foreign and domestic, far above any personal or private consideration. I saw the conservative party in the Chambers well determined to support me, on the whole, although it had deserted in the matter of the right of search. I knew that in the existing state of things, I was better adapted than any other person to preserve friendly relations with England, and to extricate my own country from the new false step in which it had entangled itself. I determined to adjourn the ratification of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, and to propose modifications which should either annul or render it accept-

able to the Chambers. The King and council coincided with my opinion.

The debate in the Chamber having terminated, I wrote to M. de Sainte Aulaire: "I regret the annoyance this will occasion to Lord Aberdeen. I can readily sympathize with difficulties of this sort, for I am used to them. I have often combated popular impressions, but never one more general and animated than this which has manifested itself against the right of search, unthought-of during the ten years of its exercise. All the bitterness that Lord Palmerston has sown amongst us, has seized this opportunity for display. Be well assured that, in the present state of minds, we could not proceed to the pure and simple ratification without exposing ourselves to the most imminent dangers. I have established the full liberty of our right to ratify. I have stated the reasons for ratifying. I maintain all that I have said. But at what moment can we ratify without compromising interests highly important in another sense? This is what I am unable to determine to-day."

While writing this letter, I received one from M. de Sainte Aulaire, giving me an account of his first conversation with Lord Aberdeen, after the knowledge of our debate had reached London. "I should fail in my duty," he said, "if I held back from you the entire truth. On entering his lordship's study, I at once recognized a premeditated intention of making me listen to the harshest words. He laid down that he had nothing to do with what had passed in the

Chambers; he held the treaty as ratified, since neither delay nor refusal were supposable, and that the Queen would speak in this sense at the opening of her Parliament." I replied that, "with the exception of the last words, M. de Metternich would, under similar circumstances, use the same terms, and that I should be much more embarrassed by this language in his mouth, than in that of a Secretary of State to the Queen of England. The chancellor of Austria does not trouble himself much with the necessities of the parliamentary government he detests. In London, all its advantages are too well appreciated not to secure respect for its difficulties."

M. de Sainte Aulaire's answer was judicious. I added a postscript to what I was writing to him. "I change nothing in my letter after having read yours, for it makes no change in the situation. Lord Aberdeen deceives himself if he thinks to act upon me by the words he has used in his interview with you. I will not say they are more likely to confirm than alter my opinion; this would be childishness on my part. They leave me exactly in the same mind as before. I regret the obstacle which the immediate ratification of the treaty has encountered. I have done all in my power to remove it. But I know how to measure things by their relative importance. Six weeks ago, I supported in principle and by the most disinterested action, the right of the King of the Netherlands to refuse a ratification he rejected without external necessity, and of his own will. I know equally

well, if compelled, how to maintain the same right on our own account, when it is evident that the delay, far from emanating from our wishes, has arisen in spite of them, and after a fierce struggle to avoid it."

The powers transmitted to M. de Sainte Aulaire on the 20th of November, 1841, instructing him to sign the new treaty, contained expressly, *with reserve of our ratification.* We were, therefore, not only in general principle, but by special and direct right, authorized to give or withhold the ratification, thus reserved beforehand. I recalled this text to M. de Sainte Aulaire, and sent also the modifications we required in the treaty, and which alone could place us in a condition to conclude it. The English cabinet refused to admit them, less on account of their importance, than to avoid the air of yielding to the feelings of distrust and hostility towards England exhibited in France. "The symptoms in society here," the ambassador replied to me, "are serious. The opinion that a violent hatred of England prevails in France, gains ground, and provokes retaliation." I did not regret the rejection of the modifications proposed, and wrote immediately to M. de Sainte Aulaire: "At present neither ask nor urge anything. Time is what we want most. We require all the time we can gain. Steer by this compass."

We were verging on a critical moment; the 20th of February, 1842, the day named for exchanging ratifications, was close at hand. On that day we were bound to declare openly and explain our refusal. On

the 17th, I forwarded to M. de Sainte Aulaire our fixed points:—"1. We cannot give our ratification at present. 2. We cannot name the precise date when we shall be able to do so. Certain modifications, reserves, and additional clauses are indispensable to enable us to give it. These points admitted, what can then be done? Ratification may be postponed indefinitely, or to a fixed term. I have nothing to say against indefinite postponement. It is clear that this would suit our policy. As to postponement to a fixed term, we cannot oppose it, neither could we engage to ratify purely and simply when that time arrives. Evidently, the circumstances which impede our ratification are not created by us, and it is beyond our power to make them disappear by a given day. Postponement to a fixed term allows, it is true, time for possible change of circumstances, and mutual understanding on the indispensable modifications; but it has the objection of holding the question in suspense, in sight and knowledge of all the world, without affording a certainty of settlement when the term arrives.

"The actual change of ratifications between the other powers, and the protocol left open for France until we reciprocally understand each other on the required modifications, appears to me, at present, the most convenient solution for all. It accomplishes, for the other powers, the treaty of 1841, and leaves France on the ground of the treaties of 1831 and 1833, giving us as regards the treaty of 1841, the chances of time and fresh negotiation.

"But talk over this, my dear friend, with Lord Aberdeen, before attending the conference. Concert with him the mode of proceeding and the forms he considers most suitable. I have indicated to you our fixed points. We shall do all we can, within these limits, to diminish the embarrassments of position and debate which this affair may throw on the English cabinet, relying, on its part, for the same disposition."

The meeting for the exchange of ratifications took place on the 19th of February, and M. de Sainte Aulaire found, not only Lord Aberdeen, but the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian plenipotentiaries in a most conciliating temperament. "I have just left the conference," he wrote; "at noon we met at the Foreign Office. It rested with me to bell the cat. I said, that I had not received my ratifications, etc. etc. You will find my text in the accompanying note. Lord Aberdeen replied, that I was entirely changing the position assumed by you; that you had declared in fact that you could not ratify at this moment without reserves, but that with reserves you would have ratified at once, which left it to be supposed, that, with an undetermined postponement, you would give pure and simple ratifications. I answered that not only could I give neither engagement nor hope, in this view, but that, on the contrary, I was compelled to insist on a drawing up of the protocol which should leave us the most complete independence. Lord Aberdeen admitted this independence, and simply required that I should not impress on you the necessity

of holding to reserves destitute of serious value, and which he felt convinced you would voluntarily renounce, if opinion, ever fickle in France, permitted you to do so, at a later period. M. de Brünnow, who is commissioned to draw up the protocols, suggested an opinion that this particular one should be as brief as possible, and state simply that the French plenipotentiary not having produced the ratifications of his court, the exchange had taken place between the other powers, the protocol remaing open for France." After some explanatory remarks on the modifications we had demanded, and on the necessity of waiting, on this point, for the instructions of the courts which as yet had no precise knowledge of them, the opinion of M. de Brünnow was adopted, and the protocol drawn up in terms which suited us. Now then," M. de Sainte Aulaire said to me, "move at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh; the reports forwarded from hence, even to the last court, will be, I feel certain, of a conciliatory nature."

I replied to him on the 27th of February: "You have spoken and acted well. The drawing up of the protocol is good, and the situation as favourable as the embarrassments made for us permit. I had already informed them at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh of what was taking place. I shall follow up the matter. I rely on time, and the spirit of conciliation. We have ample reason to be pleased with the language held in the English Parliament. It was full of consideration and tact. I dreaded a debate which

might aggravate the irritation here and add to my difficulties. I can, on the contrary, take advantage of a good example. I am delighted at this."

The diplomatic embarrassment was thus adjourned; but from day to day, on the other hand, the parliamentary difficulty went on increasing. At every opportunity, on the slightest pretext, in both Chambers, the debate recommenced on the treaty still in suspense, on the conventions of 1831 and 1833, on the particular complaints and claims to which their execution had given and was still giving rise. Our adversaries incessantly mounted and remounted this ever open breach, and our adherents, while remaining faithful to us on the foundation and entire edifice of the policy, yielded readily to the desire of raising, on this point, a slight popular opposition. The general elections which took place in July, 1842, for the Chamber of Deputies, revealed a similar disposition in the public; it was clear to us that the new Chamber would be as strongly decided against the right of search as that which had just terminated.

It was indispensable that before the opening of the session of 1843, the question should make a step. I wrote to the Count de Flahault, the King's ambassador at Vienna, on the 22nd of September, 1842: "I need not tell you that we could not and do not think of ever ratifying, under any modification it might undergo, the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841. At the first moment, when the debate sprang up, if the modifications I pointed out had been at once accepted,

perhaps the ratification might not have been impossible. But the modifications have been rejected. The question has become what you know it to be. At present it is no longer practicable. For us, the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, is dead, and all the world here, in the diplomatic body as well as with the public, is as thoroughly convinced of this as I am.

"Meanwhile, the protocol left open in London induces a belief that the ratification of France is still possible. The ill-disposed say so to the idlers. It would be said much more, and would be credited a little in the approaching session. It is therefore necessary that the closure of the protocol should close a situation which can no longer have any other issue.

"We require this on another ground. In the next session, the conventions of 1831 and 1833 will be attacked. We ought and wish to defend them. We should do this under great disadvantage if the protocol still remained open, and the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, suspended over us. To enable us to entrench ourselves in the old treaties, the Chambers and the country ought no longer to be disturbed by the new one. This inquietude would draw them into a state of susceptibility and irritation which would not fail to be worked upon, as has already been done with so much effect.

"All that I repeat to you here, I have said to Lord Cowley and to Mr. Bulwer, who has gone to pass some weeks in London. I know that they have written and

spoken in this sense to Lord Aberdeen and to Sir Robert Peel, and that the two ministers comprehend the situation, and will offer no objection to the closure of the protocol. But they do not think they can take the initiative in this step. They fear the *saints* in Parliament, and are unwilling to have it said that they themselves proposed to renounce the ratification of France. They are ready, if I am correctly informed, to accept the closure of the protocol, provided that the proposition is made by a third power.

"I have mentioned this to Count D'Appony. I have told him that M. de Sainte Aulaire was going back to London, that he would state the situation to Lord Aberdeen, and would tell him that we could not dream of ratifying the treaty, and that, in consequence, as far as we are concerned, it is quite useless to keep the protocol longer open. I signified a desire to Count D'Appony, that on this declaration by France, the Austrian plenipotentiary would at once demand the pure and simple closure of the protocol, without any observation unpleasant or embarrassing to us. He wrote on the subject to Prince Metternich, and has just read a dispatch to me which promises to render us this good office. M. de Neumann is summoned to Johannisberg, where he will receive suitable instructions. You see, my dear Count, that the affair is very nearly settled; but I wish you to understand it thoroughly, to speak of it to Prince Metternich on his return to Vienna, and to thank him for the favourable course he has adopted. It is delightful to treat

with a just and elevated mind which simplifies everything."

At the same time I forwarded to M. de Sainte Aulaire positive instructions for the closure of the protocol. At the first moment they found him a little uneasy. Lord Aberdeen said to him that he understood the ratification of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, was considered by us henceforward as impossible, that he should never ask for it, and that on the meeting of Parliament he would announce unequivocally not only that we had entered into no engagement to ratify, but that he entertained no hope on this point. This, according to him, would suffice to set the question aside as closed. "I confess," added M. de Sainte Aulaire, "that I am much of his opinion; explicit declarations from the tribune seem to me to supply the place of a formal closure of the protocol, and I dread lest by employing the pen in this untoward affair some new embarrassment might arise. But the intentions here are positively conciliating: tell me which course you prefer, and I shall endeavour to carry it through."

I replied without delay: "With us, and in the temper of our public, the declaration which Lord Aberdeen has named to you, would produce nothing like the effect of the closure of the protocol. More than this; in the then state of the affair, I should be unable to comprehend it. In the course of the present month you will be instructed to announce to Lord Aberdeen and to the conference that after mature

reflection and in consequence of all that has passed within the last year and a half, the King's government feels that it ought not to ratify the treaty, and decidedly will not ratify it; and that therefore, as far as regards us, there no longer exists a motive for keeping the protocol open. When you have made this declaration, no reason can remain for saying that we have not entered into an engagement to ratify, that no hope is entertained on this point, and that we shall never be asked for our ratification. These words would imply the continuance of a situation which has ceased to exist. Why has the protocol been left open? In the prospect of a possible ratification by France and to maintain that possibility. This is not only what has been done, but officially announced. When France has finally declared that she cannot ratify, keeping the protocol open would be absolutely objectless.

"What, then, would it imply, and to what suppositions would it give rise?

"It would be supposed, either that the present cabinet may recall its declaration that it will not ratify, or that at some future day, another cabinet can and will ratify. Evidently the protocol could only remain open for one of these two chances, and all the world would believe or think itself entitled to believe so.

"I do not hesitate to affirm that neither of these chances exists, and that by keeping them on the horizon, serious embarrassments would be created be-

tween the two countries, and particularly for us in our Chambers.

"And at what moment, in fact, would this prospect be left partially disclosed!

"At the exact moment when the conventions of 1831 and 1833 are and will be violently attacked, and when their execution may, does, and will furnish pretexts for untoward conflicts and incessant complaints.

"To defend the conventions of 1831 and 1833, to execute them without compromising, at every instant, the amicable relations between the two countries, I require, no additional burden on my shoulders. This is, of itself, weighty enough.

"Now, the mere prospective of a possible resurrection of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, however distant and doubtful it might be, and in spite of any denials in both Parliaments, I should feel as an enormous burden which would weaken me extremely in the task, already difficult, I shall have to fulfil. This prospective always in existence, would also keep alive with us, every shade of irritation, jealousy, and mistrust. The opposition would seize on these eagerly. The slightest incident, in the execution of the treaties, and such we may surely foresee, would become the source of bitter complaints and violent debates.

"The pure and simple closure of the protocol after our declaration that we shall not ratify, can alone cut short these difficulties, or as I may even call them, dangers. Nothing else accords with the true state of

things and with the interest of friendly relations between the two countries. Nothing else will allow us to open an entirely new account, and to settle the different affairs between us with no other difficulty than that of the affairs themselves."

Lord Aberdeen, finally, came over to this opinion. I never knew a man less fettered within his own ideas, more disposed to comprehend the views and position of others, and to allow them their full share. There was in him, with a prudence which disguised none of the difficulties of an affair, and made no attempt to surmount them but step by step, a freedom and equity of mind which led him, in all matters, to seek for the solution most just to all concerned. But, on this question of the right of search, he had to deal, in his own cabinet, with opposing and intractable dispositions. The English Admiralty, its president, Lord Haddington, and several other ministers were opposed to all concession. The head of the cabinet, Sir Robert Peel, although extremely judicious and pacifically inclined, was, in regard to foreign policy, suspicious, susceptible, prompt to adopt popular impressions, and above all, prepossessed by the fear of being or of seeming to be deceived or weak. When it became known in London that all attempt to obtain our ratification of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, was of necessity renounced, and that we were on the point of issuing a positive declaration on the subject, violent differences sprang up in the cabinet as to the bearing of this declaration, and

the manner in which it should be received. "Some," M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote to me,—"are strongly exasperated against our proceeding; they wish an answer to be sent to our declaration, and for that reason prefer that it should be specifically detailed. Others are anxious that the matter should be conducted as gently as possible, that no reply should be made to our declaration, and to afford less hold for an answer would prefer no justification. From what I see and hear, the mode selected by Lord Aberdeen would be the declaration without arguments. To this Sir Robert objects that a dry, abrupt declaration has something of a dictatorial air, and would naturally call for the question, *Why is this?* It seemed preferable to him that we should enter into explanation, and say that since the signature of the treaty, the Chambers having investigated it, have manifested an opinion to which a constitutional monarchy is bound to defer, and which opposes an absolute obstacle to the ulterior ratification. Sir Robert Peel adds, that if you see difficulties in the way of a positive avowal of the dependence in which the prerogative of the crown finds itself before the Chambers, you might simply say, that between the signature of the treaty and the epoch fixed for the ratification, facts had occurred in France which the government was compelled to consider, and which rendered the ratification from this moment impossible. Lord Aberdeen thinks Sir Robert Peel is right in his objections to a decisive refusal to ratify without argu-

ment. We separated without coming to a decision. He has requested me to try several forms of drawing up in accordance with Sir Robert Peel's ideas and his own. I have promised to give my attention to this, but before submitting anything to him, I am anxious to receive your instructions. They may reach me by Friday next, the 28th. I hope the business will then advance rapidly."

My instructions were forwarded without delay. I gave M. de Sainte Aulaire all the facilities they could desire in London, and sent two forms of drawing up for the definitive closure of the protocol. One contained, without reasons, our declaration that we had resolved not to ratify the treaty of the 20th of December; the other, explaining our refusal, "in consequence of important and well-known events connected with this subject, which have occurred in France since the signature of the treaty, and which the King's government considers it a part of its duty to take into serious consideration." — "With this choice," I added, "it seems to me easy to arrive at a speedy conclusion."

Nevertheless, obstacles and doubts were still prolonged. Nothing is more difficult even amongst those who, in the main, agree in intention and object, than to satisfy all the susceptibilities and appearances which different situations require. "Observe well," said Lord Aberdeen to M. de Sainte Aulaire, "that in this whole affair you yield to motives which possess a conclusive value for you, but which you ought

not to call upon us to appreciate, for we find them extremely injurious, and we cannot, with dignity, see them introduce themselves without questioning them severely. They have arrived at a persuasion in France that we are abominable hypocrites, that we conceal Machiavelian combinations under the cloak of an interest for humanity. You find yourselves under the necessity of yielding to these calumnies, and we give ample proof of good temper in showing that we are not offended by them. But if you come, in the face of Europe, to present them as the deciding rule of your conduct, we are compelled to repulse them, for our silence would imply a kind of adhesion." In my private correspondence with M. de Sainte Aulaire, I replied to all these humours and suspicions of the English cabinet and public; I endeavoured to throw light on the legitimacy in principle, as on the necessity in fact, of our conduct. When I authorized him to do so, he showed my letters to Lord Aberdeen, who said to him one day, on returning one he had communicated to Sir Robert Peel: "M. Guizot's letters are all perfectly beautiful; but, on reading them, one would readily believe that he is entirely right and we wrong, that we have ever to praise his proceedings, and he to condemn ours; finally that, in all this, it is he and not us who is the aggrieved party." "I replied," said M. de Sainte Aulaire to me, "that up to this you had made no complaint against the English cabinet, but that if you saw susceptibilities and suspicions, it could not be surprising that you

should feel wounded by them. 'What is, in reality,' I added, 'the position of M. Guizot in France? Upon what ground do his enemies attack him? They reproach him with his partiality to England, with his preference for the English alliance, with the esteem he professes for your nation and government. If, while he is pursued at home for these reasons, he has also to defend himself against you, a little humour on his part is surely legitimate.' Lord Aberdeen admitted that there was truth in my remark, but he retorted a portion of it against me. 'If M. Guizot is attacked on account of England,' said he, 'England also is attacked on account of him. The odious accusations charged, the passions excited, are not in reality directed at us; they are machines of war against M. Guizot: it is to oppose him that the ratification of the treaty of 1841 has been prevented; it is to embarrass him that those of 1831 and 1833 are going to be assailed.' I cautioned Lord Aberdeen to beware of the practical consequences that might be drawn from these premises. Unquestionably, the strategy of parties has its share in what is now passing in France; but parties trade only on existing dispositions, and if a man less intrepid than you were in power, he would, beyond all doubt, be carried away by the tempest against which you are struggling. To this Lord Aberdeen replied by very explicit, and I doubt not sincere, protestations of his confidence in your loyalty and his esteem for your ability and courage. Now, my dear friend, it is my

duty to apprise you, that at the bottom of all this lies the prevision that we shall return to the treaties of 1831 and 1833, that a resolution is formed to yield nothing on this point, and that any attempt to modify those treaties would lead, as a necessary and immediate consequence, to a diplomatic rupture."

The difficulties and hesitations were finally surmounted by the mutual good will and good sense of the negotiators. Lord Aberdeen resolved to disregard the wishes of some of his colleagues. "They want a reply to your refusal to ratify," he said to M. de Sainte Aulaire, "and if I trusted to them it would be sharp; but, in fact, it is I and not they who would be responsible for the consequences. I shall not allow myself to be driven."—"I presume," added M. de Sainte Aulaire, "that he and Sir Robert Peel are agreed." Some days later, on the 8th of November, 1842, he wrote thus: "Although I have deviated slightly from the line you traced out, you will not, I hope, be dissatisfied with the result. You required,—1. An *unqualified* declaration that you would not ratify, either now or later, the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841. 2. That this declaration should be admitted, and the protocol closed, *without phrases*. I have carried both points, not, I assure you, without a struggle. I conceded that our declaration of non-ratifying should be made by a note to Lord Aberdeen, who will convoke the conference to-morrow, and communicate to it the said announcement. He has pledged himself not to allow the introduction of a single word in the

protocol uncourteous towards us; the closure is to be *without phrases.* It was Prince Metternich who suggested this mode of proceeding. Lord Aberdeen did not relish it at first yesterday evening; however, after a long and animated discussion between us, he produced this expedient as extenuating the tartness of our style. He seemed quite satisfied when I gave my consent, and left me precipitately to tell Sir Robert Peel, who was waiting for him in an adjoining chamber. On resuming our interview this morning, I was surprised to find Lord Aberdeen almost indifferent upon the expedient to which he attached, the preceding eve, so much value. I then asked to return to the course more conformable with my instructions, from which I had departed with much regret. "For Heaven's sake," said Lord Aberdeen, "do not go back upon that. For my own part, I care little; but yesterday, when I told Sir Robert Peel that you and I had agreed on this point, he expressed the utmost joy, and would be greatly annoyed at any misunderstanding. Neither M. Guizot nor you will ever know the tenth part of the trouble which this unhappy affair has given me."

Trouble signifies little when the end is gained. It was completely so on this occasion. The knot was untied, and the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, as far as it regarded us, annulled, without any recrimination from the other powers between whom it continued in vigour, and without producing the slightest change in the friendly relations between France

and England. I wrote to Count de Sainte Aulaire: "You have reason to be satisfied, and so have I. Your form of declaration, by a note written and communicated, is almost as clear, perhaps more correct, and certainly less open to controversy than a face-to-face announcement in the conference. The drawing up of the protocol is good. All is therefore well, and here is a great embarrassment shaken off. But I wish that not the slightest cloud should exist between Lord Aberdeen and me, in consequence of this non-ratified treaty. This would be a great reciprocal injustice, for we have both, I venture to say, conducted and wound up this untoward affair with irreproachable prudence and loyalty. For my part, I struggled with it as long as I could. I proposed modifications in the treaty. I waited more than a year. Could I go further? Ought I to have risked, on this question, our position and entire policy? Evidently not. Neither the interest of France nor of Europe, nor the interest of the relations between France and England would have gained anything thereby. I have adopted the only rational and suitable course. In the form, I was desirous that our resolution, once taken, should be frank and concise. I have admitted nothing which could wound either the dignity of my country or of its government. This was my duty. But at the same time, I have neither said nor received anything in a manner of which England could complain. Lord Aberdeen, on his side, has thrown into the affair much good will and persevering moderation. We were both

in a difficult position. We have both exercised sound policy, and should both remember it with satisfaction.

"So much for the past. Let us now look to the future, for we have one before us which will also bring its embarrassments.

"Evidently, in the approaching session, the conventions of 1831 and 1833 will be attacked: by the opposition, by the intriguers, and by some ill-disposed or blind conservatives. More or less openly, two things will be demanded of me. One, to elude, by indirect means, the execution of these conventions; the other, to open a negotiation to excite their abolition. I shall reject the first in the name of loyalty, the second in that of policy. I am not an attorney, a hunter after quibbles. I shall carry out honestly what has been promised in the name of my country. As to a negotiation for the abolition of the treaties, England would not lend herself to it. Her refusal would bring on ill feelings, perhaps the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Such a fault shall not be committed by my hands. I said recently to Lord Palmerston, that he sacrificed great policy to small, that the friendship of France was worth more than Syria taken from Mehemet Ali. I shall not incur the same reproach. Good intelligence with England is of more value than the abolition of the treaties of 1831 and 1833. Here is a commanding reason which relieves me from the search of others.

"Such, my dear friend, is my plan of conduct. I shall encounter in it many combats, many obstacles, for prejudices are general, passions highly excited, and all the pretenders to power will club together, openly or secretly, to profit by them. Still, I shall persevere, and I think with success; but that I may reckon on this issue, I require three things:—

"1. The complete execution, in the conventions of 1831 and 1833, of all the clauses which can be considered, in France, as guarantees: particularly of article 3 in the Convention of 1831, which requires that the number of cruising vessels should be fixed annually by a special agreement.

"2. Much prudence and moderation in the exercise of the right of search. This depends on the selection of cruising officers and on the instructions they receive. It does not belong to me in any manner to interfere in the choice of the officers employed by the English cabinet in this service, especially on the west coast of Africa. Nevertheless, we may fear, from ascertained facts, that some of them have not always been as moderate, calm, and civil, as could have been desired. Our own people are proud and susceptible; it is by coolness and politeness that jealousy is forestalled. I cannot refrain from remarking that no complaint has ever arisen on the part of the English vessels visited by our cruisers, and these visits have often occurred. I therefore take the liberty of calling the entire attention, or rather the scrupulous delicacy of the English cabinet to the choice of their

officers. Thus, above all, we shall spare each other serious and continual embarrassments.

"As to the instructions, I am charmed at hearing that Lord Aberdeen examines and causes them to be examined very minutely. He certainly cannot forget that according to the terms of article 5 of the Convention of 1831, there are instructions, *drawn up and settled in common by the two governments.* If it be those that Lord Aberdeen has under revision at this moment, that revision ought to be made in common, and no modification can be introduced except by concert. Undoubtedly there may and ought to be, beyond the general instructions settled in common, special instructions personally given by each government to its officers. Upon these also it might be useful to understand each other officially. Neither you, nor any one attached to your embassy, is, I feel sure, acquainted with the executive details of this service, and prepared to discuss them with professional men. Should you consider it desirable I would send to you to London an officer to supply information, and to communicate with the English Admiralty, specially selected by our minister of marine, and placed at your disposal for this purpose.

"I now come to my third essential point. Satisfaction and just reparation promptly rendered for past and future grievances. In matters of this nature I shall be compelled to show myself exact and insisting. I understand fully that the English cabinet may, on this point, be placed in some embarrassment;

facts are often doubtful, disputed, difficult, and slow of proof. There are also some that are certain. A few examples of firm impartiality would produce an excellent effect here with the public, and on the different stations, with the cruisers themselves. I shall do my entire duty, but I shall claim my full right.

"I have gone into length, my dear friend, and yet, on this subject I could say much more. I have named the essential points; the rest will follow in due time. The case stands thus: here is between Paris and London a delicate, prolonged situation, and concerted, prudent action difficult but necessary. I hope we shall succeed as we have hitherto succeeded, but, in truth, I must be allowed to say, my share is the weightiest."

I did not deceive myself on this point. As soon as the session of 1843 opened, the Chamber of Deputies hastened to express its sentiments on the right of search. Although the speech from the throne made no allusion to the question, the conservatives, in a decided majority in the committee on the address, and selecting for their reporter one of my most intimate friends, M. Dumon, inserted in the draft of their reply, a paragraph thus worded: "Uniting in a feeling of humanity, the powers apply themselves to the suppression of the infamous traffic in negroes. We have seen with satisfaction, that while lending to this just enterprise the concurrence of France, your Majesty's government has not given its consent to the extension of the existing conventions. For the strict

and loyal execution of these conventions, without infringement, we rely on the vigilance and firmness of your government. But impressed by the objections which experience reveals, and also in the interest of the good intelligence so essential to the accomplishment of the common work, we call, with our most ardent wishes, for the moment when our commerce shall be replaced under the exclusive superintendence of our own flag."

Here, beyond doubt, was an urgent insistence that the government should undertake the abolition of the conventions of 1831 and 1833. But the opposition did not content itself with this. It used the attack on the right of search as an onset against the cabinet and its whole policy. It demanded, for the abolition of the conventions of 1831 and 1833, a categorical and immediate negotiation. The debate lasted for six days, and it was not without a slight degree of mournful surprise that I reckoned M. de Tocqueville amongst my adversaries. He seemed to me called, by the elevation of his character and ideas, to place himself, on this occasion, beyond the ranks and routines of opposition. In requital, a young deputy, new in the Chamber, M. Agénor de Gasparin, defended with undaunted courage the almost abandoned cause of the conventions of 1831 and 1833 which he persisted in considering as necessary for the effectual repression of the traffic, and little dangerous, in reality, to the security of commerce and the liberty of the seas. Several amendments were proposed to aggravate the paragraph

in the draft of the address, and to turn it into a weapon of war against the cabinet. I spoke towards the end of the debate, and after fully explaining the attitude of the cabinet in its refusal to ratify the treaty of the 20th December, 1841, I added, "As to the treaties of 1831 and 1833, they have been for ten years concluded, ratified, and in execution. I believed that it concerned the honour of my country as well as my own to carry them on loyally, not to furnish an example of extreme irregularity and of positive bad faith in international relations. I have therefore advised the crown and have continued their execution. The Chamber knows that in the course of this execution negligence has occurred, and that the carelessness of all classes, Chambers, public, and government, on this question, during so many years, has caused several guarantees, important to us, to fall into disuse. I have recapitulated and claimed them all. They are three in number; the drawing up of an annual convention to debate and settle, according to the circumstances of the year, the number of cruisers; the declaration that the cruisers shall be attached to a special station, and shall not, without a fresh order, pass from one to the other; finally, equality, as nearly as possible in the number of cruisers belonging to the two countries. None of these guarantees were in force for ten years. I have claimed them, and they are now in vigour. At this moment, England and France, as regards the execution of the treaties of 1831 and 1833, are in the exercise of strict, complete, and loyal rights.

"Beyond this, is it necessary to provoke the actual abolition of these treaties? I cannot dispense with recalling this maxim, that treaties concluded, ratified and carried into execution can only be loosened by agreement or cut by the sword. There is no third method. Is this a moment to demand mutual consent and accordance for the abolition of the treaties of 1831 and 1833? Is there any actual chance of obtaining it? The cabinet thinks not, and has not considered it a duty, at present, to enter into negotiation on this subject. I know no one who negotiates except for the purpose of success.

"It has been asked whether the cabinet will really take the public sentiment and the wish of the Chamber seriously. I might be tempted to consider this question as an insult; I shall not do so. Gentlemen, if I did not take the sentiment of the country and the wish of the Chamber in this question seriously, shall I tell you what I would do? I would open a negotiation, I would open it on the instant without caring for the probable consequences. My opinion, my forethought tell me that it would not succeed. After it had failed, I should come to you and say, I have deferred to the wish of the Chamber; I have done all that depended on the cabinet; I should then ask the Chamber, now what do you require? Will you pause? Will you retreat? Will you advance? I should thus remove the burden from the shoulders of the cabinet to replace it on the Chamber and on the country.

"Such conduct would be an indignity and an act

of cowardice. The cabinet will keep the burden to itself. The cabinet will not reduce the Chamber and the country to an alternative which I cannot qualify but by these words, a madness or a folly. It takes too seriously the public sentiment, the state of minds, and the wish of the Chamber. When the cabinet believes, with perfect sincerity, with profound convictions, that such a negotiation might succeed, that the treaties of 1831 and 1833 can be loosened by mutual accord, the cabinet will undertake the work. Before, no; then, certainly."

The Chamber loudly applauded this attitude and language. The amendments were rejected, and the adoption of the pure and simple paragraph proposed by the committee on the address proved at once the persistence of the majority in its wish, and its steady adhesion to the cabinet.

An analogous debate took place in the Chamber of Peers. Faithful to its traditions, its committee maintained, on this question, in its draft of address, the same silence with the speech from the throne. Several peers demanded, by way of amendment, the formal and prompt abolition of the right of search. The Duke de Broglie combated them in the name of the committee, of which he was reporter; and taking up, on his own account, the question from the source, he discussed it historically and politically, in principle and in fact, in a manner so lucid and complete, that the Chamber of Peers, rejecting all the amendments, maintained the reserve adopted by its committee.

At this precise moment, the issue of these debates was fortunate for the cabinet. The Chambers had shown their full confidence, and had sustained it against its enemies, although they had themselves entered on the paths which those enemies had opened. But evidently the desire for the abolition of the right of search was general, and could not fail to become daily more imperative. I wrote to Count de Flahault at Vienna: "The question of the right of search remains open, and will weigh on the future. I have saved honour and gained time. But it must come to a solution. Before I touch on that, I shall wait till the necessity is understood in all quarters. Speak of it, I pray you, with M. de Metternich. He knows how to foresee and prepare things. I hope, when the moment arrives, that he will aid me in modifying a situation which cannot perpetuate itself indefinitely, for it would bring every year, on the re-assembling of the Chambers, and in the course of the the session, at any maritime incident, a dangerous fit of fever." In London, the Count de Sainte Aulaire had no occasion to be thus warned. His uneasiness on the subject of the right of search was ever alive. "You tell me," he wrote, "to feel quite tranquil, for the present, on this question. You are perfectly right; if anything should become possible at some future time, it is only on condition of compromising nothing now. I have no wish to exaggerate. While declaring without the slightest hesitation that any overture made at this moment to the English cabinet

would lead to a rupture, or a retreat with a very ill grace on our part, I do not assume that such a card would always lose, or that at another epoch, under the predominance of different circumstances, we might not attempt with success what is impossible to-day."

Other circumstances soon presented themselves, extremely unlooked for, and well calculated to furnish us, in this embarrassing affair, with opportunities and means of acting. Towards the end of August, 1843, the session of the Chambers having terminated, the royal family and the cabinet left the capital. The King was enjoying his summer vacation at the Château d'Eu; the Prince of Joinville, and the Duke of Aumale, went to pass some days at London and Windsor; the Duke of Nemours held a camp of ten thousand men at Plélan in Brittany; I reposed at Val Richer from the fatigues of the session. Returning to Paris on the 23rd of August, I received a call from Lord Cowley to inform me that Queen Victoria was on the point of paying a visit to the King at the Château d'Eu, and that Lord Aberdeen would accompany her. He had only as yet received the information by a letter from Mr. Henry Greville, but he considered the fact as certain. I instantly dispatched a courier to the King, who replied on the following day, the 26th of August: "Yes, my dear minister (I begin like Racine's Agamemnon), I have every reason to believe that we are about to receive at Eu a royal visit from Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. She has entrusted my sons, who arrived this morning,

with all her messages. She only requires us to keep till the 30th of August a secret which is no longer one; because, she says, the execution of this project might be impeded by publicity. I therefore think it important, and I have just written to this effect to Duchâtel, that our official or ministerial gazettes should not take the initiative of the news, that they should express doubt in publishing it, and that they should speak always of the unsettled state of the weather and the sea, particularly in September. The Queen intends to be at Brighton on Monday, to embark there to visit some English ports in the Channel, and thence to proceed to Tréport, taking perhaps a French pilot at Cherbourg. Be so kind as to name this to Admiral Mackau. I conclude that the authorities by land and sea will attend to their duty for the salutes from all the forts, batteries, and men-of-war, in case the royal flag of England should appear at Cherbourg. However, we shall have full intelligence, I hope. Here, I am badly supplied with four invalids to serve six guns, although the marshal ordered thirty last year. I have told General Teste to send them by post from Douai. This to facilitate the secret. Then, we must have plate and china. All here have lost their heads. The rooms are another embarrassment. Fortunately Peckham has a dozen wooden huts intended for Algiers, which I shall set up in the garden of the church, and furnish them as well as we can. I have ordered sixty beds from Neuilly, and have sent to Dieppe for sailcloth,

which they can pay with tar, to cover the roofs. This will be a sort of *smahla*, in which the Duke of Aumale will set the example of sleeping, as he did of charging the *smahla* of Abd-el-Kader. I have ordered a play for Monday, for the Queen expects to arrive on Saturday, the 2nd. It is settled that Lord Aberdeen comes with her. This seems to indicate to us the invitation of Lord Cowley. Have the goodness to tender it on my part to Lord and Lady Cowley, and Miss Wellesley. As to yourself, my dear minister, you will come when you please, but I advise you not to let it be later than Thursday, that we may have time to understand each other thoroughly, and to talk matters well over before the broadside is poured in. I shall also be delighted to see Admiral Mackau here; *but you will have to excuse the accommodation, which will be very indifferent. Never mind;** all will go on excellently well. Good night, my dear minister."

At Paris, and wherever the news spread, a great effect was produced. Satisfaction for some, discontent for others, surprise for all. Amongst some members of the diplomatic body ill-humour vented itself in thoughtless and unworthy expressions: "the freak of a little girl; a king would not have acted so." And when they were answered, "a freak accepted by ministers who are not little girls," the ill-temper redoubled. "Her ministers think only of pleasing her, they tremble in her presence." Very soon, however,

* The words in italics were thus written in English in the King's letter.

these ebullitions restrained themselves before the importance of the fact and the public sentiment. Impressions of the moment, and on the spot, are more truthful than the most tenacious reminiscences. I insert here, textually a letter, in which, on the same evening, writing to Paris, I related the arrival and disembarkation of the Queen.

"At a quarter past five, cannon announced that the Queen was in sight. In another half-hour, we embarked in the royal barge, the King, the Princes, Lord Cowley, Admiral Mackau and myself, to anticipate her arrival. We proceeded about half a mile, in the calmest sea, under a beautiful sky, and the land teeming with the entire population of the neighbourhood. Our six ships under sail, dressed with French and English flags, saluted loudly and joyfully. The report of the cannon scarcely drowned the shouts of the sailors. We drew up alongside the yacht '*Victoria and Albert.*' We mounted the deck. The King and Queen were mutually affected. He embraced her. She said to me, 'I am delighted to see you again *here.*' She descended with Prince Albert into the King's barge. As we approached the shore, the salutes of the cannon and crews of the men-of-war grew louder and more animated. The land batteries repeated them. The Queen, as she placed her foot on shore, had the the brightest expression of countenance I have ever looked upon: a mixture of emotions, a degree of surprise, and above all the most animated pleasure in this reception. There was much shaking of hands in

the royal tent. Then the carriages and the journey. *God save the Queen* was loudly played, and there were as many shouts of *Long live the Queen! Long live the Queen of England*, as of *Long live the King!* Let us put faith in the power of just and simple ideas. This district loves not the English. It is Norman and maritime. In our wars with England, Tréport was three times burnt, and pillaged I know not how often. Nothing would be more easy than to excite a popular passion which might embarrass us seriously; but it has been said and repeated, 'The Queen of England does an act of courtesy to our King, and we must be extremely polite to her.' This idea possesses the people, and has surmounted all recollections, passions, temptations, and parties; they have shouted and they will continue to shout *Long live the Queen!* and they applaud *God save the Queen* with enthusiasm. We must take care only not to ask it from them for too long a time.

"I add, however, that another simple and more durable idea, peace, the advantage of peace, has become, and becomes daily more powerful. It prevails amongst the citizens and also with the reflecting and well-disposed sections of the people. It serves us greatly at this moment. They say often amongst themselves, 'When we want peace, we must not exchange abuse and make faces at each other.' This was understood to-day by all the world on this side of the Channel."

As soon as we were alone, Lord Aberdeen said to

me, "Take this, I beg of you, as a certain indication of our policy, on the Spanish and on all other questions; we shall talk thoroughly on all." It was not easy to talk. The days were passed in general parties, in presentations, in snatches of conversation in the drawing-rooms, in promenades. On Sunday, the 3rd of September, after Queen Victoria had been present at the English service in a hall of the Château arranged for that purpose, the King took her in a large *char à banc* entirely filled by the royal family, to the summit of a table-land which afforded an admirable view of sea and forest. The weather was beautiful, but the road bad, narrow, and full of stones and ruts. The Queen of England laughed and amused herself at the idea of being thus jolted along in Royal French company, in a sort of carriage quite new to her, and drawn by six splendid, dapple-grey Norman horses, driven gaily by two postilions, with their sounding bells and brilliant uniform. Lord Aberdeen and I followed, with Lord Liverpool and M. de Sainte Aulaire in another carriage. Lord Aberdeen had just had with the King a long *tête-à-tête*, by which he was satisfied and impressed. Satisfied with the political views and intentions which the King had opened to him, especially on the question of Spain; struck by the fertility of his ideas and recollections, by the rectitude and liberty of his judgment, by the natural and cheerful animation of his language, "The King has spoken to me without reserve and very seriously," he said to me. Lord Aberdeen and I talked as we drove along,

a little of all things. He told me that for two months the Queen had projected this voyage, and had spoken of it to Sir Robert Peel and himself; that they had strongly approved of it, requesting her to say nothing on the subject until the rising of Parliament, to avoid the questions, remarks, and perhaps censures of the opposition. "The Queen," added Lord Aberdeen, "would not go to Paris: she wished to pay a visit to the King and royal family, not to divert herself." In this conversation, I expressed a disposition to concert with him liberal modifications in our mutual tariffs, separately arranged by the two governments in perfect independence, rather than to conclude a solemn and permanent treaty. He seemed to accept my arguments, and I afterwards ascertained that he had said to Sir Robert Peel, "I incline to think that this would be better than a commercial treaty, the importance of which is greatly exaggerated, and never fails to excite, on both sides, much dissatisfaction and complaint."

On returning from the drive, the King had no sooner left his carriage than he asked me what effect their interview had produced upon Lord Aberdeen: "Good, Sire," I replied, "I am certain; but Lord Aberdeen has not given me any details, which I must wait for." This delay greatly disconcerted the King. He was patient in the end and for general results, but the most eager and anxious of men at the moment and in any particular case. Never did he appear more friendly, I might even say more affectionate

to myself. "We are," he said to me on that day, "very necessary to each other. Without you I can arrest bad policy, but it is only with you that I can carry out good."

On Tuesday the 5th of September, during a royal drive, from which we requested permission to absent ourselves, Lord Aberdeen and I walked together for two hours in the park, conversing on all subjects, on both our countries and governments, on the East, on Russia in the East, on Greece, Spain, the right of search, and the treaty of commerce. A conversation singularly free and frank on both sides, and in which we visibly enjoyed the pleasure that leads to confidence and friendship. I was more impressed than I can describe by the calm expansion of Lord Aberdeen's mind, and the modest elevation of his sentiments. I found him at once extremely impartial and thoroughly English, a practical politician without contempt for principles, and liberal from justice and respect for rights although decidedly conservative. At the same time he seemed to me to have little taste for public and ardent controversy, and disposed to prefer, for the attainment of his object, slow and gentle proceedings. The marriage of the Queen of Spain was evidently, in his eyes, our great affair, and the right of search our leading embarrassment. "There are two things," he said to me, "on which my country is not tractable and I myself less liberal than I could wish,—the abolition of the slave trade, and Protestant propagandism. On all other matters, let

you and me think only of doing what appears best; I will undertake to ensure approval. The two points I have named, embrace impossibilities, on the side of England, and great circumspection must be observed." I asked him what might be the strength in the House of Commons of the party called *saints*. They are all *saints* on such questions, was his answer. I convinced him, nevertheless, that our Chambers would persevere obstinately in demanding the abolition of the right of search, and that this international question was one for which a solution must be found, and a danger which called imperatively for termination.

The visit ended with all the personal satisfaction and political effect which could have been anticipated and hoped. Queen Victoria departed on Thursday the 7th of September for her kingdom, leaving, between the two royal families and the ministers of the two states, the seeds of sincere confidence and rare friendship. For myself, I greatly enjoyed the trial; which in this rencontre, the policy I practised had undergone; and before the party assembled at the Château d'Eu broke up, I wrote as follows to one of my friends: "I reflect much on what is passing here. If I consulted only my own interest, the interest of my name and future, I should desire, I should seize a pretext for retiring from power and placing myself on the shelf. I took office, three years ago, to prevent war between the two greatest nations of the world. I have prevented war. I have done more: at the end of three years, through incidents and ob-

stacles of every kind, I have re-established between these two countries, good intelligence and harmony. The most brilliant demonstration of that result is at this moment offered to Europe. I am not like Joan of Arc. She drove the English from France; I have secured peace between France and England. But truly this day is for me what the coronation of the King at Rheims was for Joan of Arc. I ought to do what she wished,—retire. I shall not do so, and some day or other they will burn me as they did her."

We cannot escape from public life as we wish, and when we are deeply engaged in it, we do not pause long on the thought of retirement. "You are making one in a grand spectacle," wrote M. Duchatel,* who had not quitted Paris; "I regret that I cannot witness it, but we have duties in this world and business must supersede pleasure. The effect will be immense, beyond what could at first have been imagined. When impressions gain strength as they continue, it is a sign that they are general and profound. You tell me that the Queen will not come to Paris. Altogether this is best; the visit has a more distinct character. But her reception here would have been magnificent. At first I had some doubts, but all my information is most favourable. General Jacqueminot finds the national guard warmly animated in the right sense." Abroad, and at foreign courts, the impression, very different, was not less powerful. "For a long time," Count Bresson wrote to me from Berlin,†

* On September 3, 1843.

† On August 31, 1843.

"I have received no intelligence so agreeable as that of the visit of the Queen of England to Eu. My satisfaction can only be equalled by the displeasure they will feel at St. Petersburgh and other places. What becomes now of all those malevolent engagements, insulting restrictions, and meannesses mixed up, for thirteen years, with great public affairs? What does it import us that any particular prince, of first, second, or inferior rank, should declare that his principles permit him not to touch the soil of France? The essential manifestation is accomplished. One must, like me, have lived and breathed, during long years, in the midst of so many narrow prejudices, such a host of mean though fiery passions, to appreciate fully the service you have done, and to know how many calculations you baffle, how many triumphs you change into disappointments, and all that the country gains by the homage rendered to the King." From Vienna, Count de Flahault gave me similar information, in less animated language.* "You know," he said to me, "that a close union between France and England is the object of my warmest wishes. The visit of Queen Victoria to the Château d'Eu produces here a great effect. I will not say that the joy I feel is participated; far from it. You will readily understand that this is not made apparent to me; but I can easily see that Prince Metternich, (the quarter most favourable to us), is anything but satisfied. It is not that he wishes for unfriendly intelligence be-

* On the 11th and 30th of September, 1843.

tween the governments of France and England; he is too much an advocate of peace for that; but he has no desire to see established too close a friendship, and the idea of an alliance between France and England, he holds in antipathy. Nothing would tend more to negative the influence he is accustomed to exercise as the grand moderator and mediator of Europe." While I received from without these testimonies of the favourable effect of a visit as unexpected by Europe as by ourselves, I caught a glimpse of a chance of solving, in accordance with the desire of the Chambers and of the country, the question of the right of search which weighed so heavily upon us. I returned to Paris satisfied and confident, waiting the session of 1844 and its debates.

"I set myself to work to prepare a favourable issue. Three weeks before the meeting of the Chambers, I wrote to Count Sainte de Aulaire:* "Resume with Lord Aberdeen the conversation I had with him at the Château d'Eu on the conventions of 1831 and 1833 and the right of search. The question is a little cooled. The public seems less preoccupied with it. The journals no longer dedicate to it all their columns. The prudence of the instructions given to the cruisers has prevented the multiplication of complaints. I acknowledge this improvement of the situation and it delights me. But we must not suffer it to deceive us. At the bottom, the disposition of minds is the same; no one forgets the question, neither those who enter

* On the 6th of December, 1843.

into it from sincere conviction, nor others who use it as a weapon against the cabinet. If they supposed we have forgotten it, and that we think no more of a matter which has so generally and warmly excited the country, they would remind us of it with an increase of ardour, real or calculated, which would instantly re-inflame public passion and bring back the former or perhaps augmented embarrassments. Lord Aberdeen knows, as I do, the pride and jealousy of public assemblies. The Chamber of Deputies has pledged itself by its addresses; the Chamber of Peers has not spoken expressly, but it has clearly manifested the same sentiments and desires. While resolutely refusing what was required of me, while struggling against the evil policy they wished to impose, I said myself that, as soon as the effervescence had tamed down, and when negotiation might become possible without compromising our loyalty in our engagements, and the friendly relations between the two countries, I should hasten to open it. I cannot longer delay. What has passed and what is likely to pass render it impossible.

"Lord Aberdeen, I hope, knows me well enough to feel convinced that there are two things, or rather, I may say, duties, which I shall never deny or abandon. One, to pursue constantly the end we proposed in 1831, and for which the conventions of that epoch are only a means,—the abolition of the traffic; the other, to observe the treaties faithfully until they are changed or abrogated by common accord. I have maintained these two principles in the most critical

moments; I shall always be faithful to them. The honour of my country, of its government, and my own word are thereto engaged. But I have studied the question with care. There are, I think, not only in the disposition of minds, but also in other circumstances which have arisen since 1831, decisive reasons, and at the same time effectual means of modifying, in certain respects, the existing state of things, and of giving it a new form. At present, I only wish to remind Lord Aberdeen of the necessity that presses on us, and of which I spoke with him three months ago. He has too much judgment and equity not to acknowledge it."

M. de Sainte Aulaire replied on the 12th of December: "I forwarded to Lord Aberdeen your letter relative to the treaties of 1831 and 1833. We spoke of it this morning. I had no occasion to enlarge on the considerations therein developed. Lord Aberdeen had thoroughly comprehended them, and retained the spirit of your conversation with him at the Château d'Eu. I therefore confined myself to asking him in what precise terms I should transmit his answer: 'You can write to M. Guizot,' he said, 'that fully confident in the sincerity of his resolution to labour for the suppression of the trade, I shall receive any proposition coming from him with much *consideration*, and shall examine it with the greatest care.' I had nothing more, as it appeared to me, to urge at present. We spoke of other matters; and on separating, I repeated his phrase, saying I should write to you.

'Quite right,' said Lord Aberdeen; 'but be careful to add nothing which implies adhesion on my part to any specific measure. It was settled at Eu, between M. Guizot and me, to commence a negotiation, but not to prejudge the issue. I understand the position of your ministry with its Chambers; he must also understand mine.'"

Lord Aberdeen's position, not only with his parliament but with his cabinet, was far from easy, and required, on his part, as much moderation as persevering firmness; on ours, great circumspection. When he communicated to Sir Robert Peel my letter, and the proposal of a fresh negotiation, the first minister exhibited equal uneasiness and displeasure. "Why bring on," he said, "a parliamentary debate on this subject? We have already shown ourselves extremely yielding to the desires of France. M. Guizot lays down principles well suited for partial application hereafter: he speaks of the pride and jealousy of public assemblies; he knows well that England also is not a country of absolute power, and that her government is compelled to take into account, national prejudices and passions. The House of Commons will never consent to make concessions to the exigences of the Chamber of Deputies."—"There is no question of concessions or exigences," replied Lord Aberdeen; "M. Guizot attaches importance to a necessity of situation, as we also should do, did the case occur. He announces propositions which we have no right to reject *à priori*, for this is not exclusively an Eng-

lish question. The suppression of the slave trade is a common interest in which France, equally with England, has a right to originate an opinion. I know not what measures M. Guizot can substitute for reciprocal search, and certainly I shall not accept them, unless they are effectual for the suppression of the traffic. But to entitle us to reject, we must first know and discuss them." Sir Robert Peel had too just a mind, and too much confidence in his colleague not to yield to such honest and equitable language. It was settled between the two ministers that negotiation should not be rejected.

When our session opened, on the 27th of December, 1843, the speech from the throne,—while stating, "the sincere friendship which unites me, as the King said, to the Queen of Great Britain, and the amicable understanding existing between my government and hers,"—maintained, of course, complete silence on the negotiation entered upon with regard to the right of search; but the committee appointed, in the Chamber of Deputies, to prepare the address in reply to the speech, knew and perfectly understood the new position; and in congratulating itself on the good intelligence which prevailed between the two countries, added, in a special paragraph; "This perfect understanding will, without doubt, aid the success of the negotiations, which, while guaranteeing the repression of an infamous traffic, must tend to replace our commerce under the exclusive protection of our own flag." The Chamber persisted thus in its desire for

the abolition of the right of search, and at the same time signified its confidence in the cabinet charged to prosecute its accomplishment. This was distasteful to the opposition. M. Billault proposed an amendment which omitted all testimony of confidence in the cabinet, and declared that the good understanding between France and England, "had no chance of being durable, until the day when negotiations conducted with perseverance, should, while continuing to prosecute the suppression of an infamous traffic, replace French navigation under the exclusive superintendence of its own flag." I opposed this amendment formally. "I have taken the desire of the Chambers seriously," I said, "and at this moment, I give proof of it, for I accept fully the paragraph of your committee. That paragraph repeats textually the desire that French commerce should be replaced under the exclusive protection of our own flag. Since I accept this without objection, it is evident that this is the object I have in view.

"At the same time that I am thus formal in the expression of my conduct, I affirm that I should fail in my duties were I to produce here documents and details on the actual state of the negotiation, for I should create difficulties in its way, instead of aiding it to advance.

"Allusion has been made to the many reasons that might be given for reaching the accomplishment of the desire expressed in the address. Permit me to keep those reasons to myself, and to give them where

it is profitable that I should give them. I am not called upon to produce them within these walls; elsewhere I must make them valid, and I shall know how to do so.

"The amendment of the honourable M. Billault creates a difficulty in the negotiation, instead of giving me strength. What do I say? It creates two difficulties, one bearing on me, and one which addresses itself to London. The difficulty bearing on me is, that in this amendment, there is no confidence in the negotiator; there is a contrary sentiment. Do you believe that you would give me strength in London by acting thus? To act in London, I must present myself there with the confidence, as well as with the desire of the Chamber. This is what your address of the last year did, and what the address of your committee does now. The amendment of M. Billault takes strength from me in a negotiation it imposes.

"Here is the second difficulty it creates for me:

"This amendment is denunciatory. It has the features of menace. Gentlemen, there are two national sentiments, two national self-loves in presence here. What is the duty of the negotiation? To prevent these two sentiments from clashing. The honourable M. Billault does the contrary; he compels them to clash. This, at any cost, is what I seek to avoid.

"Leave the question to debate itself between the two governments; between two governments seriously and harmoniously disposed, who know, on

both sides, the difficulties with which they have to deal. The object is indicated by the French Chambers to the French government, by the French government to the English government, with which it negotiates. Give strength, then, to the negotiators, instead of clogging them with embarrassments."

The Chamber was convinced. M. Billault withdrew his amendment. The paragraph proposed by the committee was unanimously adopted. And in 1844, as in 1842 and 1843, the Chamber of Peers maintained silence on this question in its address.

Henceforward I found myself in a suitable position for entering on negotiation in London with authority and some chances of success. In demanding the abolition of the right of search, I was the interpreter of a national desire, not of the vote of a party; I made no concession to my adversaries; I spoke in the name of my own friends, in the name of the conservative party which supported me firmly in our general policy and in our amicable understanding with the English government. I began to perceive means of continuing, without right of search, the effectual prosecution of the repression of the slave trade. The minister of marine, M. de Mackau, and the heads of his department, amongst others, M. Galos, director of the colonies, studied the question with zeal. A young and clever naval officer, M. Bouet-Willaumez, then only captain of a corvette and provisional governor of Senegal, had communicated information and views to the Duke de Broglie and myself, which we considered

valuable. And by a singular coincidence, at the same moment, analogous ideas were suggested to me by Lord Brougham, one of the firmest supporters of the good intelligence between France and England, who had just given me, in the House of Lords, eloquent tokens of amicable sympathy. I wrote to Count de Sainte Aulaire, on the 24th of February, 1844: "An idea has occurred to Lord Brougham for replacing the right of search without injury to the suppression of the slave traffic, which we have had under consideration here for six weeks; a system of combined squadrons, placed alternately under a commandant from each nation. I do not yet see this very clearly; but I think something may be drawn from it, —perhaps a definitive solution of the question. I am delighted that this idea should have sprung up in London as well as in Paris, and I encourage Lord Brougham to cultivate it. Do not speak of it but to him. I am preparing a complete memoir on this subject, which I shall send to you later."

Several months elapsed before these preparatory studies were terminated, and in that interval two incidents occurred which furnished me with an opportunity of making some progress in the negotiation scarcely opened. On the 1st of June, 1844, the Emperor Nicholas arrived in England, and remained eight days there, between London and Windsor. On the 8th of October following, King Louis Philippe returned the visit of Queen Victoria to the Château d'Eu, and passed six days at Windsor, whither I accompanied him.

The journey of the Emperor Nicholas occasioned us no surprise. On the 16th of February, M. de Sainte Aulaire had written to me: "I forgot an important fact, which I beg you to keep secret. The Emperor has announced himself for this summer in England. On the return of the Grand-duke Michael, who gave great accounts of his journey, the Emperor manifested, in presence of Mr. Bloomfield, secretary to the English embassy, a desire of judging for himself of the exactness of these recitals. I heard this from Lord Aberdeen. He did not add that a formal invitation had been sent." Two months later, on the 16th of April, I, in turn, gave warning to our ambassador; "I have reasons for believing," I wrote, "that towards the end of May, the Emperor Nicholas will appear in London suddenly, like an unexpected and unceremonious traveller. He says, and causes it to be repeated, that to his great regret, he cannot go this year. All, nevertheless, indicates that he will go. He is fond of surprises and effects of this nature."

The surprise was merely apparent. Without having been suggested in London, the journey was eagerly accepted by the English court, by the cabinet more than by the Queen herself. As soon as the emperor had arrived, I wrote to M. de Sainte Aulaire: "On this subject, I have no private directions to give you. Be reserved with a shade of coldness. The unfriendly here, or the malicious only, would rejoice if we took umbrage at this journey, or evinced at least ill temper. There will be nothing of the kind. We see things

as they are, and reject perverse conclusions. The Emperor goes to London because the Queen of England went to Eu. We find no difficulty in looking on this as a retaliation. We are quite sure that he will accomplish no policy with the English cabinet beyond what we know. Far from regretting that he should pay court to England, and that England should exercise influence over him, we are glad that it is so; it is advantageous to the European world. So much for the reality of things. As to external forms, you know as well as I do, the proprieties of our situation. Do what they prescribe to you, neither more nor less. Wait for the Imperial civilities, and receive them with the respect which is their due, and as being due to you also."

'During his whole visit, the Emperor Nicholas conducted himself like a royal courtier come to display his graceful manners with his greatness, anxious to please Queen Victoria, her ministers and ladies, the aristocracy, the people and all the world in England; always preserving in his eagerness much personal dignity, but deficient sometimes in tact and restraint. Being present one day, with the Queen, at a review, and complimenting her on the splendid appearance of her troops, he added, with a profound bow, "I beg your Majesty to consider all mine as belonging to you;" and he took care to repeat what he had said to several officers of the Queen's staff. At Ascot races he affected the most extravagant admiration, and to assist the expenses of this national amusement in

England, he conferred the annual gift of a gold cup, valued at five hundred guineas, forgetting that at that precise moment the lovers of the turf were a little displeased with Prince Albert, to whom they attributed some of the police restrictions recently enforced against the incidental games. A subscription ball was to take place on the 10th of June, for the benefit of the Polish refugees. Attempts were made, without success, to adjourn it. Baron de Brünnow wrote to the Duchess of Somerset, the first of the lady patronesses, to say that the Emperor viewed this act of benevolence with much interest, and would willingly associate himself with it, should the receipts not answer the hopes of the committee. While the committee, with much difference of opinion, deliberated on the question whether they should accept the Emperor's money or thank him for his offer, he observed with ill-suppressed humour to Horace Vernet, "They cry in my ears even here, *Long live the Poles.*" Success, however, attended him at the court; and in London, with the crowd, the singular circumstances of his journey, his splendid person, his lofty, open deportment and haughty simplicity excited curiosity without kindly feeling, but not without admiration. Altogether he was more run after than appreciated by the English public, and he left on shrewd observers the idea of a man who drapes himself majestically in a brilliant part, the weight of which disturbs him, and who dreads the trial of action, although he wishes to appear always prepared for it.

The day after his departure, Lord Aberdeen chatting familiarly with M. de Sainte Aulaire complimented him on the reception, particularly gracious in fact, with which the Emperor had distinguished him. "I do not accept the compliment," said the Count; "exclusively personal civilities on the part of a sovereign to an ambassador are actual embarrassments. The Emperor ought to have spoken to me of the King; he did not do so; I set no value on his attentions." Lord Aberdeen then said that with Queen Victoria the Emperor Nicholas had been equally reserved and refrained from mentioning the King's name. Once, the tenor of the conversation having introduced it, the Emperor checked himself in the midst of his speech and changed the subject abruptly. M. de Sainte Aulaire having asked Lord Aberdeen whether with him the Emperor preserved the same restraint, Lord Aberdeen, while endeavouring to soften rather than aggravate, gave the ambassador reason to believe that the sentiments of the Emperor Nicholas were always the same and that he had manifested them freely. "He has not," said Lord Aberdeen, "any personal animosity against your king; he acknowledges that for fourteen years Europe owes much to his ability and wisdom; but the principle of the government of July is revolutionary, and that principle is essentially opposed to his sentiments and policy. I have nothing more to reproach myself with, he added; in 1830, I was induced to recognize the government of France, and since, I have done nothing to injure it. I have not

given the slightest support to its enemies. I see without the least regret your amicable relations. Continue them while you can. To tell you the truth, I do not think they will last long; the first squall in the Chambers will sweep them away. Louis Philippe will try to resist, and if he does not feel strong enough he will place himself at the head of the movement to save his popularity."

The sagacity of the Emperor Nicholas was at fault here, and he much miscalculated events and men. The trial of the worst as of the best days has shown how far the perseverance of King Louis Philippe could go, rather than sacrifice his policy to the maintenance of his popularity.

"This exclusively French subject being exhausted," M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote, "I asked Lord Aberdeen what he wished me to say to you on the political object of the Emperor's visit.—'I understand your curiosity, he replied; a voyage to England from the Château d'Eu, or from the Château d'Eu to England, may be explained as a party of pleasure; but to arrive in eight days from the extremity of Europe to return eight days after, appears less simple; and yet in spite of all probability, it is positive that the Emperor has neither transacted nor attempted any public business here; the only subject on which we spoke in detail is the Turkish Empire. The Emperor much desires its preservation and is very uneasy at its weakness. But he proposed no plan and suggested no project applicable to the different eventualities we may anti-

cipate.'—I remarked, however," M. de Sainte Aulaire added, "in the course of our conversation, that the Emperor Nicholas had declared that under any circumstances he wanted nothing for himself. He evinced equal confidence in the disinterestedness of England, with which country he is confident of a friendly understanding, happen what may. But the embarrassments will, he thinks, come from the side of France, who will throw herself impulsively into a question, which, the case occurring, ought to be treated with much restraint and wisdom. Lord Aberdeen sincerely believes that these generalities comprise the full scope of the Emperor's thoughts. If he had arranged a plan, if he had come to England to propose its execution, he would assuredly have made some overtures, and he has made none."

The Emperor Nicholas in 1844 took care not to propose to Lord Aberdeen the plan for the conquest and partition of the Ottoman Empire, to the entire exclusion of France, which nine years later he somewhat thoughtlessly revealed to Sir George Hamilton Seymour, and which cost Russia Sebastopol and the dominion of the Black Sea.

But whatever may have been his confidence or reserve, this visit of the Emperor of Russia was, for the English cabinet, a signal triumph of policy and self-congratulation, and Lord Aberdeen did not dissemble his satisfaction. But far from chilling or impeding his good dispositions towards France and her government, this incident encouraged and placed him more

at his ease. He could no longer be accused of an exclusive preference, prejudicial to the relations of England with her other allies. A short time after the departure of the Emperor Nicholas, he spoke to Count de Jarnac of the King's visit to Windsor as of a settled affair, which Queen Victoria mentioned to him as often as he saw her, and which gratified him as much as it did the Queen herself. The report soon spread in England, and was received in all quarters with that satisfaction, alternately silent and eager for public and formal manifestation, which forms the characteristic of English enjoyments. The Mayor of Liverpool wrote as early as the 12th of September to Lord Aberdeen, expressing a desire that King Louis Philippe would honour with a visit the second commercial city of the kingdom, offering to defray the entire expenses of the reception either at his own private residence, or in the Guildhall. Being informed of this desire before he embarked for England, the King requested Lord Aberdeen to thank the Mayor on his part, and to express at the same time his regret that he could not avail himself of it. "I am aware," he said, "that I must deny myself these gratifications; I shall and ought to be exclusively *the Queen's guest*, and I shall be too happy to devote entirely to her the little time that I am permitted to remain."

At that moment I was myself in poor condition for travelling, having scarcely emerged from an indisposition caused by the fatigues of the session, and which still left me suffering so much that the King, on the

27th of September, addressed me thus:—"My dear minister, no one can take a more lively interest in your health than I do. You are surrounded by skilful physicians who ought to know your temperament better than any one else; but I, who am naturally bilious, have persevered in the system of Tronchin, who superintended my early years, and I have found the advantage of it. Now he said;—few remedies, diluents, and caution in the abuse of tonics. Forgive me if I say too much. The interest I feel for you, and my long experience of seventy-one years, dictate my remarks; but I know I am not a doctor, and ought to hold my tongue. What succeeds with one might be injurious to another." Although I felt weak, I determined to take my part in this visit, a brilliant evidence of the success of the policy for which I had so strenuously fought. On the morning of the 7th of October, I joined the King at the Château d'Eu, and on the same evening we embarked at Tréport, in the *Gomer*, a fine steam frigate, in which we expected to reach Portsmouth the following day. This was not the only occasion on which I have felt the power of grand scenes of nature and imposing actions of life in suddenly reviving physical strength, and enabling the body to bear the impulsive movements of the soul. During the day the weather had been dull and rainy; towards evening, the sun reappeared, a breeze sprang up. At half-past six, the King, the Duke de Montpensier, Admiral de Mackau, and I, entered the barge of Admiral de la Susse,

which immediately cleared the bar of Tréport, and rowed towards the *Gomer*, at anchor in the roadstead, with two other steamers, the *Caïman* and *Elan*, intended for our convoy. Night had already fallen, the air was fresh, the rowers vigorous and animated; the barge advanced rapidly; sometimes we looked astern towards the shore, where the Queen, Madame Adelaide, the Princesses and their suite were still standing, endeavouring to follow us with their eyes across the sea, through the approaching darkness, and still continuing to wave their adieux. At other times we looked ahead towards the ships that expected us, and whence the shouts of the sailors mounted on the yards already reached our ears. As we approached the *Gomer*, the three vessels in the road illuminated suddenly; the port-holes were lighted up; Bengal fires shone on the nettings, and their bluish flames were reflected in the slightly agitated waves. We reached the bottom of the ladder; the King placed his foot on it; a cry of *Long live the King!* re-echoed above and around us. We ascended; a company of marines drawn up on deck presented arms; the scattered sailors redoubled their acclamations. We were moved and gratified. The last arrangements then took place; every one went to his assigned post; the fires fell, the lights disappeared, the boats were hoisted in, all resumed silence and obscurity. The anchor was raised, and when the three vessels began their voyage, I was already in bed in my cabin, where I slept almost immediately, with a feeling of repose and

comfort to which I had been a stranger for many days.

The following morning, by seven o'clock, we were in sight of Portsmouth. There was no mist; the sky was bright, the sea calm; the rising day showed us the three towns surrounding the harbour, Portsmouth, Portsea, and Gosport, which seemed to form one only. Eight small steamers, dispatched before our departure to form lines on our route, and salute us alternately as we approached, had ranged behind us, and followed in our wake. Others, anchored in the road, had joined them spontaneously. As we advanced, our convoy increased; the sea was now covered with vessels of every kind, under sail or steam, large ships, yachts, barges, and boats, so eager and numerous, that the *Gomer* was compelled to slacken her speed, to avoid running foul of them. All were dressed with flags; the French and English colours floated together; the crews were on the yard arms or on deck; the crowd assembled on the shore mixed their *huzzas* with the salutes of the batteries, forts, and ships of the line. It was an immense movement and uproar in testimony of national and pacific joy. Having entered and anchored in the harbour, we waited, before disembarking, the arrival of the train by which Prince Albert was coming to Gosport to receive the King. But the delay proved to be no gap. Animated by the same sentiments which three weeks before the Mayor of Liverpool had expressed to Lord Aberdeen, the Mayor and Municipal Corporation of Portsmouth had re-

quested and obtained authority to signalize, on their own account, the arrival of the King of the French in England, by presenting him with an address. They delivered this on board the *Gomer*, and retired delighted with the answer they received, and at having thus taken part in such a meeting between two sovereigns and two nations. This municipal manifestation of national feeling occurred four times during the King's visit; at Portsmouth, when he arrived, at Windsor, at Dover, when he re-embarked, and on the 12th of October, the Corporation of the City of London, regretting strongly that they could not entertain the King in London, dispatched to Windsor Castle the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Sheriffs, Common Councilmen and officers, instructed to present to him in a formal address their congratulations, homages, and good wishes. It was a solemn and affecting ceremony. I wrote the same day to Paris: "I have just come from the reception of the City address by the King. His answer was admirably received. I wrote it this morning, and gave it to M. de Jarnac to translate. By the advice of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen, it was necessary that it should be written, read, and immediately handed by the King to the Lord Mayor. The Queen and Prince Albert passed half an hour in the King's cabinet looking over and correcting the translation. This is a true family intimacy. According to universal opinion here, this address, voted unanimously in the *Common Council*, is an unexampled and highly significant event. Sir Robert Peel says he is deeply impressed by it.

At the court, filled with Tories, some expressed considerable surprise at seeing around them and amongst themselves, such marked courtesy to France, and to a King of France, sprung from a revolution. But these remnants of the passions and routines of party vanish or remain silent before the evident friendship of the Queen for King Louis Philippe and his family, the amicable understanding proclaimed by the Tory cabinet, the adhesion given to this policy by the old and illustrious chiefs of the party, the Duke of Wellington at their head, and the satisfaction which the Whigs could not avoid exhibiting. It was with the general approbation, Whig and Tory, aristocratic and popular, that the Queen conferred on Louis Philippe the Order of the Garter; and on the evening of the day on which the city of London presented its address, the ceremony of knightly investiture took place at Windsor, by the hands of Queen Victoria herself, surrounded by the full splendour of her court. Lord Aberdeen ever thoughtful and just towards his adversaries, took care that, by special favour, the chief of the Whig leaders, Lord John Russell should be invited to dine at Windsor on the eve of the King's departure, and he engaged me to talk freely with him on the relations between the two countries, and on the right of search. This question ever occupied his mind; he endeavoured to place it beyond party disputes, and he had some hope that Lord John Russell might render assistance. Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, in the preceding session of Parliament, had tried to excite on this question a

passionate debate. He gave notice of a formal motion against any attack upon the right of search and the treaties which established it. The slight favour which his project received, even from the Whigs themselves, led to its repeated adjournment. Mr. Monckton Milnes declared that to that motion he would propose an amendment to the effect that the conventions relative to the right of search for the abolition of the slave trade ought to be regarded as a temporary essay, ever open to the examination of both countries; and on the day when Lord Palmerston proposed to develop his proposition, the House of Commons was counted out. The right of search was evidently shaken in the opinion of the Parliament and the country; but no one dared to say so openly, or to perceive as yet any other mode of action against the traffic, by which it might be replaced.

I conversed on the subject with all the members of the cabinet who were at Windsor; with Lord Aberdeen, Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Stanley (now Earl of Derby), and Sir James Graham. I held the same language to all: "It may be," I said to them, "that the right of search is, as they think in England, the most effectual method of repressing the trade; but to become effectual, it must be rendered practicable. Now, in the present state of minds in France, Chambers and country, it is no longer so; for if seriously exercised, it will infallibly lead to incidents tending to a rupture between the two countries. Ought we to sacrifice to this particular question our

general policy, and peace to the suppression of the trade by the right of search? Therein lies the question. We believe, in France, that there are, for the suppression of the traffic, other modes than the right of search, and such as in the actual position will prove more effective. We shall propose them to you. Will you refuse to examine them with us, and to adopt them, if, after examination, they really appear more effective than the right of search which no longer possesses that quality?"

Lord Aberdeen accepted fully the question thus stated, and laid it before his colleagues in the same form, with reserve, however, and subordinating the issue of the negotiation to the practical value of the new methods we should propose. It was his nature to appear always less decided than he was in reality, and to wait patiently until time and reflection should bring round wavering and refractory spirits to his opinion. Sir Robert Peel entered into no explanation with me on the question itself. He was evidently perplexed and moved by the opposition which the abandonment of this right would encounter in Parliament, and by the impression it would convey to the public. But he evinced towards me much confidence, repeated twice that on all points he and Lord Aberdeen perfectly agreed, and at the end of one interview, extended his hand with more cordiality than I expected, inviting my unreserved friendship. The Duke of Wellington visited me in my own room, and passed half an hour with me, listening with the attention

which his deafness rendered necessary, astonished that a right, exercised for ten years with so little stir, should suddenly excite so much clamour, half disposed to consider these clamours less serious than I reported them, but admitting that the good intelligence between the two governments was of more value than the right of search, and ready to accept what his colleagues decided. Lord Stanley, after a tolerably long conversation in a corner of the grand drawing-room, said to me in a frank and firm tone: "I promise you I will remember all you have said;" and Sir James Graham seemed to me, of all, the most intimate with Lord Aberdeen, and the most decided to march with him at the same pace towards the same end. I left Windsor convinced that the moment had arrived for entering on the negotiation, and for following it up vigorously.

On the 27th of November, I forwarded a memoir to Count de Sainte Aulaire, instructing him to communicate it confidentially to Lord Aberdeen,—in which I pointed out the new means which appeared to me suited to replace, for the suppression of the slave traffic, the right of search. In this, I suggested that the commissioners selected by the two governments should meet without delay in London, either to examine my suggestions, or to seek others themselves if these appeared ineligible. I announced the dispatch of this memoir to Lord Aberdeen, myself, saying; "You and we are in a false position. Entirely occupied with the right of search, we lose sight of the

actual suppression of the trade; we sacrifice the end to the means. The conventions of 1831 and 1833, the pledge and symbol of the union of France and England to suppress the trade, have lost almost all their practical efficacy, and have become little better than empty appearances, and official falsehoods. Is this a serious policy worthy of us? Is it not a thousand times more convenient and useful to adopt, for the suppression of the trade, other means that we might mutually exercise with the same zeal and confidence, so that the union of France and England, in this great object, may become once more real and effective?"

The call for special commissioners appointed to examine the question freely, and to seek new modes of common action for the two governments, convinced Lord Aberdeen. "He has adopted this idea eagerly," M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote to me; "his responsibility will be thus relieved, and he might name such a commissioner, Lord Brougham for instance, as would be to us, a guarantee of success. "But, on the substance of the affair, Lord Aberdeen exhibited much more hesitation. "I understood at Windsor," he said to M. de Sainte Aulaire, "that M. Guizot proposed, not to abandon entirely the system of the treaties of 1831 and 1833, but to try a new system with a view of returning to the old one, in case of non-success,—the treaties not ceasing thus to be in virtual existence. "I replied," said M. de Sainte Aulaire, "that, for my part, I had not heard you say

anything to that effect, and that I considered it impossible to satisfy our Chambers on such terms. I should not be surprised if Lord Aberdeen found it much more difficult to change the treaties of 1831 and 1833, than to let them fall into disuse by refusing to deliver to the cruisers, warrants of search. Such a refusal, coming from us, would be, at the most, referred to the crown lawyers, who, in their Judaical system of interpretation, would not fail to declare that we are within the letter of the treaties in not asking or giving more than one warrant for one cruiser. Assuredly I do not propose this expedient to you, which I could not consider either worthy or advantageous; but how am I to receive it in case the suggestion should come from Lord Aberdeen?"

Lord Aberdeen was far from entertaining any such idea, for M. de Sainte Aulaire, having allowed it to escape him: "That would be an insult," he said; "and all negotiation would become impossible. But before I add a word, I must communicate, at least officially, M. Guizot's memoir to my colleagues, and above all must come to an understanding with Sir Robert Peel. Perhaps it would be best, when your official communication arrives that it should merely develop your objections to the treaties of 1831 and 1833, on account of their inconvenient conditions, and their want of effect for the suppression of the traffic. Then, without entering into a detail of the means to be substituted in place of the reciprocal right of search, you might indicate them vaguely, and

propose the appointment of a mixed commission to examine them. I think it would be much easier to obtain the adhesion of the cabinet in this way, than by calling it to discuss a complex proposition."

I followed Lord Aberdeen's advice. On the 26th of December, I forwarded to M. de Sainte Aulaire, with instructions to communicate it to him, an official dispatch from which I removed all precise indication of the new methods for repressing the trade which might be substituted for the right of search. I confined myself, on this point, to general expressions, marking the end towards which the commissioners should direct their attention, namely, the discovery of some means of repression as effective as the right of search, for such efficiency, both for France and England, formed the essential condition of any new system. I pointed out the spirit in which the commissioners should be selected, and what dispositions and qualities they should possess. We also, as Lord Aberdeen had suggested to me at Windsor, looked for men of consideration, of unquestionable independence of position, and known for their zeal in the question of the abolition of the slave trade. My dispatch thoroughly satisfied Lord Aberdeen, who forwarded it immediately to Sir Robert Peel, and on the 30th of September M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote as follows: "The *Premier* does not dispute in principle the mixed commission: he argues even under the hypothesis of its admission, which is, in fact, admitting it implicitly; but he calls for two points: 1. the nomina-

tion of the commissioners; 2. concerted instructions. He requires that you should not name the matter in the Chambers until it is settled. Even vague words, uttered by you, might prepare serious difficulties. In conclusion, he strongly urges his colleague to persevere still in great reserve." While listening to this letter, I did not feel quite at ease; I dreaded scruples and delays; I was most agreeably surprised by the commentary which followed the text. "Lord Aberdeen, who understands better than we can the value of Sir Robert Peel's emendations, sees nothing in his letter which prevents him from advancing. He proposes therefore to send your dispatch in communication to all the members, at present dispersed, of the cabinet, and has little doubt except as to the date more or less early at which you will receive his answer."

While expecting this answer, we each selected our commissioner. Lord Aberdeen informed me that he should appoint Doctor Lushington, a member of the Privy Council and Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, a grave and learned man, honoured equally for his character and knowledge, and one of the most ardent enemies of the slave trade. I, in turn, instructed M. de Sainte Aulaire to tell Lord Aberdeen that I should ask the Duke de Broglie to undertake this delicate mission. "If M. de Broglie accepts," replied Lord Aberdeen, "M. Guizot must still express himself with great reserve before the Chambers; but he may from that day regard the success of his proposition as secured." Sir Robert Peel, in

fact, when informed of this choice, wrote to Lord Aberdeen that he laid aside every objection. "If, however," he said, "M. Guizot should leave the ministry, and if, in that case, the Duke de Broglie were to retire from the commission, the choice of his substitute might be unfavourable, and we should have reason to regret our concession." In transmitting these details to me, M. de Sainte Aulaire added, "At Windsor, Prince Albert spoke to me equally of the good effect which the appointment of the Duke de Broglie as commissioner, would produce here. This is the first time the Prince has touched on politics with me; I found him very judicious, well informed, and most friendly to Lord Aberdeen. As to ourselves, it is impossible to be better disposed than are the Queen and Prince; the remembrances of the King's visit to Windsor are as lively as on the day after his departure."

Nearly at the same moment, when M. de Sainte Aulaire gave me these assurances, I wrote to him thus: "The Duke de Broglie consents willingly to be our commissioner, on two conditions only. The first is, that you approve of it; the second, that it must be well understood that he only undertakes this mission for, and with the cabinet in office; and that, in case it should retire, he retires also. I accept this new mark of his friendship without regret, for I feel confident he will have no occasion to put it in practice. The bureaux of the Chamber of Deputies have just named the committee on the address, and we have

eight votes against two, and eight of the most decided character. The debate will be animated, but success appears to me certain. The opposition has raised and taken alarm. The abstract of votes in the bureau gives us a majority of fifty-five."

The debate on the address was, in fact, warm, less on the right of search than on newer questions, which offered better chances to the opposition; amongst others, the war with Morocco, and the affairs of Otaheite. It was difficult to press the ministry strongly on the right of search at the moment when it had induced the English cabinet to accept a serious negotiation to satisfy the desire of the Chamber in demanding its abolition. Enlightened by information which reached him from London, M. Thiers himself engaged his friends not to pronounce too decidedly impossible a success which the cabinet might perhaps obtain, and which would be increased by denying it beforehand. When I was called upon in both Chambers to give explanations on this point, I confined myself to saying, "The question is very difficult in itself, and certainly, nothing has been done for three or four years to render it more easy of solution. I do not say that at present it is entirely settled; do not believe that I extend my words beyond the reality of facts: I should prefer remaining within them. If I said more to-day than actually exists, I should impede rather than advance the solution of the question. This is what has taken place. The English government is engaged with a national feeling with which

it must treat, as we treat with that of France. You know with what passion, what honourable passion the abolition of the slave trade is prosecuted in England. Now, it is the general opinion there that the right of search is, with this object, the most, perhaps the only effectual course. That the English government may be able to change what exists, it must first recognize, and through itself cause the Parliament to recognize, and through the Parliament the country,—that to suppress this trade there are other means than the right of search; means as effective, more effective; for in the existing state of facts and minds, the right of search has lost much of its efficacy. The first, perhaps the greatest step to take, is to induce the English government to decide with us on these new means of repressing the trade. This step has been already made. Not to adjourn the difficulty and beguile ourselves with false appearances, but to undertake seriously the investigation and settlement of the question. And the names of the persons who co-operate in this act will furnish the best proof of the serious consideration that the two governments bring to the inquiry. It is said that we pursue an impossible end. I firmly hope that those who say so are mistaken, and that two great governments, filled with reciprocal esteem, and firmly resolved to persevere in the great work they have commenced in common, will, under any circumstances, succeed in its accomplishment."

Before the question thus laid down, all the amend-

ments moved against the cabinet in the Chamber of Deputies were rejected, and the Chamber of Peers, breaking the silence it had hitherto preserved, inserted this paragraph in its address: "Your Majesty assures us that the relations between France and England have not been altered by discussions which might have compromised them. We congratulate ourselves on this with you, Sire, well convinced that your Majesty's government perseveres in its efforts to smooth, in a manner conformable with the dignity and interests of France, the difficulties which might menace the peace of the future. A good accord between the two states is important to the repose of the world; the interests of civilization and humanity are engaged in it; the high degree of prosperity which two great peoples enjoy, and which have equal rights to reciprocal esteem, depends on it. May a mutual spirit of equity preside over their relations and hasten the success of the negotiation, which, while guaranteeing the repression of an odious traffic, must tend to the replacement of our commerce under the exclusive protection of the national flag!" Far from causing any embarrassment by this language, it was a support which the Chamber of Peers thus afforded to us.

Having arrived in London on the 15th of March, the Duke de Broglie was received by the court, the cabinet, and in general society, with distinguished favour. On the day next but one after, the Queen asked him to dinner. Lord Aberdeen and M. de Sainte Aulaire were the only guests invited to meet him.

"Notwithstanding the Holy Week," the Queen said, "I did not wish to delay your reception." She spoke much to him of the King and the royal family, and slightly alluded to the affair which had brought him to England, merely observing, "It will be very difficult." The evening before, he had passed an hour with Lord Aberdeen. "He anticipated," he wrote to me, "our propositions, entering successively on all the general points of the matter; the appointment of a new squadron better adapted to the service of the suppression of the traffic and the pursuit of the slave ships, the destruction of the slave markets, the difficulty and dangers of the undertaking, and the possibility of a future association of the Americans in the new system. Finding him so well informed on the subject, I did not decline conversation, but restricted myself to general terms, and professed the greatest doubt on the result of all these speculations until based on the accordance and approbation of professional men. I therefore suggested that, above all, we should hear the commandants on the French and English stations on the coast of Africa, which was eagerly admitted. I added only, that I was authorized to say my government would not shrink from any expense which might be considered necessary to effect the object we have in view. Lord Aberdeen returned to the charge on several of the points he had touched upon, and, as far as I suffered myself to go, we entered into the substance of the discussion. If I had to deal with him only, perhaps I might have

yielded to his desire of knowing and saying everything; but as it is Dr. Lushington who must be convinced first of all, I entrenched myself behind a distrust of our own ideas, giving him at the same time to understand that we are perhaps prepared to answer the objections he foresees. In short, we parted in a perfectly good understanding." Amongst the members of the English cabinet, Sir James Graham and Lord Haddington were particularly well disposed. "I wish you," said the latter to the Duke de Broglie, "all possible success in your enterprise, and I place my entire department—the Admiralty—at your disposal." Sir Robert Peel was absent; but, on his return he gave his opinion more frankly than was expected, and formally approved of the substitution of an increased number of cruisers of the two nations, in place of reciprocal right of search. The Whig leaders, nearly all friends of the Duke de Broglie, received him with their former sentiments, but with much reserve, and were silent on the object of his mission. "They are much divided," he wrote to me, on this point: "the reasonable section considers itself beaten, or even wishes that we should succeed; Lord Clarendon said this to me yesterday. Lord Palmerston stands alone in attaching great importance to the treaties of 1831 and 1833; but when he speaks, he imposes his opinion on many persons otherwise well disposed." A circumstance occurred, calculated to act upon the Whig party. The *Anti-Slavery Association*, composed of the warmest and most approved *saints*, transmitted a me-

morial to the Duke de Broglie, which the year before had been presented to Sir Robert Peel. "This memorial," he wrote to me, "lays down through a long series of quotations and arguments that the right of search is utterly useless; that the only way to extinguish the traffic, is to abolish slavery, and concludes that France ought to be answered thus:—Put an end to slavery, and there will no longer be a question of the right of search. If you require, to effect this, five, ten, or fifteen years, take them; the right of search will last as long as slavery does, and will end with it.—The conclusion is absurd, but the argument against the right of search has its value, and I shall use it in the discussion. Lord Brougham has undertaken to speak to the committee of the Association against the conclusions in the memorial, and to send the members to me, one by one, that I also may reason with them to the best of my ability." Lord Brougham seconded us with indefatigable zeal; and appearances looked so favourable that the Duke de Broglie did not think he went too far in saying to Lord Aberdeen, "I hope, my Lord, it will happen to you on this occasion, as on many others, to reply to your adversaries, as the Lacedemonian said to the Athenian, *What thou speakest, I do.* It is you who will definitively abolish the traffic in negroes." And Lord Aberdeen did not refuse the compliment.

But, whether in hope or fear, we ought not, in public affairs to trust too much to favourable appearances and easy beginnings. While evincing his

friendly disposition, Lord Aberdeen, as soon as the questions were closely pressed, retreated behind Dr. Lushington. "I give him no instructions," he said to the Duke de Broglie: "I leave to him the care of finding expedients, and I shall accept all he agrees to with confidence." The first time that the Duke de Broglie met Lord Aberdeen and Dr. Lushington together, he found the minister more reserved in presence of the commissioner than he had been when they were tête-à-tête. It was, therefore Dr. Lushington above all who was to be persuaded and decided. It was admitted on all hands that he was a man of perfect integrity, honourable and scientific, devoted to just causes, open to sound reasoning, but somewhat opinionative and punctilious, pre-occupied with his own judgment and personal success. The Duke de Broglie, whose pride is absolutely divested of self-love and of all inclination for display, abstained from bringing on the controversy abruptly, evinced a stronger desire to hear Dr. Lushington's ideas than to expose his own, and sought, in the first instance, to establish with him a confiding intimacy. This he was enabled to effect without affectation or loss of time. The negotiation commenced by a long inquiry into the circumstances of the traffic on the coasts of Africa, and on the means of suppressing it, otherwise than by the right of search. Six naval officers, three French and three English, were heard in succession. Dr. Lushington had previously expressed great confidence in Captain Trotter; and the Duke de Broglie found in

Captain Bouet-Willaumez, now a vice-admiral and maritime prefect at Toulon, a sailor of equal genius and experience, full of ardour, of invention and ready resource, and remarkable for his tact in living on good terms with the English officers, even when a little too eager to forestall at the risk of eclipsing them. His deposition agreed entirely with that of the English Captain Denman, a distinguished officer, who, like himself, had long commanded on the Western coast of Africa. After a week entirely devoted to this investigation, the Duke de Broglie and Dr. Lushington entered into conference on their mutual views and plans.

That which the Duke communicated to Dr. Lushington, as in conformity with the instructions of his government and his personal conviction after a minute study of the facts, was simple and short. It consisted in declaring, at first, the impossibility of maintaining "under any form and within any possible limits" the right of reciprocal search established by the conventions of 1831 and 1833, and in substituting in their place: 1. On the Western coast of Africa, the principal theatre of the traffic, two squadrons, French and English, each composed of a considerable and fixed number of cruisers, steamers and sailing vessels, with orders to pursue, each under its own flag, all ships suspected of being engaged in the slave trade: 2. Treaties concluded with the native chiefs on those parts of the coast at which the slave markets were usually held, to obtain from them engagements to interdict the

trade within their territories, with authority to interfere on land and by force, should occasion require, to compel respect for their interdiction, and to destroy the *barracoons*, or places and instruments of traffic.

Dr. Lushington's plan was longer and more complicated. It contained two clauses unacceptable by us:—1. Instead of abolishing the conventions of 1831 and 1833, it confined itself to their suspension for five years, to replacing them by the new system proposed for the suppression of the trade, and to declaring that at the expiration of five years they should resume vigour *ipso facto*, unless expressly abrogated by consent of the two governments; 2. It established in principle, and in the name of the law of nations, the doctrine supported by the English government in its relations with the United States of America, upon the right of verifying the nationality of the ships suspected of hoisting a flag, not their own, for the concealment of acts essentially illegitimate. This maintained indirectly and under a general denomination, the right of search specially instituted against the traffic.

On the first point, the question was simple, and from the opening of the negotiation our object had been positively determined. On the second, a serious objection presented itself. It was impossible to establish, in principle, that, to escape all examination, it would be sufficient for a vessel engaged in an act essentially illegitimate, piracy, or slave traffic, to hoist a flag not its own; neither could it be formally recognized that men-of-war should be privileged, in

time of peace, to stop and search merchant ships under pretext of verifying their nationality. As soon as the Duke de Broglie informed me precisely of the difficulty, I replied: "I much fear that it will be impossible to make the mass of our public here comprehend the difference between a search for the suppression of the trade, and a visit to verify nationality. And even when we have made it clear to them, it will suffice for the Americans to reject, on principle, the second visit as well as the first, to bring it into equal disrepute with us. Unless I deceive myself greatly, if our negotiation leads to no other result than the substitution of one search for another, instead of producing any good effect, it will rather aggravate the position." A long and subtle controversy ensued on this point between the Duke de Broglie, Dr. Lushington, and Lord Aberdeen. I am wrong in saying controversy, for there was, on both sides, so much good faith and sound sense that they had the air of seeking truth and justice together, rather than that of each maintaining his own interest and opinion. Long practice in business, and experience of the artificial egotisms mixed up with it, leave on the minds of upright men a natural disposition to mistrust and suspicious precautions; but when they meet and mutually recognize each other, they joyfully emerge from that depressing routine, and gratify themselves in surmounting, by frankness and rectitude of mind, the difficulties which spring up in their way. This happened on the present

occasion with the three negotiators. After a month of research and conversation, equally sincere on the part of all, they agreed in the articles which, while taking into account every situation, solved equitably, and in the main point according to our desire, the two embarrassing questions. With regard to the conventions of 1831 and 1833, it was stipulated that they should be suspended for ten years, the term assigned to the duration of the new treaty, and that at the end of that period, they should be looked upon as definitively abrogated, unless, by common accord, they were restored to vigour. On the right of verifying the nationality of vessels, no general and absolute maxim was established; but it was agreed "that instructions founded on the principles of the right of nations and the habitual practice of maritime countries should be addressed to the commandants of the French and English squadrons and stations on the coast of Africa, and that the two governments should communicate to each other their respective instructions, the text of which would be annexed to the new convention." Thus drawn up, the treaty was signed on the 29th of May, 1845, and the right of search abolished.

Towards the close of the negotiation I had suffered from hepatic and nephritic attacks which compelled me, for a month, to almost absolute repose. When I returned to business, we presented a bill to the Chamber of Deputies, asking for an extraordinary credit of 9,760,000 francs to meet the expenses

which, in the naval department, the execution of the new treaty would entail. The debate on the bill opened on the 27th of June, and no one asking to be heard, we expected to carry it without objection. Nevertheless, Messieurs Denis, Mauguin, and Dupin broke the general silence, and made some remarks on the right of verifying the nationality of vessels, to which I hastened to reply. The Chamber would hear no more, and the bill was carried by 243 voices against 1. The greater part of the members of the opposition, not wishing either to approve or condemn, abstained from voting. The debate was equally short in the Chamber of Peers. The Duke de Broglie ended it by a few explanations, and 103 votes against 8 adopted the bill, which was promulgated on the 19th of July, 1845. The year following, in the session of 1846, the two Chambers expressed, in the clearest manner, their approbation of the new treaty and of the negotiation which had effected it. The address in the Chamber of Peers ran thus: "A convention recently concluded between France and England, with the object of putting an end to an odious traffic, replaces our commerce under the protection and superintendence of our own flag. We loudly applaud the success of a negotiation skilfully conducted and promptly terminated. The execution of the treaty, entrusted to the loyal co-operation of the navy of the two states, assures us that the right and dignity of both nations will be equally respected, and that effectual repression will henceforth reach

every violation of the sacred laws of humanity." The Chamber of Deputies was not less explicit:— "The repeated testimonies of the friendship which unites you to the Queen of Great Britain," it said to the King in its address, "and the mutual confidence of both governments have happily secured amicable relations between the two States. Your Majesty announces to us that the convention recently concluded, to put an end to an infamous traffic, is at this moment in the act of execution. This realizes the desire constantly expressed by the Chamber. The laws of humanity will be effectually protected, and our commerce replaced under the exclusive superintendence of our own flag." In both Chambers, however, the opposition broke from the silence it had preserved the preceding year. The treaty of the 29th of May, 1845, was criticized. In the Chamber of Deputies Messieurs Dupin and Billault proposed amendments to expunge from the address the approbation bestowed on it; but, after the debate, M. Dupin withdrew his, and M. Billault's was rejected. The Chamber retained fully its testimony of satisfaction and adhesion to the cabinet.

I know no affair in which the salutary efficacy of free government, discreetly and honestly exercised, demonstrated itself more powerfully than in this. The question of the right of search was not naturally raised by the facts; in its application to the suppression of the trade, this right had not given rise to alarms sufficiently grave and numerous to strike a

blow against the safety of legitimate commerce and the liberty of the seas. The conventions of 1831 and 1833, in virtue of which it was exercised, had been as loyally executed as conceived. Their effect had not exceeded their object. They had only acted, in reality, against the trade, and had they been accepted and practised by all the maritime powers, they would probably have furnished the surest method of repressing that detestable traffic. But after the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, and the check of France in the Egyptian question, these conventions and that of the 20th of December, 1841, which merely formed their complement, became, suddenly, in France, a subject of alarm and national anger. The opposition seized this sentiment to work upon; but it was general and sincere, and the conservatives were not less ardent than their adversaries in their manifestation. Immediately two serious dangers sprang up. Abroad, good relations, even peace, between France and England,—at home, the general policy of the French government,—were compromised. In England, also, the national sentiment was wounded, and might have rendered all settlement impossible. In France, the union of the majority of the opposition, on this question, might have led to the fall of the cabinet. Nothing of this occurred. In both countries, facts ended by being considered in their true light, and reduced to their just value. In England, they arrived at an understanding that the conventions of 1831, 1833, and 1841, were not worth the rupture of friendly relations with France, and that

the trade might be suppressed by other means than the right of search. In France, the conservative party refused to be hurried beyond its general policy, because it found itself on a special point in agreement with the opposition. In both countries, free discussion and time came in aid of judicious diplomacy, and the national feeling was satisfied without sacrificing the public interest.

CHAPTER IV.

VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

(1840—1842.)

STATE OF SYRIA AFTER THE EXPULSION OF MEHEMET ALI.—WAR BETWEEN THE DRUSES AND MARONITES.—POWERLESSNESS AND CONNIVANCE OF THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES.—MY STEPS IN FAVOUR OF THE MARONITE CHRISTIANS.—DISPOSITIONS OF PRINCE METTERNICH;—OF LORD ABERDEEN.—BARON DE BOURQUENEY AND SIR STRATFORD CANNING AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—OBSTINATE RESISTANCE OF THE PORTE TO OUR DEMANDS FOR THE CHRISTIANS.—SARIM EFFENDI.—PLAN OF PRINCE METTERNICH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LIBANUS.—WE ADOPT IT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A BETTER.—THE PORTE ENDS BY YIELDING.—MY OPINION ON THE TURKS AND THEIR FUTURE.—STATE OF GREECE IN 1841.—MISSION OF M. PISCATORY TO GREECE; ITS OBJECT.—WHAT I CONVEY ON THIS SUBJECT TO LORD ABERDEEN.—HE GIVES ANALOGOUS INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR E. LYONS.—OUR ANXIETY AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BEY OF TUNIS.—SUSPICIONS OF THE ENGLISH CABINET ON THIS SUBJECT.—MY INSTRUCTIONS TO PRINCE DE JOINVILLE.—MISSION OF M. PLICHON.—AFFAIRS OF ALGERIA.—SITUATION OF THE FOREIGN CONSULS IN ALGERIA.—VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF FRANCE IN AFRICA.—FACTORIES ESTABLISHED ON THE WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA.—THE EASTERN COAST OF AFRICA AND MADAGASCAR.—POSSESSION TAKEN OF THE ISLES OF MAYOTTA AND NOSIBÉ.—TREATY WITH THE IMAN OF MUSCAT.—QUESTION OF THE CUSTOM HOUSE UNION BETWEEN FRANCE AND BELGIUM.—NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.—MY OPINION ON THE QUESTION.—THE COMMERCIAL TREATY OF THE 16TH OF JULY, 1843, AND THE 13TH OF DECEMBER, 1845, WITH BELGIUM.—AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.—RIVALRY AND OBSTINATE SUSPICION OF ENGLAND TOWARDS FRANCE IN SPAIN.—QUEEN CHRISTINA IN PARIS.—REGENCY OF ESPARTERO.—INSURRECTION AND DEFEAT OF

THE CHRISTINOS.—OUR GENERAL POLICY IN SPAIN.—M. DE SALVANDY IS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR IN SPAIN.—RECEPTION GIVEN TO HIM ON HIS JOURNEY.—QUESTION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS CREDENTIALS.—ESPARTERO REFUSES TO ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT THEM TO THE QUEEN ISABELLA.—ATTITUDE OF MR. ASTON, THE ENGLISH MINISTER AT MADRID.—M. DE SALVANDY RETURNS TO FRANCE.—INSTRUCTIONS FROM LORD ABERDEEN TO MR. ASTON.—INCIDENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA.—COUNT DE PAHLEN QUITS PARIS ON LEAVE.—FROM WHAT MOTIVE.—MY INSTRUCTIONS TO M. CASIMIR PÉRIER, FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN RUSSIA.—ANGER OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.—VAIN ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION.—PERSEVERANCE OF KING LOUIS PHILIPPE.—THE AMBASSADORS OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA DO NOT RETURN TO THEIR POSTS, AND ARE REPLACED BY CHARGÉS D'AFFAIRES.

ABSOLUTE governments, whether absolute in the name of a revolution or a dictatorship, are inclined and almost condemned to practise a foreign policy full of arbitrary resolutions and enterprises, unexpected, and excited by their own will, not by the natural course of facts and necessity. They require to occupy the imagination of their millions abroad, to distract them from what is withheld at home, and then give them the chances of adventures and wars in exchange for the rights which they refuse to liberty. Free governments do not resort to such means. Their mission is to conduct well the natural affairs of peoples, and the spontaneous activity of national life relieves them from the necessity of seeking factitious and unwholesome gratifications for idle spirits.

After the crisis of 1840 and when the cabinet of the 29th of October had established itself, we found abundance of business on hand, and took care not to excite new questions, gratuitously. Natural affairs

and questions sprang up before us in all quarters. To accept them without hesitation when they presented themselves, to conduct and solve them in accordance with the particular interest of France and our own general policy, and to obtain by constant discussion, the adhesion of the Chambers and the country to our resolutions and acts;—in those points our whole ambition was comprised; and this constitutes the only legitimate, and in my judgment, the most exalted ambition which men called to the honour of government can conceive. I do not undertake to repeat here in detail, as I have done in the affairs of the East and the right of search, all the questions and negotiations with which I had then to occupy myself: some only belong to history; for the rest, I merely propose to mark their date and place, and to indicate, with exactness, the character of the presiding policy. It is with events as with men; the greater number are destined to oblivion, even after making much stir in their time.

The Egyptian question had scarcely terminated, when that of Syria rose up. No longer the question of deciding who should govern Syria, but the much more difficult one of how Syria should be governed. Mehemet Ali oppressed and drained that country, but to a certain extent with impartiality and order. Anarchy and fanaticism returned there with the government of the Sultan. Civil war recommenced, in the Libanus, between the Druses and Maronites; an old war of race, religion, influence and pillage. Far

from repressing it, the Turkish authorities, scarcely re-established and at once malevolent and powerless, alternately fomented it secretly, and looked on with cynical indifference. Rumours soon spread over Europe of the devastations and massacres to which the Libanus was in prey. Reports, declarations, accusations and petitions from Constantinople and Beyrout, reached us by every courier; the Maronite Christians invoked our treaties and traditions, our common faith, and the name of France. I did not wait, before acting, until their cries and entreaties resounded in our Chambers. It would have been a great mistake to have wished to act alone. In all times, the rivalries of the European powers had been, in Syria, an additional excitement for local disputes, and a source of mutual helplessness; and in a greater degree even after what had recently passed and was yet passing in the East, we should have been suspected and speedily baffled by our rivals still coalesced against us. To act effectually, it was necessary to move Europe, by taking ourselves the initiative of the movement. On the 13th of December, 1841, I wrote to Count de Flahault: "I send you a copy of the last reports from our consul at Beyrout. I beg you to make use of them, in calling the serious attention of Prince Metternich to the present condition of Syria, and particularly of the mountain districts. Europe cannot remain an indifferent and passive spectator of the massacre of Christian populations abandoned to the fury of their enemies by the apathy and perhaps the detestable policy of the

Turkish authorities. M. de Metternich will think, without doubt, that such a state of things, if suffered to be prolonged, would produce on the public mind an impression which sooner or later might engender serious complications and dangers for the general peace. In the interest of that peace and also on the ground of humanity, M. de Metternich will acknowledge the urgency of pressing and energetic steps at Constantinople, that the Porte, solemnly warned, may prevent, by vigorous and effective interposition, such fatal consequences. I intend sending instructions to M. de Bourqueney conceived in the sense of these considerations, and I have already directed M. de Sainte Aulaire to communicate them to Lord Aberdeen. I shall also write to Berlin and St. Petersburgh."

M. de Flahault replied on the 20th of December: "I have read your dispatch to Prince Metternich relative to the troubles which still desolate and stain Syria with blood. I added that you felt convinced he would feel the pressing necessity of enforcing advice at Constantinople in the interests of peace and humanity. 'You may rely on it,' he replied; 'M. de Stürmer has received orders to that effect: but I shall repeat them, and direct him to act in conjunction with your agent. M. Guizot's reflections on the fatal effects which the conduct of the Turkish authorities may produce, are perfectly just, and on this point I participate in all his ideas. The authorities must be closely watched and denounced at Constantinople as often as they neglect their duty. With this object I have de-

cided to send a consul-general to Damascus, which is the true central point, to observe what passes. He has orders to transmit to Constantinople all legitimate complaints which may be preferred against the agents of the Porte. You and we are, in quality of co-religionists, the natural protectors of all the Latin Christians established in the East, and we can only have one and the same end, namely, to protect them from every kind of persecution and oppression. There is only one point which could offer a difficulty, or which, at least, some persons might consider as a possible source of jealousy between us;—the exercise of your old right of protection. In my eyes, this cannot be, for reason that we never dispute an acquired right. As we are essentially conservative, a right acquired, is, with us, a right which must and ought to be respected. The King of the French holds this by treaties, usage and tradition. Be assured that we shall not contest this with you. We know perfectly that all disputes on this subject could only profit a third party, and would be injurious to those we desire to protect. We must not introduce politics where there should be no question except that of humanity and religion."

The Emperor Nicholas was less rational than Prince Metternich. M. de Barante wrote thus from St. Petersburgh: "The dispositions relative to the Christians of the East, and to the guarantees that may be given to them, are not unfavourable. I should think, however, that the best course would be to effect a previous accord with the other powers, well assured,

in that case, of obtaining without difficulty the subsequent consent of Russia. In addressing ourselves directly here, we should be met by indecision, slowness, dilatory answers, and an inclination to rely on any opinion opposite to ours."

M. de Sainte Aulaire found Lord Aberdeen somewhat embarrassed: "I asked him whether he would not write to Constantinople on the subject of the events in Syria. He objected at first that the too frequent intervention of the powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire might tend to evil consequences. 'We cannot hope,' he said, 'that the Turkish government should ever be legal or paternal. We should vainly endeavour to lead it to exact ideas of order and justice. The powers who assume this task and act too vigorously in its accomplishment, will compromise themselves uselessly, and perhaps not without risking their reciprocal good intelligence.' In these words I recognized a policy, not Lord Aberdeen's, but to which, they say, he is disposed to make great concessions. I answered that, if he feared the too active intervention of the European powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the only method of preventing that was to put a prompt end to horrors, the prolonged spectacle of which would assuredly excite public opinion in all civilized countries. Lord Aberdeen readily returned to more generous inspirations. He agreed with me in detesting the Turkish Machiavelism which he believes to be aware of the events in Syria. He assured me that

his letters to Constantinople explicitly urged the necessity of sending disciplined troops to Syria, and of placing them under the command of men determined to re-establish order. He accuses the apathy or baseness of some pachas, and positively demands the dismissal of the Pacha of Damascus, who has assisted the Druses in their attack upon the Christians: 'the Druses are nevertheless the English party,' he added; 'judge after this step of the importance I attach to these miserable questions of local contention.'"

I felt no inquietude on the first hesitations of Lord Aberdeen; I was sure that they would yield to his sense of justice and the interests of sound general policy. He sent, moreover, an ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, an envoy very friendly to the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time fully alive to moral considerations and the rights of humanity, and capable of restraining the Turks with the same energy he employed in their support. At the same moment I appointed Baron de Bourqueney the King's minister at Constantinople; I knew him to be faithful and able in the prudent execution of his instructions, and I felt confident that he would agree with Sir Stratford Canning, who was said to be somewhat haughty and suspicious. I resolved to urge on vigorously our action with the Porte in favour of the Christians of Syria, and to exercise all the rights of the traditional French protectorate, while calling to their aid the European concert which could scarcely be refused to us.

The Porte resisted our remonstrances with a degree of obstinacy and artifice which seemed to challenge the employment of our whole force. The tumults and massacres in Syria embarrassed it in its relations with Christian Europe, but, in reality, were not unwelcome. What the Porte desired was to re-establish in Syria, no matter at what price, the Turkish authority, the government of Turkish pachas. The populations who were exterminating each other in the Libanus were the ancient and natural adversaries of that authority; it expected to control them by their discords, and to raise itself on their ruins. The Sultan's ministers began by disputing the fact we pointed out to them. When our remonstrances became too urgent, they sent, one after another, extraordinary commissioners to Syria, instructed, as they said, to verify them and stop the anarchy. The anarchy went on; they promised us that the Turkish agents against whom complaints were made should be recalled, and, meanwhile, they declared for ever deposed from the government of the Libanus, the family of the Cheabs, an indigenous and Christian race, invested for more than a century with traditional power in those mountains. Baron de Bourqueney sent the dragoman of France, M. Cor, to complain of this forfeiture, and to apprise the minister for foreign affairs of the impression it would produce in Europe. "Talk not to me of Europe," replied Sarim Effendi; "we are tired of it. If we are not statesmen such as there are in Europe, we are not madmen. The Ottoman Empire

is a house which the proprietor desires to keep quiet at home; it is his interest that his neighbours should have no cause to complain of him. If he were mad or drunk, or acted so as to kindle a fire which threatened the neighbourhood, then indeed it would be necessary to call his household to order; but until then, is it not exorbitant to ask me whether the Porte is or is not exercising a right? Sir Stratford Canning recently questioned me on what had happened; I gave explanations which apparently satisfied him, for he has said nothing more in reply." Sir Stratford Canning, not in the least satisfied, united strenuously with Baron de Bourqueney; the other ministers followed his example; even the Russian envoy, M. Titow, though hesitatingly and with qualification. The grand vizier, Mehemet Izzet Pacha, to whom they equally preferred their complaint, was more circumspect than Sarim Effendi, but not more efficacious. Fresh commissioners were dispatched to Syria; but they were always Turks, instructed, in reality, to dissipate the ancient privileges of the Christian population, and to maintain solely the Turkish power. The men changed, but the facts continued the same.

Prince Metternich, fertile in expedients, suggested a new idea. He proposed, if the Porte refused absolutely to re-establish in the Libanus the old Christian administration personified in the family of the Cheabs, that at least the Turkish pacha should be withdrawn, and that the two populations, Maronite and Druse, should each be ruled by a chief of

its own race and religion, both subject to the Governor-General of Syria. After long negotiations and repeated conferences, the Porte also rejected this idea, and offered to place the Maronites and Druses under the authority of two Caïmacans, each distinct from and independent of the other, but both Mohammedans. The European plenipotentiaries unanimously refused this proposition and persisted in their own. Fresh instructions from their courts approved their persistence. New disorders burst forth in the Libanus. The Porte began to be alarmed. "If Europe neither divides nor grows weary," M. de Bourqueney wrote, "everything induces me to believe that we shall carry the last and only point in dispute." From Berlin, Count Bresson apprised me that Sir Stratford Canning, tired of the Turkish subterfuges, had urged his government to the prompt employment of coercive means on the coasts of Syria. Lord Aberdeen still waited; but on the 24th of November, 1842, conversing with M. de Sainte Aulaire, he said: "M. de Neumann has just shown me a letter in which Prince Metternich lays down in principle that we can only act by council in the affairs of Syria. This would be an extremely false and dangerous idea to give to the Porte. England will not confine herself indefinitely to councils. She has waited long enough already, perhaps too long, in an affair in which her word, and consequently her honour, is engaged towards the Christian people of Syrie. I have explained myself

clearly on this point with M. de Brünnow; 'Pay attention to this,' I said to him; 'France and England had lately men-of-war on the coasts of Syria, whose presence gave efficacy to their demands with the divan; those men-of-war have been removed with great prudence; but they could readily return, for France undoubtedly is not more indifferent than England to the fate of the Christians of Syria.'" Informed of these words, I wrote immediately to M. de Sainte Aulaire: "This disposition on the part of Lord Aberdeen is excellent; cultivate it without pressing the result. After the treaty of the 15th of July and the events of 1840, it would be, you must admit, an amusing spectacle to see the French and English fleets acting in concert on the coasts of Syria to intimidate the Turks for the advantage of the mountaineers of the Libanus. There is a great mixture of comedy in the tragedy of this world. I have communicated your conversation to M. de Bourqueney. I think Lord Aberdeen must have written in the same sense to Sir Stratford Canning."

Thus stimulated by their governments, the five representatives of the great European powers at Constantinople resolved to take a fresh step with the Porte, and to demand a conference with Sarim Effendi, in which they strongly insisted on the adoption of the plan they had proposed. Apprised by Baron de Brünnow of the menacing disposition of Lord Aberdeen, the new minister of Russia at Constantinople, M. de Boutineff, evinced as much eagerness as

his colleagues, and the conference was officially required. Having suddenly decided on yielding, the Porte was anxious to spare itself at least the discussion, and instead of fixing a day for an interview, Sarim Effendi, on the 7th of December, 1842, addressed a dispatch to the five plenipotentiaries, to the following purport: "The Ottoman ministry feels the most lively regret at seeing that the point of this question has given rise to so many conferences and debates for an entire year, and that despite the good administration it has been enabled to re-establish in the mountain, and the convincing proofs it has in its power to produce in support of this assertion, the high powers have never changed their views on this subject. The Sublime Porte, moved nevertheless by the sentiments of respect it has never ceased for an instant to entertain for the five great powers, its dearest friends and allies, has preferred, in order to settle a question so delicate, and which is at the same time a domestic affair, to conform to their wishes rather than to oppose them by a refusal. . . . If the re-establishment of good order in the mountain can be attained by the aid of the system proposed, the wish of the Sublime Porte will be accomplished, and its gratitude secured. But if, as there is reason to apprehend, from information successively received up to this date, tranquillity could not thereby be restored in Syria, in that case the justice of the objections hitherto made by the Porte would be evidently recognized, and his Highness's government would

find itself, by the avowal of the whole world, to have been in the right."

On receiving news of this concession, I wrote immediately to Baron de Bourqueney; "The King's government cannot but approve of the act whereby the Porte, deferring to the representations of its allies, has formally adopted the system of indigenous administration for the mountain of Libanus, and has decreed the appointment of a Christian chief for the Maronites, and of a Druse for the Druses. Such a resolution is conformable, in principle, with the object the great powers had in view, and I gladly acknowledge the active part which the influence of your counsels and proceedings have a just title to claim in the result. However, I do not conceal from myself what this measure of the Porte comprehends of incomplete and precarious, especially by the exclusion of the Cheab family from the government of the mountain, contrary to the rights it derives from the past, and perhaps also in opposition to the desire of the inhabitants. I have therefore remarked with satisfaction, that, while judging that it would be, at least, inopportune to mix up a question of individual names with the leading object, you have avoided, in reply to the communication of Sarim Effendi, the appearance of accepting such a conclusion. But what the decision of the Porte leaves to be desired under certain bearings, only demonstrates more strongly the necessity of securing the results obtained, and of taking care that they are carried out loyally and in a spirit

of durability. To this you must apply your utmost attention. It is idle for the Porte to attempt to repudiate, on its own account, the disorders which may still disturb the tranquillity of the Libanus, and to throw this back beforehand on the cabinets to whose counsels it has yielded. Europe would not follow it on such ground, for Europe expects that the Porte will now realize in good faith, seriously, and without reserved intentions, what it has consented to adopt in principle, in the interest of its own repose.

We were only too well justified in taking precautions beforehand against the ill-dissembled obstinacy of the Porte. Scarcely had the new system adopted for the Libanus begun to be put in execution, when the European plenipotentaries at Constantinople ascertained that one of the principal districts of that province, the Djebal, which contained 30,000 Maronite Christians, had been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Maronite chief, and placed under Turkish administration. They remonstrated on the instant and in common accord against this serious infringement of the engagements of the Porte. "Take care," said M. Cor to Sarim Effendi, when handing to him the French complaint: "in deferring to our consels, you almost declared that our system was an attempt that would not succeed; we neglected this announcement; we took it for a mere defence of the past; but from the moment when you yourselves introduce into the measure dissolvents calculated to produce failure, the parts change, and I tremble sin-

cerely for you when I think of all that Europe will in that case have to demand at your hands. "Well," replied Sarim Effendi, angrily, "let Europe resort to force; let her govern the Libanus herself; these are continual attacks on our independence, our rights of sovereignty:" and he attempted to show that the Sultan had a right to retain the district of Djebal under his direct and exclusive jurisdiction. But ill-temper soon yielded to fear, and the Djebal was replaced under the authority of the Christian chief. Events have not ceased to prove the insufficiency of this system for the establishment of order and justice in Syria; but since 1843, nothing has been tried with better success.

We had grounds of complaint against Sarim Effendi, and Sarim Effendi was not destitute of them against us. In the relations of Christian Europe with the Ottoman empire there exists an incurable vice. We cannot but demand of the Turks what we require from them for their Christian subjects, and they are unable, even when called upon to make the promise, to do what we ask. European intervention in Turkey is at once inevitable and vain. To enable governments and peoples to act with efficacy upon each other, by counsels, and examples, by diplomatic relations and engagements, there must be between them a certain degree of analogy and sympathy in manners, ideas, and sentiments, in the leading features and currents of civilization and social life. There is nothing similar between the Christians of Europe and the Turks; they can,

through necessity or policy, live in peace, side by side, but they are always strangers to each other; while ceasing to combat they have not achieved mutual understanding. The Turks have been nothing in Europe beyond destructive and sterile conquerors, unable to associate themselves with the races that have fallen under their yoke, and equally incapable of being impressed or transformed by them or their neighbours. How much longer will the spectacle of this radical incompatibility endure, which ruins and depopulates many fine countries and condemns millions of men to such accumulated misery? No one can foresee. But the scene will never change while it continues to be occupied by the same actors. We are attempting at present a difficult enterprise in Algeria. As Christians, we are labouring to make Arab Mussulmen understand and accept regular and just government. I trust we shall succeed; but Europe will never compel the Turks to govern according to justice the Christians of their empire, or induce the Christians to believe in and trust Turkish government as a legitimate power.

While we were endeavouring to obtain from the Turks, for the Christians of Syria, a slight infusion of order and equity, we also had to exert our influence for the advantage of other Christians, recently delivered from the yoke of the Turks, and inheritors of the fairest name of pagan antiquity. Greece, in 1840, was far from being well governed. King Otho, an honest man, attached to what he conceived his duty and

his right, was tainted with the maxims of the Bavarian court, obstinate without vigour, and plunged in continual hesitation and permanent sloth, which paralysed his government and allowed financial disorder and political agitation to increase from day to day in his little state. The people grew impatient; the foreign envoys openly blamed the king; the English minister, above all, Sir Edmund Lyons, a rough and imperious sailor, imputed all the mischief to him, and urged the prompt establishment of a constitutional system as the only effectual remedy. The evil was not so great as the appearance and the complaints. Despite the errors and weaknesses of power, the natural intelligence and activity of the Greeks displayed themselves with more freedom in fact than in principle, and with more success than security. Agriculture revived, commerce prospered, population increased, the love of study and science once more sprang to life in Athens. There was evidently in this resuscitated nation impulse and a future. For some time, the French government, absorbed in the East by more dangerous and pressing questions, had bestowed little attention on Greece. The English and Russian party almost entirely disputed preponderance there, and the English had recently conquered. M. Maurocordato, its leader, had just been called to the head of affairs. I thought the moment had arrived for France also to resume her place. I entered into correspondence with the King's representatives at London, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Berlin, on the state of

Greece, of the evils of which she complained, on her progress in spite of those evils, and of the ideas which, in my judgment, ought to preside in the conduct and councils of the allies. I had at hand, in the Chamber of Deputies, a man extremely well fitted to be the living proof and interpreter of my dispatches. M. Piscatory had evinced towards Greece tokens of ardent and intelligent devotion. Still young, in 1824, he had quitted the enjoyments of his paternal home, and the pleasures of worldly life, to engage in the war of independence. He had fought by the side of the bravest *palicari;* in Greece he was known and loved by all, leaders and people. I resolved to send him there on an extraordinary mission, so that in seeing him, the attention of the Greeks should be drawn back towards France; that he might explain to them cordially our counsels, and put me in possession of the true state of facts, disfigured in the recitals of interested rivals or desponding friends.

But while thus resuming at Athens an active position, I was most anxious that my intention and proceeding should be everywhere well understood, above all in London, and by Lord Aberdeen, a perfect intelligence with whom appeared to me, from day to day, more necessary and more practicable. After some months of ministry, M. Maurocordato had fallen. He was replaced by M. Christidès, one of the chiefs of the French party, and the friend of M. Colettis, at that time Greek envoy in France. I wrote to M. de Sainte Aulaire, on the 8th of December, 1841:

"Since my assumption of office, I have been forcibly impressed by the bad state of the Greek government, by the serious, perhaps mortal dangers which threatened it, and by the heavy embarrassments they might produce in Europe. This evil I have traced to two causes: the obstinate inertion of King Otho; the discord between the foreign ministers at Athens and their struggles for influence. Lord Palmerston proposed for remedy, the establishment of a representative constitution in Greece. In the existing state of things, this remedy appeared to me more calculated to aggravate than to cure the evil. A regular, active administration, in harmony with the country, capable of managing its affairs and progressively ameliorating its institutions, I consider the only cure at present practicable and effectual. I also believe that such an administration can only maintain itself in Greece by the concert and united support of the great European cabinets. My dispatch of the 11th of last March was written to recommend this plan of conduct, and to prepare its execution.' Since M. Maurocordato was called to power, I have put my dispatch in practice. I did it the more readily because the elevation of M. Maurocordato could not be attributed to French influence. I do not pretend that the policy of France towards Greece is disinterested, if by this term is implied a policy exclusively occupied with Greek objects. But I feel satisfied that the only great and true interest which France has in Greece, lies in the permanence and consolidation of that state within its present

limits and under the monarchical form. With this conviction, I declared myself ready to asssist M. Maurocordato without troubling myself as to his origin and party. What I announced I did. When M. Maurocordato came to Paris I gave him the same assurance, and I do not hesitate to say, convinced him that he might rely on our sincere support. I endeavoured to smooth his path by reconciling him to M. Colettis, a long time his rival, and used my utmost efforts to persuade them to aid each other mutually. I directed M. de Lagrené, at that time French minister at Athens, to second M. Maurocordato with all his power, both in and after the construction of his cabinet. I acted for him so vigorously, myself, that the minister of Austria at Athens having blamed him for his conduct to King Otho and the severity of the conditions he wished to impose on him, I wrote to Vienna, to Berlin, and to St. Petersburgh, to exculpate him from that reproach and to urge the necessity of sustaining him. Finally, even at the moment when M. Maurocordato quarrelled with King Otho, I forwarded to all quarters a fresh dispatch, to give him aid. In this sense, I sent new instructions to M. de Lagrené. When they reached Athens, M. Maurocordato had already retired.

"I do not enter into the cause of his fall. Even now, I scarcely understand it. But it is certain that I supported him loyally and energetically, before he formed his cabinet, while he was struggling to complete it, and after his resignation.

"From M. Maurocordato I pass to M. Piscatory. I sent him to Greece;—

"To obtain the report of a new, non-official, and intelligent observer on its administration, prosperity, and resources. I required it at the moment when we were called upon to complete the issue of the third series of the Greek loan:

"To assure and persuade King Otho and our friends in Greece that the support promised and given, on our part, to M. Maurocordato was thoroughly real and sincere; that no reticence was to be sought for in our words, no reserved thoughts in our acts;

"To turn the Greeks from all rash or irregular demonstration, at home or abroad, tending to change either their territorial limits or the political constitution of their country.

"It was highly necessary to act in this sense, for, on the question of territory, in Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus, insurrection had broken out or was on the point of explosion; and on that of internal organization, dispositions were manifesting themselves, of the most animated and compromising character in regard to King Otho.

"Such were the instructions I gave to M. Piscatory; such was the true object of his mission. Undoubtedly, in sending him, I expected that his name, his antecedents, his presence, and his speeches would contribute to place France in good credit and position in Greece. But that credit and position I neither used nor wished to use except to maintain Greece in

a sound course, for her own advantage as also for ours and that of Europe at large.

"On the 28th of last July, in a private and confidential letter I wrote thus to M. Piscatory: 'I have no new instructions to give you. You went to Greece to tell and convince the Greeks that our wishes towards them are really what we declare,—a good administration at home, tranquil expectation abroad. Herein lies our whole policy: Greece has reached this point;—to rise, she has only to live. To live, requires, I admit, a certain amount of wisdom. By general consent, this was recently found wanting in the Greek government. I hope that M. Maurocordato may exercise it. In this hope we have supported and shall continue to support him, without pausing to consider any incidental occurrence or proposing to ourselves any other object. Some complaints reach me against the new cabinet; they say it does not contain enough of our friends, and that our friends are not in the posts best suited to them. Let us sustain our friends, but without urging their pretensions beyond what is necessary for the success of the Greek government itself, whether presided over by Maurocordato or Colettis.'

"Repeat all this carefully to Lord Aberdeen, my dear friend, and show him my letter. Let him do as much on his side, let him be for M. Christidès what I have been for M. Maurocordato, and I hope we shall succeed in securing for Greece some degree of stability. But it is most essential that, on the spot, we

should put an end to those blind jealousies, those puerile rivalries, those contests on the most trifling points, and all that tumult below which falsifies and paralyses sound policy above. I have nothing to say of Sir Edmund Lyons; I cannot endure giddy accusations and unguarded assertions. He seems to me credulous, imprudent, and rash. I trust he may not compromise and embarrass his cabinet. I shall again recommend to M. de Lagrené to neglect no effort to live on good terms with him, and to prevent quarrel or offence. In truth, as our views with respect to Greece are similar, it would be unfortunate if Lord Aberdeen and I could not compel our agents to second and promote their accomplishment."

As I instructed him, M. de Sainte Aulaire communicated my letter to Lord Aberdeen, and I feel convinced it moved him, for he addressed the same instructions to Sir Edmund Lyons which I had given to M. de Lagrené and M. Piscatory. He desired him to live on friendly terms with the representatives of the other powers. He apprised him that his recall had been formally demanded from Vienna and Berlin, and that at St. Petersburgh and Paris it had been signified that it would be acceptable; and while assuring him that his own government had determined to refuse compliance, he strongly recommended him not to meddle, at any moment, with all sorts of trifles, or to lend himself to the exaggeration of the short-comings of the Greek government, which might be as great as he, Sir Edmund Lyons, represented them, but which

should always be considered with leniency. It was impossible to impart more loyalty to the common action and concert of England and France at Athens; but it is much more difficult to establish and maintain active harmony between secondary agents, on the spot, than from a distance and at the summit of the hierarchy. Neither did the affairs of Greece occupy in the general policy of Europe, nor in the relations between France and England, a position sufficiently prominent to call, in London and Paris, for all the efforts and sacrifices necessary to the continued success of the policy anxiously desired by the two cabinets. Small affairs are often as difficult and require as much management as great ones; but they weigh too little in the destinies of the states which handle them, to command all the attention they require; and the most judicious governments apply their full strength and wisdom only in presence of imperious necessities and important dangers.

Notwithstanding the importance, in my eyes, of a good intelligence between France and England, and the value I attached to the daily increasing confidence between Lord Aberdeen and myself, I was fully determined, in all places and at all times when the serious interests of my country and its government required, never to elude the diplomatic embarrassments to which they might give rise. By land and sea, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, in the Mediterranean and in the ocean, frequent occasions occurred which excited such difficulties; for at all

those points the two nations found themselves incessantly in contact, either from local causes or habits of rivalship. Our establishment in Algiers was particularly an object of continual prepossession with the English government. The Porte had for a long time nourished the desire of effecting, in Tunis, a revolution analogous to that recently accomplished in Tripoli; that is to say, of taking from the regency of Tunis all it had conquered of hereditary independence, and of reducing the Bey of Tunis to a simple pacha. A Turkish squadron issued nearly every year from the Sea of Marmora to make a demonstration more or less meancing on the Tunisian coast. It was highly important to us that such a design should not succeed. Instead of a weak neighbour, like the Bey of Tunis, interested in living on friendly terms with us, we should have had, on our eastern frontier in Africa, the Ottoman Empire itself with its persevering pretensions against our conquest, and its alliances in Europe. The slightest incident, the enmity of wandering tribes, an unpremeditated violation of territory might have raised the fundamental question of our establishment in Algeria and bring on European complications. We were firmly resolved not to suffer such an arrangement. We had not the slightest wish to conquer the regency of Tunis, or to break the feeble traditional ties which still united it to the Porte; but we desired the complete maintenance of the *status quo*; and as often as a Turkish squadron threatened to approach Tunis, our ships steered

towards that coast, with orders to protect the Bey against any enterprise of the Turks. At different intervals, I gave my private instructions on this subject, to the commandant of our naval forces in the Mediterranean, particularly to the Prince of Joinville, in 1846. I did not confine myself to these precautions by sea; I wished to ascertain whether, as report said, it was possible that the Porte might send troops, by land, from Tripoli to Tunis, and attempt a surprise against the Bey by that route. In June, 1843, I instructed a young man, not invested with any official character, M. Ignatius Plichon, to repair without delay to Tripoli, to collect there all the information he could obtain, to ascertain the means of passage that were available, and to traverse himself the vast space, nearly a desert throughout, which separates Tripoli from Tunis, to ascertain whether, in fact, the Turkish expedition spoken of was practicable. M. Plichon acquitted himself of this perilous mission with equal intelligence and courage, and reported to me the certainty that, on that side, we had nothing to fear for the Tunisian *status quo*. At every movement of this kind the English cabinet showed disquietude; its agents, even some of the acutest amongst them, with little clear-sightedness and governed by habitual apprehension, talked incessantly of the restless spirit and ambition of France. Observations and questions were addressed to us, enhancing the rights of sovereignty of the Porte over Tunis We declared our intention of respecting them and of recommending

the same conduct to the Bey, provided that the Porte made no attempt to change an ancient state of things at Tunis, the maintenance of which imported much to our tranquillity in Algeria. Lord Aberdeen thoroughly understood our position; but he found it difficult, and his colleagues more difficult still, to believe in our persevering moderation. The English government accepted our conquest of Algeria, in fact, and declared its determination of refraining from any further opposition; but it evaded recognizing it, in right, until the Porte made the same admission. An embarrassing circumstance presented itself. Before our conquest, England had a consul at Algiers, and consular agents at several points of the regency. The consuls were commercial, not political agents; it was almost the general custom in Europe to consider them as strangers to the question of sovereignty, and not to require, when the sovereign changed, that they should receive, from the new ruler, a new title to their mission. In Algeria, we had conformed to this custom, and after our conquest, the consul-general of England at Algiers had, without fresh authority, continued his functions. But, in 1840, the Duke de Broglie, and after him, M. Thiers, determined that every new consular agent in Algeria should demand and receive our *exequatur*. Not only did I maintain this principle in debate in the Chambers, but I rigidly practised it, with the English consular agents, as well as with those of every other nation. In July, 1844, out of thirty-nine consuls and consular agents of all

nations and ranks, in Algeria, twelve had received their *exequatur* from the King; fourteen of inferior grade held theirs from the minister for foreign affairs, and eight from the governor of the province. Five only still acted in virtue of titles anterior to 1830.

Algeria was not the only point in Africa where great French interests appeared to me engaged. That quarter of the world, still so unknown, offered an immense field to the activity and future greatness of France. It was at our gates; to reach it, we had not to incur the risks of a long and perilous navigation. Our establishment on the northern coast gave us an extended and solid base. On the western side, our colony of Senegal secured to us the same advantage. In the interior of the country, we encountered no formidable competitorship; none of the great European powers had established themselves strongly there in the road to conquest. The colony of the Cape, though important in the eyes of England, was not progressing, and its situation, moreover, did not interfere with ours on that vast continent. Struck by these facts, and by the future they disclosed, I not only seized but sought opportunities of extending the power and presence of France. The merchants of Marseilles, Nantes, and Bordeaux, already carried on, on the Western coast, a considerable trade in palm oil, ivory, gum, earth-nuts (*arachides*), and other African produce. We resolved to erect at the principal centres of this traffic fortified factories, to give them security and facilitate extension. The

mouths of the rivers, Great Bassam, Assinia, and Gabon, in the Gulf of Guinea, were the localities selected with this object. From 1842 to 1844, treaties concluded with the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes gave us the full possession and external sovereignty of a certain extent of territory on the sea-coast and on the banks of those rivers. Small forts were built there; suitable garrisons were provided; the Governor of Senegal was ordered to inspect and protect them. The English merchants who prosecuted on that line the same commerce with ours took alarm; some difficulties arose on the spot. The English cabinet demanded explanations; our replies were peremptory; we established our right of acquiring territories and of founding new factories. We had anticipated objections. We had proclaimed entire franchise for all flags, and the maintenance of all the commercial usages in vigour on that coast. Lord Aberdeen, with his accustomed loyalty, acknowledged our right, and put an end to the discussion. France obtained, on the Western coast of Africa, for her commerce, her marine, and her future prospects, the resting points of which she stood in need.

When our attention turned to the Eastern coast, we found ourselves confronted by difficulties of another kind. The large island of Madagascar offered a great temptation for conquest, and for a vast colonial establishment, with indefinite perspectives. The King's government was pressed to undertake the

enterprise; the natural riches of the island were described, the excellence of its ports and roads, the maritime and commercial advantages it promised us, the facilities afforded by the discords of the two races who inhabited it, the Hovas and the Sakalanes. Traditional claims were not wanting in support of desires. From the commencement of the seventeenth century, at first, under the auspices of Cardinal Richelieu, and subsequently under Louis the Fourteenth, French companies had sought to take possession of Madagascar. They had formed relations there, built factories, and erected forts. They had obtained from the native chiefs vast concessions, and a sort of admission of French sovereignty. Through frequent alternations of success and reverse, Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Louis XVI. had acknowledged and maintained their establishments. At one time the name of *Isle Dauphine*, at another that of *Eastern France*, had been given to the whole island. Saving the exceptions formally stipulated, the treaty of the 30th of May, 1814, restored to France all her possessions beyond Europe in 1792, and Madagascar was not amongst the excluded number. Since that epoch, diplomatic and maritime acts had, at least reserved, if not exercised our rights. Quite recently, skilful naval officers had visited the island, examined its coasts, communicated with the inhabitants, and revived old memories. The colonial council of Isle Bourbon represented with details, in an address to the King, all the reasons which, in their

idea, "called upon the government to undertake the general conquest and colonization of Madagascar." The Governor of Bourbon, Admiral de Hell, vigorously supported the opinion of the colonial council. Finally, the empire of these traditions and hopes perpetuated itself even in the 'Royal Almanack,' in which, since 1815, the Governor of Isle Bourbon was styled *Governor of Bourbon and Madagascar.*

I was opposed to any enterprise of this nature. To enable a nation to found with success, far from its centre, great territorial and colonial establishments, it must have, in the world, a widely extended, active, powerful, and enterprising commerce, and its population must be disposed to transport its force and destiny far from its native soil;—to swarm, like the bees. Neither of these conditions existed in France in 1840, nor do they exist there now. We had enough on hand in an Algeria to conquer and colonize. Nothing is more injurious to the power of nations than the miscarriage of great enterprises, and it is amongst the misfortunes of France to have more than once signally failed in such attempts, in Asia and America, in India, Louisiana and Canada, and to have abandoned her conquests to the hands of her rivals. The King, the cabinet, and the Chambers concurred fully in my opinion. We therefore rejected all projects for the conquest of Madagascar; and we should have abandoned them equally, even though England had not exhibited jealousy and uneasiness. But while I refused to seek, for my

country, great and distant territorial establishments, I was far from thinking that she ought to continue apart and inactive on different points of the globe. Our small land belongs to European and Christian civilization, and wherever European and Christian civilization establishes and develops itself, there also France is bound to assume her place and exercise her peculiar genius. It is both suitable and indispensable for her to possess, at all the great centres of commercial and international activity, secure and strong maritime posts, which do not, of necessity, create for us aggressive and undefined relations, but act as resting-points for our commerce, where we can refit and revictual; stations where French sailors may find everywhere, in the great seas and on extended coasts, the forecasting protection of France, without implicating her beyond her general and superior interests. It was to attain this end on the Eastern, as on the Western coast of Africa, that between 1841 and 1843 we took possession, at the north entry of the channel of Mozambique, of the islets of Mayotta and Nosibé, and that in 1844 we concluded a treaty with the Iman of Muscat, which gave us, on the long extent of his coasts, important securities and liberties for our colony of Isle Bourbon, and for our relations with the great East.

About the same time, and under the dominion of a similar idea, we took possession, in the Pacific Ocean, of the Marquesas Islands. I shall speak later of this act and of the incidents it excited, which occasioned

more stir than they deserved. In 1841, we were engaged, at our very doors, in two questions infinitely more important, and well calculated to complicate seriously our relations with England.

The first of these was the unity of custom-house duties between France and Belgium. A country of immense produce and extremely limited consumption, Belgium was choking within her narrow limits, and ardently aspired to a more extended market than her own. From her emanated the formal proposition for a union of customs, which, since 1831, had been a subject of continual publication, conversation, and discussion between the two countries. In 1840, under the ministry of M. Thiers, the question had been introduced, and a negotiation opened. It was resumed in 1841. Four conferences took place in Paris, in the month of September, between some of the ministers and several commissioners of the two States. I presided at them. On both sides, dispositions were guarded; we had no wish to make our trade and finances pay too highly for the political advantages the union of customs might produce, and the Belgians were anxious to obtain at the smallest possible political sacrifice the industrial profits they looked for. They proposed, however, the total abolition of all scale of customs between the two countries, and the establishment of a single and identical tariff on their other frontiers. This was a real and complete custom-house union. But they attached to it the express condition that the Belgian frontiers

should be guarded solely by Belgian officials. "The admission of some thousands of French soldiers on Belgian territory, in the uniform of custom-house officers, would be," said one of their commissioners, "a mortal blow against the independence and neutrality of Belgium." We declared, in turn, that France could not entrust to Belgian officers the care of her industrial and financial interests. "I see," King Leopold wrote to King Louis Philippe, "that your ministers incline towards a treaty of differential tariffs. I could ask nothing better. I understand the uneasiness which our custom-house inspires as guardian of a part of French revenue and industry. We could not, however, consent to have French officers. Europe would pretend to see therein an actual incorporation; and even those amongst us who do not live by commerce and trade, would oppose the measure. I still hope something acceptable may spring up from *the kettle which is boiling.* The matter is extremely important, and the consequences of failure might be highly injurious. Evidently, some politicians in France believe that, if the negotiation broke down, no inconvenience would arise, and all might remain as it is. There are positions in which we cannot remain, and, when passions mingle with them, the chances of their endurance are diminished. In this country, men of importance of all parties are opposed to a commercial association with France. It is with great repugnance that they have finally consented to it, seeing the standstill to

which Belgian industry would be inevitably exposed by the sort of blockade which weighs upon us at present. Having, according to their idea, made a great sacrifice, almost equal to the abandonment of their political existence, they have persuaded themselves that a proposition for association with France could not be rejected by her. You may therefore readily form an idea of the political embarrassments which would result from the non-success of the treaty. The labour of our internal enemies is also to this end; to demand association with France,—and, if she repulses Belgium, to base itself on the impossible position of the country, for a change of government and re-union with Holland."

We were quite as determined as King Leopold himself, to combat, at any cost, this last hypothesis. We had, moreover, some fear lest Belgium, rejected by France, might turn towards Germany, and seek to enter the Prussian *Zollverein*. We were not ignorant that Belgian and German statesmen were favourable to this combination, and endeavouring to prepare it. The negotiation dragged slowly on in the midst of these solicitudes, when an incident intervened to postpone the system of a great custom-house union, and to drive us into the path of differential tariffs concerted between the two countries. For two or three years, threads and tissues of English flax had rapidly encroached upon the French market. From 1840 to 1842, their importation had doubled. Our spinning factories were seriously menaced. On the

26th of June, 1842, a decree, declared as urgent, raised our duties on foreign threads and tissues of flax. The measure was general. Belgium remonstrated energetically. We had no intention of striking her, and our trade in flax could bear the competition of hers. We entered into negotiations, and on the 16th of July, 1842, a commercial convention was concluded, which exempted threads and tissues of Belgian flax from the increased duty. Belgium, in turn, adopted, on her frontiers not adjoining France, our new tariff on threads and tissues of foreign flax, and made, in addition, some slight concessions in favour of our commerce. The duration of the treaty was fixed at four years.

When the bill for executing these articles was debated in the Chamber of Deputies, the treaty met with various adversaries. Some reproached me with not having accomplished the union of customs, and under this form, the incorporation of Belgium with France. Others, with having too much sacrificed French trade, and with exacting too little from Belgium in return for the exceptional favour we had accorded her. Independently of the special reasons which I wished to establish in their full value on this point, I seized the opportunity of expressing the general idea which had guided me in the negotiation, and to which, under any circumstances, I proposed to remain faithful. "I am not amongst those," I said, "who think that in affairs of trade and commerce, existing interests and establishments are to be easily

given over to all the risks and changes of external and unlimited competition. I believe, on the contrary, that the conservative principle ought to be applied to these as to other social interests, and that they should be effectually protected. It is however indispensable that industrial interests should, in certain cases and to a certain extent, be called upon to assist in what serves the security, strength, and greatness of France, in her foreign relations. The State must have a right to demand sometimes from these interests a proportionate elasticity and sacrifices, with this object in view. These industrial interests also must lend themselves, in some degree, to the general and easy extension of the common good; that is to say, they must hold themselves bound to accept progressively a competition which excites and compels them to work better and cheaper for the advantage of all. These are the two conditions imposed on, and which legitimize the protective system. We are bound to apply the policy of conservatism to industrial interests, and to protect them, in the name of that policy, from the dangers by which they may be assailed; but, at the same time, those interests must accommodate themselves to the necessities of foreign policy, and to the progress of internal improvement. On these terms only can protection be justified and maintained.

The Chamber accepted these maxims, and sanctioned the treaty. But the fundamental question still subsisted, and the danger Belgium had lately encountered for one of her trades, rendered her more

eager in her desire for unity of customs. The negotiation was resumed. A plan of treaty, which contained, on the part of Belgium, the adoption of the principal arrangements of the French system in custom-house duties and indirect assessments, was prepared and discussed under three successive forms of drawing up; the last was read on the 1st of November, 1842, in a council held at St. Cloud; the Belgian commissioners still demanded certain changes. The nearer we approached the term, the difficulties of this great international measure became more apparent. The principal French trades strongly testified their alarm. Abroad, the interested powers became uneasy, at first silently, and without diplomatic stir. "You ask me," Count de Sainte Aulaire wrote on the 20th of October, 1842, "what they think here of the Franco-Belgian customs union. I can only guess by induction, for they preserve with me as absolute a silence as with you. Even the papers, with an admirable intelligence of the interests of their country, approach the subject with great reserve. Each understands that powerful French interests will undertake the opposition, and that England would diminish their force by prematurely taking the initiative." At this very moment, however, on the 24th of October, Lord Aberdeen wrote a pressing, though at the same time a conciliatory letter to King Leopold to detach him from a measure "full of danger, it may be affirmed, for the interests of your Majesty, and the tranquillity of Europe." Some weeks after, on the

19th of November, talking with M. de Sainte Aulaire; "It seems," he said, "that the Belgian question is still pending." "I replied," the ambassador wrote to me, "that I knew nothing of it, except through the newspapers; that, in my opinion, a speedy and definitive solution was scarcely probable, and that I was glad to notice the indifference of the English press, whence I concluded that, in any case, I should not have to quarrel with him on this subject." He replied, "that all commercial treaties were popular in England, and that English capitalists would be the less disposed to complain of a Franco-Belgian treaty of commerce, as they would hasten to embark their capital in Belgian manufactures, and would promise themselves enormous profits from those speculations. But, on the hypothesis of the union of customs, his language was altogether different. "You can understand," he said, "that England could not see with a favourable eye, French custom-house officers at Antwerp. You will also encounter opposition on the side of Germany, and this time you would find us more united than on the right of search." The English cabinet had, in fact, assured itself of this union. On the 28th of October, Lord Aberdeen addressed a dispatch to the representatives of England at Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, with orders to communicate it to those three courts, in which, without fully adhering to the principles which Lord Palmerston had manifested from the earliest reports of the intended Franco-Belgian union, he maintained

in the name of the neutrality of Belgium, and in virtue of the protocol of the 20th of January, 1831, which had established it, that the other cabinets were authorized to oppose themselves to a combination which would present a real danger to the balance of European power. On the 29th of November, he expressed himself still more strongly on the subject, with the Belgian minister in London, M. Van de Weyer, who hastened to inform King Leopold; and on the 6th of December, having requested the Count de Sainte Aulaire to call upon him; "I am informed," he said, "that a former minister* has had an interview with King Louis Philippe, and that they held a long conversation on the Franco-Belgian union of customs. The ex-minister said that the project would encounter unanimous opposition in Europe. The King replied, 'I have no reason to expect this opposition, and I do not believe in it, since none of the powers have caused a word to be said to me on the subject.' In consequence of this speech of your king, and to avoid all misunderstanding on a matter so serious, I have thought it my duty to write to Lord Cowley, and also to tell you that the customs union between France and Belgium would appear to us an attack on Belgian independence, and consequently on the treaties by which it is established."—"I declined," M. de Sainte Aulaire said to me, "any discussion on the words or personal opinion of the King; but I affirmed that my government had, for a considerable

* It was Count Molé to whom he alluded.

time, been informed by me, and through other channels also, of the intentions of the English cabinet; it was therefore in full knowledge of the case that you had entered on the examination of the question, determined to solve it in consideration with the national interests, and without pausing at the expression of a discontent founded neither in justice nor reason."—"I have abstained until now from speaking to you in any detail on this subject," resumed Lord Aberdeen, "and I am glad of it, as your government can defer to the complaints of French commerce without the appearance of its resolutions being influenced by diplomatic considerations; but to-day, I felt bound to name it to you to prevent any false interpretations arising from my silence. I have, moreover, taken care that the step adopted with you shall not be in any manner collective."

Without announcing to me, on the part of Prussia, any positive movement, Count Bresson forwarded to me from Berlin, on the 7th of November, 1842, analogous information, and after treating the question himself under different points of view, he concluded by saying that in his opinion, the union of customs with Belgium possessed only a very secondary importance for France and her government, and that we should derive from it but little advantage to counterbalance the inevitable embarrassments and mistakes.

In face of these reports, and of the secret labours and official declarations to which this question gave rise in Europe, I resolved to explain myself fully on the

subject with the representatives of France abroad, and to regulate carefully their attitude, while determining our own with precision. I wrote therefore, on the 30th of November, 1842, first to Count Bresson, for the cabinet of Berlin was the most seriously disturbed, and the most eager to seek, in the English anxieties, a resting-point for their own. "I wish you to know, from this time forward, our views on the main point of this affair and on the arguments of Lord Aberdeen, as also the motives which regulate our conduct.

"The treaties which established Belgium, also stipulated that she should form an independent and neutral state. Could this independence and neutrality be, as is assumed, destroyed or encroached upon by the simple fact of a union of custom-house duties with France?

"Yes; if the clauses of that union in any manner touched the political sovereignty of the King of the Belgians; if he did not preserve in his state the full exercise of the rights essential to that sovereignty. No; if the political sovereignty of Belgium remained entire, and if the Belgian government retained always the faculty of breaking the union within a fixed period, as soon as it should find it opposed to its independence.

"It would be a strange independence accorded to Belgium which should at the same time interdict to her absolutely and as a condition of her existence, the right of contracting the relations, and of adopting the measures suggested by her interest, and which might possibly be necessary to her very existence itself.

"Independence is not a mere word; it ought to be a fact. A state is not independent because it has been so written down in a treaty, but on the condition that it can really act according to its interest, necessity, and will.

"Supposing the political sovereignty of Belgium to be respected, and we are the first to say that no other hypothesis is admissible, the union of customs between France and Belgium would be no more than a particular form of a commercial treaty,—a form which would, without doubt, lead to certain changes in the internal administration of the two states, freely consented to on both sides, but which, far from encroaching on the independence of one of the two, would be, on its part, an act and evidence of independence.

"Lord Aberdeen admits the right of France and Belgium to interchange commercial treaties, even though such treaties should prove injurious, economically speaking, to the interests of third states. What would he say if France and Belgium should each, on their common frontier abolish all custom-house duties, and if, at the same time, Belgium by an act of its own government should establish on her other frontiers, the tariffs and existing system of the French customs, without any other change in the relations and internal administration of the two States? I do not say that such a system would be practicable; but assuredly it would be one of those commercial treaties against which Lord Aberdeen himself acknowledges that no foreign government would have a right to

protest. And yet, the union of customs would be complete. It is not therefore necessarily, and in itself, opposed to the independence of Belgium, and to public European law.

"But the neutrality? This is a special condition of existence of which Belgium reaps the advantages, and which imposes on her certain obligations, certain inconveniences which the five great powers accepted with her, and are equally bound, with her, to respect.

"Assuredly, it is not France that will ever strike or suffer the slightest blow to be struck against the neutrality of Belgium. This neutrality, is, since 1830, the only advantage we have acquired abroad. In 1814, the kingdom of the Netherlands was erected against us. It fell; in its place a state arose which has been declared neutral, and which, by its origin, institutions, political and material interests, and by the marriage of its King, has, while still retaining its neutrality, become to us a friendly state. We have here a material guarantee of security on our own frontier, and a political pledge of peace and of the balance of power in Europe. Europe has accepted this situation. Above all other states we comprehend and esteem its advantages. Much less than others are we disposed to the slightest change.

"How could the political neutrality of Belgium perish by her union of customs with France? This is Lord Aberdeen's assumption and his leading argument. I shall not say, although it might be true,

that this argument is insulting to us; as it implies that we could only desire a commercial union with Belgium to destroy her neutrality, and to find therein a hidden road to conquest. Neither shall I say that it is treating public European law very slightly, and holding it as utterly vain to suppose that it would lend no strength to states that might appeal to it if it were disowned. I go straight to Lord Aberdeen's fundamental idea, and weigh exactly its value.

"A unity of custom-house duties and of a financial system cannot, it is said, take place between two states of very unequal force, for one would be politically absorbed by the other, and the European balance thereby endangered. The example of German unity of customs, it is added, is not applicable, for this last rests on a political union long admitted by public European law, which it has never disturbed.

"These are mere assertions and appearances by which we cannot be satisfied. Let us look to the fact. Is it true that the German unity of customs has subsisted between states of equal force capable of balancing each other reciprocally? Is it true that the internal equilibrium of Germany, which weighs something in the general balance of Europe, has not been thereby sensibly affected? Ask the question of Austria? Ask it of the small German powers engaged in the association? It is evident, that by this new fact, Prussia has greatly advanced,

that her weight in Germany, and consequently in Europe, has much increased, that the German powers of the second and third class have no longer the same importance or even liberty in their foreign combinations. Assuredly, these are serious facts, profound changes in the state of Germany and Europe; and if they occupy little attention in London, I feel convinced that they are deeply considered at Vienna, at Hanover, and even Stuttgardt and Dresden.

"Why have not the powers, Austria for example, to whom this new fact is distasteful, openly opposed it? Because they understood that they had no right to do so. When a change in the division and scale of European influence operates in virtue of powerful and legitimate interests, by regular and pacific means, and when the state or states engaged confine themselves within their habitual limits of action, we may feel discontent and uneasiness; we may labour to shackle, to restrain, or to overthrow this change; but we have no right to oppose it by violence or official protest. The history of Europe offers more than one example of such changes in the division of influences which, beyond doubt, have given rise to disguised struggles and diplomatic efforts, but they have neither ended in hostile declarations nor wars. And, in our days, a war excited on such grounds would be more opposed than ever to the notions of justice entertained by the public of Europe, and to its sentiments on the rights and relations of states.

"Undoubtedly, the Franco-Belgic unity of customs

would give France an increase of weight and influence in Europe. But why should not France and Belgium exercise equally with Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, the right of regulating under this form their common interests? Why should whatever takes place on the right bank of the Rhine, for the profit of Prussia, be denied on the left bank, to the advantage of France, without any infringement on the peace of Europe, in the one case more than in the others?

"So much, my dear Count, for the question of right. These are, in my opinion, and searching to the heart of things, the true principles. I now turn to what has been, and will continue to be, our practical rule of conduct in this affair.

"We have not taken any initiative. We have not hastened, and have no intention of hastening the Franco-Belgian unity of customs. Without doubt, it offers us advantages; but, at the same time, it creates great difficulties with some of our most important interests. The union of customs is not necessary to France. In this relation, France has nothing to ask from Belgium. The existing state of things is suitable to, and sufficient for France, who, of her free choice and movement, will do nothing to change it.

"It is upon Belgium that this position weighs. It is Belgium who tells us she cannot remain in it, and that for her internal security, even for her national government and existence, the danger is so great, that

she must risk all to escape from it. She comes to us. If we reject her, she will look elsewhere. Were she to remain as she is, everything with her, would be compromised.

"Now, the security of Belgium, the existence of the Belgic kingdom, as at present constituted, forms the peace of Europe. You know, my dear Count, that the constitution of this kingdom has not been a result readily obtained. It was not easy to restrain and baffle all the passions and ambitions that desired another state of things; and you also know that, that other state of things would have been war and the conflagration of Europe. Let us not deceive ourselves. The same passions and ambitions which in 1830 and 1831 desired other results than those which were effected, are still in active existence. And if an opportunity, a great internal commotion in Belgium, for instance, presented itself to them, they would explode. To-day, as in 1830, their explosion would infallibly bring on war, the overthrow of European order, and all those fatal, undeveloped chances, which for twelve years we all labour to charm away. This, in our eyes, constitutes the seriousness of the question. These are the dangers to which the Franco-Belgic union of customs may furnish a remedy. Let these dangers be dissipated; let Belgium no longer believe herself seriously menaced by them; let her not appeal to us formally for extrication; let her be contented with the actual *status quo;* it is not we who shall urge her to escape from it. We are not devoured by that thirst of inno-

vation and extension so incessantly attributed to us. We believe to-day, that for the greatness as well as for the happiness of France, her first want is stability. This conviction governs and will continue to govern our conduct in this affair, as it has already done in so many others. But what we cannot and will not suffer is, that the stability of a kingdom founded at our very doors should be impaired at our expense or compromised by I know not what absurd jealousy of the progress of our influence. Truly, those who see, in this Franco-Belgic unity of customs, a question of political rivalry, uphold a very narrow and false idea; the matter here is widely different from that for competitorship in influence; it concerns the maintenance of European peace and order. This is what we defend.

"From all these facts and ideas, I now give you, my dear Count, the conclusions I have formed on the line of conduct that becomes us, and by which you will regulate your own.

"1. Remain perfectly tranquil; avoid rather than court discussion on the Franco-Belgian unity of customs, and convey strongly the impression that we do not seek the fact. That unity must seek us, and Belgium must impose it upon us, in some degree, as a necessity of her actual existence;

"2. Maintain on the pith of the affair, our complete independence; acknowledge no right on any part to oppose it, in the terms of the treaties and on the principles of public law.

"3. Watch carefully the dispositions of the different powers on this subject. Are they all prepossessed with the same view and in a similar degree? What differences exist between them? How far would they go in their opposition? What objections and concealed efforts would be made to prevent a public protest or war? What are the various steps possible in this course, and at what point would any specific power think proper to pause?

"4. For the present, beyond this work of observation and expectation, one thing alone is important to us; to prevent all collective or official step or demonstration which might compromise or embarrass us. Look well to this."

I addressed the same letter, *mutatis mutandis*, to the King's representatives at London, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Brussels, and the Hague. I am quite aware that the different powers did not all attach to this question the importance bestowed on it by England or Prussia, or enter into it with the same ardour. I know especially that Prince Metternich had written thus to Count d'Appony: "As to the effort of King Leopold with the French cabinet to accomplish a unity of customs between the two countries, I think lightly of it, and I consider the cabinet of Berlin quite mistaken in evincing so much inquietude. France would not desire better than to swallow up Belgium, and Belgium would be delighted to fatten commercially at the table of France. This is perfectly clear and simple. Nevertheless, no government or country

voluntarily allows itself to be devoured by another; and in such transactions the weakest is generally that which stands most upon its guard. If it does not escape well, this is also quite simple, and exclusively its own affair. I repeat to you that I attach little importance to this project."

In his relations with the courts of London and Berlin, as also in his official communications with me on the subject, Prince Metternich thought only of calming down uneasiness and of preventing any active, collective, or diplomatic step. He assumed this amicable and impartial part the more willingly as he felt convinced that the plan of Franco-Belgic unity of customs would never be realized: "When I consider," he said one day to Count Flahault, all the varieties of danger to which King Leopold exposes himself in pursuing this object, when I reflect that a reciprocal modification of tariffs would secure to both countries (quite as well as the custom-house union) all the commercial advantages they can desire, I ask myself whether King Leopold ever seriously intended to conclude such a treaty, and if it is not much more probable that he puts forward this project, which he must know to be impracticable, to arrive at nothing, while appearing disposed to do everything to please the King, his father-in-law, the French nation, the French party in Belgium, and the national sentiment which seeks an outlet for the excess of Belgian produce." I am strongly tempted to believe that M. de Metternich was in the right, and that King

Leopold never seriously pursued the plan of custom-house unity, nor reckoned on its success. Whatever may have been the intention of the King of the Belgians, the ultimate fact accorded with the foresight of the chancellor of Austria. The negotiations, conferences, and royal and ministerial conversations ended in nothing. The idea of the union of customs between France and Belgium was gradually and silently abandoned; and on the 13th of December, 1845, after several more months of restricted and effective negotiation, a new treaty of commerce, lowering the mutual tariff on many commodities, regulated for six years, in a more extensive and liberal manner than that contracted on the 16th of July, 1842, the industrial relations of the two countries.

I felt little regret at this result. The more deeply I studied the question, the more I convinced myself, that the Franco-Belgic unity of customs would have entailed on France inconveniences, not counterbalanced by the political advantages in prospect. The advantages were more apparent than real, and would have been purchased beyond their value. We should have found in this fact a gratification to vanity rather than a solid increase of strength and power. Whatever the partisans of the measure might say, Belgium would not have been completely assimilated to and melted into France. The spirit of independence and nationality, which prevailed in 1830, would still have maintained itself there, and would have intermingled, with the relations of the two states, doubts, difficul-

ties, and continual perturbations. I am convinced that the four great powers would have immediately opposed, to the Franco-Belgic unity of customs, a formal resistance, and that they would have officially demanded the neutrality of Belgium by declaring it compromised by such an act. England and Prussia had already united in this eventual design; Russia was eager to support them; and Austria would have had no inclination to stand aloof. But under the most favourable hypothesis, and admitting that the four powers might not at once have assumed an active attitude, they would not have been less profoundly wounded and disturbed; they would have lost all confidence in our political wisdom, and in the stability of the general system which after 1830, and in concert with us, they had founded in Europe. They would have once more entered into concert against us; that is to say, they would have returned to the paths of anti-French coalition. And at the precise moment when we accepted this injurious European position, we should have inflicted a serious discontent and much confusion on the principal French manufacturers; we should have strongly agitated the country within, while placing it without, under the lee of the suspicious and hostile alliances of Europe.

The anxieties and demands of national industry had, with us, much greater weight than diplomatic considerations, in the abandonment of the project for a union of customs; but in allowing it to fall through

and in replacing it by a reciprocal reduction of tariffs, we executed an act of foresight without, and of equity and prudence within.

At that epoch, in our relations with England, we had an affair, or rather affairs on hand, far more serious and permanent than the Franco-Belgian custom-house union;—the affairs of Spain.

I have not encountered in the experience of my life, nor do I recognize in history any example of a policy so obstinately retrospective as that of England towards Spain. The war of the Spanish succession under Louis XIV., the treaty of Utrecht, the royal house of France reigning in Spain, the family compact under Louis XV., Spain concurring with France under Louis XVI. to aid the independence of the United States of America, the invasion of Spain by the Emperor Napoleon,—all these facts were in 1840, and probably are still, as constantly present to the thoughts of the English government, and as decisive in regulating its conduct, as if they were still active and flagrant. A dread of the ambitious views and preponderance of France in Spain is ever a permanent and ruling prepossession in the mind of England.

I am not surprised at this empire of tradition in the policy of a well-governed State. Memory is the mother of foresight, and the past always occupies a leading place in the present. Facts change, nevertheless. Situations become modified, and sound policy consists in acknowledging these changes, and

in estimating their value correctly, as also in not forgetting old incidents and their share of influence. Since 1830, and more particularly since 1840, the relative positions of France and England, with respect to Spain, were profoundly altered, and their respective policies had no longer the same reasons for being opposed or even different. When, in 1833, we acknowledged Queen Isabella and the constitutional system in Spain, we held ourselves utterly separated from the absolute Spanish party which the Restoration had protected, by reconciling ourselves with the liberal section, which since 1808 had accepted England for its patron. When in 1835, we refused armed intervention in Spain, despite the solicitations of England herself, we had given the most decisive proof that we sought in that country no exclusive preponderance. Finally, since the month of September, 1840, Queen Christina and the chiefs of the moderate constitutional party, called the French party, had lost power in Spain, which had passed into the hands of the extreme liberals, recognized as the English party. The new regent of the kingdom, Espartero, declared openly, that "his inclinations and opinions were and ever had been in favour of an intimate alliance with Great Britain, and that in that quarter lay the friendship on which he depended." The English government had reason to be satisfied with its position in Spain, and little cause to apprehend our pretensions to preponderate in that country.

Nevertheless its disquietude was ever the same. The necessity of combating in Spain the ambition and influence of France continued to preoccupy it passionately. The accession of the Tory cabinet did not seem to have made any important change in this feeling; Lord Aberdeen evinced on this point, as on all others, more freedom of mind and impartiality; but the anti-French suspicions of Sir Robert Peel were so deeply rooted that he declared himself inclined to seek, in Spanish affairs, the amicable understanding and concerted action of England, with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, neither of which three powers had acknowledged Queen Isabella or the Spanish constitutional system, rather than a friendly accord with France. "Our position and interests," he said, "agree better with the position and interests of these powers than with those of France; they are in community with us in the design of preventing Spain from becoming a mere instrument in the hands of France. Resistance to the establishment of French influence in Spain ought to be our principal and constant effort." The English minister at Madrid, Mr. Aston, a man of talent and integrity, but specially selected by Lord Palmerston, was imbued with the same prejudices and passion. There was at one moment a question of replacing him, but he was retained at his post, and the policy of rivalry and struggle against France continued to prevail, in fact, at Madrid, while in London, the prime minister supported it, in principle, in the council.

While I encountered at every step this disposition of the English government, I learned from Spain, even before the fall of Lord Palmerston and the Whig cabinet, that the regent Espartero was daily losing ground, and that the moderate party, particularly the military chiefs, were preparing an insurrection against him, through which they promised themselves the return to power of Queen Christina and her friends. Espartero and his partisans did not conceal their alarm; they went so far as to say that foreseeing the success of this rising, they meditated quitting Spain and retiring to Cuba, carrying with them the young Queen Isabella, and her sister the Infanta Donna Fernanda, and thus retaining possession of the royalty and legal power. I attached no faith to this report, almost as improable to conceive as impossible to execute; but I was much impressed by the state of parties it revealed and the events it prognosticated. On the 6th of August, 1841, I wrote as follows to the King, then at the Château d'Eu: "It is greatly to be desired that the friends of Queen Christina should remain quiet and leave the government of the actual Regent to follow the course of its own errors and the destinies they will produce. It goes down visibly. If they try to overthrow it, they may perhaps raise it up again; and if they succeed in the attempt, their victory will be full of dangers. On the other hand, if they wait with folded arms until victory comes, it will be sure. A natural death is the only true end for governments, the only channel which really opens their inheritance.

M. Zéa* seems to me strongly penetrated by these ideas, and Queen Christina is, I believe, well disposed to adopt them." And some days later, on the 17th of August, considering the affairs of Spain under another aspect, I again addressed the King: "An idea disturbs me; I fear lest we should assume the air of abandoning without protection or succour, this poor little Queen, who has near her neither mother nor gouvernante, nor guardian nor any faithful and devoted servant. Would not this be an extremely suitable, praiseworthy, and well-selected moment, to send an ambassador to Spain, specially accredited to her in case of revolutionary movements? The government of Madrid would have no right to complain of this. The King would perform an act of political foresight and family protection. No one could misunderstand it, and I cannot see, under any possible hypothesis, how evil consequences could result. I entreat the King to think well of this, and to communicate to me his impression."

The King replied to my first letter on the 7th of August, 1841: "Queen Christina came to Saint Cloud the day of my departure. I spoke to her in the sense you develop in your letter of yesterday, and she entirely concurs in the opinion." And to my second, on the 18th of August: "I agree with you as to the favourable opportunity of placing an ambassador near Queen Isabella II., and of thus covering her with all the pro-

* M. Zéa Bermudez, recently Queen Christina's minister, still continued to be, in exile, her intimate and faithful adviser.

tection we can at this moment afford. I even much prefer that in this matter, we should take the initiative, before England. At the same time, I fear lest they should attach to this step an interpretation which, while falsifying its character and object, might lead to a result entirely opposed to what we seek to obtain. This interpretation would consist in making it appear that the dispatch of an ambassador was an overture to Espartero and a homage to his regency. I think all will depend on the mode in which Queen Christina and her political friends may receive and qualify this step. Consequently, I wish you could see M. Zéa early to-morrow morning, sufficiently so to enable you to have an interview afterwards with Queen Christina herself before you set out for Lisieux. When you are assured of the manner in which the Queen and Zéa will regard this act, should it be taken by them as I hope, then the measure is safe and we can immediately go forward. But if, on the contrary, they see in it only an advantage to Espartero, then, I think, it will be better to give it up for the moment, and keep to the line we have hitherto followed; that is to say, wait before we act, to see what the new English ministry does, and probably what it may wish to do in concert with us."

The next day I wrote to the King in reply: "I have just seen M. Zéa. He is convinced that the immediate appointment of an ambassador to Madrid would turn to the advantage of Espartero, and be regarded by the moderate party as a serious check.

He much prefers that the King should wait the formation of the new English cabinet, which, he says, will be well disposed and even eager to act in concert with France. I find M. Zéa's conviction so firm and sound that I have not considered it necessary to see Queen Christina on the same subject. I think, with your Majesty, that the measure could only be a good one, when producing on all parties in Spain, whether moderate or extreme, an effect analogous to the intention with which it would be adopted. As this is not the case, we must wait."

We did not wait long. As soon as the Tory cabinet was formed, M. Zéa withdrew his objection to the appointment of our ambassador at Madrid, and urged me to accomplish it. He had been long acquainted with Lord Aberdeen, by whom he was well known and esteemed. He felt confident that the new English cabinet, essentially monarchical and conservative, would be the same in Spain, and would act in understanding with us. For my part, I considered it highly important that our ambassador should be appointed before the explosion of the troubles which all the world anticipated beyond the Pyrences. If those troubles terminated in favour of the regent Espartero, the unexpected dispatch of an ambassador from France to Madrid became a platitude; if, on the other hand, Queen Christina and her partisans triumphed, our ambassador would only arrive in their suite, and as their instrument. Neither of these positions suited us. In the eyes of England, as of

Spain, we wished to be the friends of Queen Isabella and of the constitutional Spanish monarchy, not auxiliaries in the service of one of the parties which, under that system, violently contended for power. We had no confidence in the regent Espartero, neither had we any intention of entering the arena against him or of assisting his overthrow. We did not conceal our opinions and wishes as to the internal government of Spain, but we remained faithful to our policy of non-intervention. I requested the King to appoint this embassy without delay, and to confide it to M. de Salvandy; a man of elevated and enterprising mind, monarchical and liberal, with earnest though somewhat ostentatious sincerity, filled with sound political views, even when inclining to be exuberant and imperfectly balanced; not invariably circumspect in the incidents and outward appearances of public life, but judicious in the main, capable of errors, but also of acknowledging them, and of loyally combating the consequences and sustaining the burden. He had been minister of public instruction in the cabinet of M. Molé, and I found a real advantage in detaching him from the opposition and enrolling him in the ministry. He knew and loved Spain, and willingly accepted the adventurous mission, to which he was appointed on the 9th of September, 1841. Queen Christina received him courteously, though with some dissatisfaction; she found that in sending an ambassador to Madrid during the regency of Espartero, against

which she had protested, that the King, her uncle, was less *Christino* than she wished; but she was one of those who know how to yield without renouncing their opinions. M. de Salvandy was preparing for his departure when the news of General O'Donnell's insurrection in Navarre against Espartero reached Paris, in the early part of October, 1841, but still confused and without ascertained result.

I felt, on receiving this intelligence, that the necessity and at the same time the opportunity had arrived for communicating fully to the new English cabinet our attitude, intention, and views, in our relations with Spain. I wrote immediately to M. de Sainte Aulaire, on the 11th of October: "I feel sure that in London, as elsewhere, they attribute to us what is now passing in Spain; they believe that we are working to restore Queen Christina. I am not surprised at this; it is a natural idea, conformable to probability and appearances. Here follows the truth as to what we have thought and done, with regard to Spain, for some years, and as to what we think and do to-day.

"Our general disposition towards Queen Christina is kind, from family feeling, as also from personal consideration, as we think she merits and naturally inspires interest.

"Political motives have co-operated with our personal good will. When, in 1833, in spite of ancient traditions and important French interests we acknowledged the regency of Queen Christina, it

was because we thought that she only was capable of governing Spain, of maintaining in that country some degree of royalty and order, in opposition to unintelligent absolutism and revolutionary radicalism."

"If all Europe had thus thought with France and England, if the five great powers had at once acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella, the regency of Christina, and had exercised their combined influence at Madrid, in all probability that influence would have diverted events into a different course, would have spared Spain many disasters, and Europe a host of embarrassments.

"Despite her faults and misfortunes, we think that, in a general view, Queen Christina was not unequal to her situation. As long as she governed, she employed, to the profit of the good cause, for the advantage of the principles of order and justice, all the power and influence she possessed. She was often led astray, frequently vanquished, but she never ceased to struggle, and her defeat was the triumph of the spirit of anarchy.

"This, without concealment or exaggeration, has been the extent of our good feeling towards Queen Christina, her political capability and her motives. Facts have already demonstrated its limits.

"After Queen Christina's fall, we accepted without hesitation or interruption, political relations with the regency, at first provisional, and subsequently definitive, of Espartero. There has never been between

the two governments any rupture, even momentary,—any shock, even concealed. I have openly declared in both Chambers that we should not interfere in the internal affairs of Spain; that we should do nothing to prejudice her new government.

"Our conduct has been conformable with our language. For the advantage of the regent Espartero, as also for that of Queen Christina, we have retained Don Carlos in France, and as far as in us lay, have preserved Spain from civil war. Neither against the regent Espartero nor against Queen Christina have we prosecuted the execution of engagements relative to the forty or fifty millions which Spain owes us, and which would have reduced her to public bankruptcy.

"Fresh opportunities for quarrel were not wanting to us. The proceedings of the new Spanish government towards France and her king have often been extremely unbecoming. A conflict was on the point of breaking out on our frontier on account of territories and rights of pasturage in dispute between the two countries. At Mahon, they decided on and almost commanded the evacuation of the islet *Del Rey* without even giving us notice. I passed by these opportunities for embroilment. I was conciliatory in the midst of cold and sometimes critical relations; I evinced neither susceptibility nor suspicion. Between the cabinet of Madrid and us there was no intimacy; but I never suffered ill-feeling to glide in for a moment.

"The residence of Queen Christina in France, and the friendly reception she has met with, are, I know, what have excited and still continue to excite the greatest suspicions.

"How could this have been otherwise? If we had not received Queen Christina kindly, we should have failed in the first duties of relationship and honour, in the examples of mutual respect which sovereigns owe to each other. We should have equally disregarded the simplest counsels of prudence. Let us not dissemble facts. We have never thought well of the Spanish revolution of September, 1840, nor of the future of Espartero. We have ever dreaded, beyond the Pyrenees, fresh revolutionary explosions. We have looked upon Queen Christina as able to become, one day, an anchor of safety for Spain,—the only possible channel of transaction and government. On this ground, also, I do not hesitate to say, we were bound to receive her, and treat her position with respect.

"We have advised her to remain totally disconnected with all plots against the new government of Madrid. We have told her that if she can ever be useful to Spain, it will be on condition of not being reproduced on the scene except by evident necessity, after the exhaustion and fall of opposing parties, not by the intrigues of her own party. In our own course, we have stood absolutely aloof, not only from all action exercised in Spain by the partisans of Queen Christina, but even from all communication with

them. We have rejected every insinuation of this nature, and have scrupulously observed, towards the Spanish government, the suggestions of prudence and the dictates of integrity. I affirm that we are completely strangers to what has lately burst forth in Spain,—we have in no manner connived at it,—we had no previous information; we have neither rendered nor intend to render it the slightest assistance. We do not ignore the difficulties of our position with the government of Madrid, and we cannot escape from this, for we are unable to change the position itself. Neither shall we change anything in our conduct. It will continue to be, as it has been for a year, perfectly loyal and pacific. We have just now given a proof of this, by decreeing, in compliance with the desire of M. Olozaga,* that the Carlists who had assembled on the frontier to return to Spain in virtue of the amnesty, should be removed from thence and sent back to our departments of the interior.

"This, my dear friend, is what actually exists, and what I have to say, with reference to passing events. But, evidently, and whatever may be the result of the movement now exploding, we must think of the future of Spain.

"Of the three parties in action there, the absolutists and Don Carlos, the moderates and Queen Christina, the extreme liberals and the regent Espartero or tutor Arguelles, neither is sufficiently strong nor

* Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain in France, since the regency of Espartero.

wise to conquer its adversaries; to restrain them and re-establish order and regular government in the country. Spain will not reach this result but by an understanding between the three.

"On the other hand, this understanding can never be effected unless France and England labour to that end in concert. The rivalry of France and England in Spain—their struggles for influence—the opposition of their patronages,—these causes alone suffice to feed the war of Spanish parties and to strike them all with impotence when they reach government.

"A good intelligence and common action between France and England are indispensable to the pacification of Spain.

"And as Lord Aberdeen most truly said to you, in order that France and England may understand each other and act in concert in Spain, it is essential that they should not be the only actors on that stage, and that the other great powers should appear there with them. With two, it is to be apprehended that rivalry might continue. With five, we may hope that a more general and elevated interest would ultimately prevail.

"Undoubtedly, interests of a secondary class will not cease to exist. Undoubtedly, there will always be, between France and England, as regards Spain, questions of national self-love and traditional jealousy, questions of alliance and marriage. I do not misconceive the importance and difficulty of these questions I do not hesitate to say, that on all, we shall be found

moderate and conciliatory, without reserved thoughts or exclusive pretensions.—I have nothing more to add at present. We earnestly desire the pacification of Spain; it is essential to our repose and prosperity. We cannot suffer a hostile influence to be established there at the expense of our own. But I affirm that, on the theatre of Spain pacified and regularly governed, as soon as we no longer see cause to fear for our just interests and rights, we shall be disposed to live in harmony with all the world, and neither to desire nor do anything to inspire reasonable uneasiness for the proper balance of strength and influence in Europe."

When forwarding this letter to M. de Sainte Aulaire I added: "Read it to Lord Aberdeen, and although strictly private and confidential, offer him a copy. It is the true expression of our position and views. I wish it to remain under the eyes of Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel. It is impossible to predict the issue of the insurrection of the *Christinos*. At present, I can scarcely augur anything from it but a new cause of anarchy in the country and impotence in the government. I tremble for those two little girls. It is a situation of the middle ages and of Shakespeare."

When the reports of the insurrection of the *Christinos* reached London, Lord Aberdeen at first evinced little emotion. He spoke of it coldly to M. de Sainte Aulaire, adding, as if incidentally, "I would not give too much utterance to this idea; but, in reality, I see no safety

for Spain except in a union of the parties of Queen Christina and Don Carlos by means of a marriage." Two days after, he was more animated, as M. de Sainte Aulaire assured him that we had taken no part in what was passing in Navarre. "Here again," he said, "are things that I am bound to believe in the face of all probability; but assuredly you will find many incredulous. Is not Queen Christina in Paris? Is she not going to place herself at the head of the insurrection?" When M. de Sainte Aulaire read and delivered to him on the 15th of October my letter of the 11th, he was much struck by it; he kept it a few days, and on returning it, said, that he had shown it to Sir Robert Peel and also to the Queen, "whom it had greatly interested." "I believe," he added, "all that M. Guizot affirms, but it will be difficult to convince Madrid. However, the prejudices I entertained against Espartero, on entering office, are now diminished. I find him moderate, without great talents, but animated by good intentions and disposed to hear reason. But I have written to Mr. Aston, directing him, in his intercourse with the regent, to confine himself within the reserve which the principles of public right require towards a recognized government, without exaggeration, and without compromising himself by too eager manifestations."

It was not only at Madrid that it was difficult to impress the belief that we had no part in the insurrection of the *Christinos*, and that we had no designs in Spain beyond what I had explained to M. de Sainte

Aulaire. They wrote from Paris to London, that, in all probability, I was, individually, a stranger to the insurrection; but that the same could not be believed of the King or of Marshal Soult. They related the frequent interviews of the King with Queen Christina, the joy which he was said to have evinced on learning the rising of O'Donnell; they spoke of audiences given by Marshal Soult to some *Christino* officers setting out for Spain. King Louis Philippe sometimes allowed too much scope to his first impressions, and Marshal Soult cared little for unity and coherence in his proceedings. But whatever might be the King's sudden ebullitions, he held firmly to his general policy, and the marshal served it without embarrassment in the midst of the deviations and contradictions which for a moment he found useful or convenient. Both were well determined not to implicate France and themselves in the affairs of Spain, and the error of the diplomatists was to attach to trifling facts, meanings and consequences beyond what they possessed. The suspicious know not the extent of their own credulity, nor how lightly, in their eagerness to believe what is possible, they mistake what is true.

The failure of the insurrection speedily put an end to these reports and doubts thus rendered unimportant. At Madrid, as in the provinces, the regent Espartero triumphed rapidly. The most brilliant and devoted of Queen Christina's partisans, General Diégo Léon, was taken prisoner and shot. At Paris, the re-

sult of the regent's victory was a visit from M. Olozaga, who came to inform me that he had received orders to demand the expulsion of Queen Christina from France; in case of refusal, he added, he was instructed to demand his passports. I did not wait to consult the King and the cabinet to tell him that in answer he would receive nothing but a refusal, and at the same time I directed M. de Salvandy to delay his departure. The King, whom I informed immediately, replied: "As to the departure of M. de Salvandy, it seems to be impossible to let him go without knowing how this impertinent demand of Olozaga will terminate. You think it has been suggested to him here. I think with you; but judging from Spanish arrogance and their fear of compromising themselves with the tribune or the journals, it is probable that whoever may be the inventors, the government of Espartero will support him. We shall see. I hope the answer will be rather lofty. If Olozaga takes it quietly and gives in, we shall say, 'Good; take your departure, Salvandy,' should he not be retained by other reasons. But it is clear that we should be much entangled by the departure of Salvandy, if Olozaga, confining himself within the circle of Popilius, should tell us to drive away Queen Christina or give him his passports. In that case it would be to him we should have to say 'Good;' and, 'go, Olozaga.' I think in that case there would not be amongst us *a dissentient voice.*"

The cabinet was unanimous, and the refusal peremp-

tory. M. Olozaga neither persisted in his demand nor asked for his passports, and M. de Salvandy remained in Paris, expecting that the conduct of the Spanish government in Spain and towards us, would suggest the course we should adopt with it in return.

At the end of six weeks, if not at the bottom, on the surface at least, the situations were changed. When rejecting the demands of M. Olozaga, in regard to Queen Christina, we had sent some troops to our Pyrenean frontier, and some ships to the coast of Catalonia, saying openly, what was perfectly true, that we had no aggressive thoughts, but that we were not disposed to put up with any act of hostility or impertinence. The regent Espartero, on his part, had scarcely derived more advantage from his victory over the *Christinos*, than escape from a momentary danger. The anarchists attacked him, in their turn. At Barcelona, Valencia, and on several other points, he was in open contest with disorders and revolutionary insurrections. He laboured honestly to suppress them, and endeavoured to supply, by the courage of the soldier, the firmness in which the politician was deficient. At the same time he demonstrated towards us moderate and conciliatory dispositions. Instead of addressing to us inopportune and haughty demands, or complaints, M. Olozaga consulted Mr. Bulwer, first secretary of the English embassy, as to the method he should adopt to obtain from us the answers or demonstrations they desired at Madrid. I then wrote to M. de Sainte Aulaire, on the 22nd of November, 1841;

"The cord slackens between us and Spain. The attitude taken by the regent Espartero against the anarchists, permits us to modify ours towards him. The ships we had sent to Barcelona have returned. Without removing from our frontier of the Pyrenees the troops already arrived there, we retard the movement of those who were in march for that quarter. Very probably M. de Salvandy will soon set out for Madrid." M. de Sainte Aulaire replied on the 24th: "I believe that the moment has arrived for the departure of M. de Salvandy. I think he would do well at Madrid, and I am sure that the effect would be advantageous in London. I strongly approve the attitude we have taken, and I see no reason to remove our troops from the frontier; but the absence of the ambassador leaves the field free to our rivals, and while it gives them advantages over us, it keeps them in a humour daily increasing in bitterness, and which will shortly become chronic. I have given M. de Salvandy credit with Lord Aberdeen for his favourable dispositions towards Espartero; I have said they were known to you, and that this selection for Madrid gave the lie to the malevolence imputed to us against the regent. Lord Aberdeen listened to me with evident satisfaction, and the departure of our ambassador would dissipate suspicions which may embarrass our policy without advantage."

M. de Salvandy left Paris for Madrid on the 29th of November, and his instructions clearly determined the pacific and impartial character of his mission.

Entering Spain on the 8th of December, his journey from Irun to Madrid, was a species of triumph. "The king's embassy," he wrote to me on his arrival, on the 22nd of December, 1841, "has received on the road, from the Spanish government, repeated tokens of respect and solicitude. The alcaldes of all the towns and villages, without exception, came with compliments and offers of their services. Meanwhile, on the frontier, it was not received with the customary salutes; but the harangues addressed to it by all military, ecclesiastical, and civil authorities at Irun, and the salvos at St. Sebastian do not permit the supposition that this neglect was either concerted or premeditated. I shall, however, make an observation with respect to this, in the interest of the future. At Irun, the speeches were full of respect and attachment to France; the alliance of the two nations, the special need of this alliance for the Spanish people, the appeal to French action to assure the union of all parties, were the texts most frequently and energetically developed. In the Basque provinces, the eagerness of the people united itself visibly to the official proceedings of the authorities. At Vittoria, the captain-general, notwithstanding the advanced hour of the night, remained up to receive me. At Burgos, Lieutenant-General de Hoyos, captain-general, visited me immediately on my arrival. I did not think it necessary to present myself to the Infants. In this last town, the political chief and the alcaldes vehemently urged on me the error into which the French govern-

ment would fall, if it believed the Spaniards inclined towards revolutionary ideas or English influence; the cause of order, they said, the consolidation of the monarchy, and affection for France, are in the hearts of all Spaniards. In many cantons of the Basque provinces, I found still animated traces of the devastations of the civil war. In the Castilles, the ravages of the war of independence are not yet effaced. After twenty-one years, I have observed few changes; the principal ones I remarked are more regular and frequent communications, cultivation advanced, and the appearance of the troops improved. These latter are very dilapidated in French eyes, but less so than in 1820."

Three days later, M. de Salvandy again wrote: "A serious incident has presented itself. The Spanish cabinet refuses to acknowledge the ambassador accredited to Queen Isabella II. It assumes that the credentials should be handed and the ambassador presented to the Regent, as the constitutional depositary of the regal authority. I have peremptorily declined these unexpected pretensions, and wait the King's orders."

In the first phrase there was a little exaggeration and confusion. The Spanish cabinet did not refuse to acknowledge the ambassador accredited to Queen Isabella II.; it expressed neither surprise nor complaint that the credentials were addressed to the young Queen herself; it assumed that they ought to be delivered to the Regent, the constitutional depositary of

the regal authority. M. de Salvandy maintained that in his quality of ambassador, representing personally the King of the French near the Queen of Spain, it was to the Queen personally, although a minor, that he ought to hand his letters of credence, without hindrance to the transaction of all affairs with the Regent only and his ministers. He founded this privilege on monarchical principles, on the constant usage of the European courts, and especially on what had passed between France and Spain themselves in 1715, when the Count de Cellamare, Spanish ambassador in France, had presented his credentials to Louis XV., a minor, and not to the regent, the Duke of Orleans. The Spanish cabinet replied, through the organ of M. Antonio Gonzales, minister for foreign affairs, that the Regent exercising in terms of Article 59 of the Spanish constitution, the full authority of king, it was to him that the credentials of the foreign representatives should be delivered. A long discussion ensued between the ambassador and minister; several notes were exchanged; various modes of accommodation were attempted. M. de Salvandy declared himself ready to present his credentials to the Queen in presence of the Regent, who might receive them immediately from her Majesty's hand and open them in her presence. It was proposed to M. de Salvandy to give all the éclat he could desire to his reception by the Regent in the Queen's palace, adding that as soon as he had handed his letters of credence to the Regent, he would be authorized to deliver to

the young Queen the private letters of Queen Christina her mother, or of King Louis Philippe her uncle, of which he might be the bearer. The discussion only confirmed the two diplomatists in the position they had assumed and the thesis they maintained, while every attempt at accommodation failed under the imperious pretensions of the two principles in contest.

It was truly an active struggle between two principles. In giving me an account of the difficulty that had arisen, M. de Salvandy added: "I feel convinced that the hand of an ally has directed all. In a conference with Mr. Aston,—and I mentioned this to M. Pageot before this incident intervened,—I saw the obstinate Whig, the determined and impassioned continuator of Lord Palmerston's policy, who finds, in the part he plays here, a double gratification, that of revenging himself on France, as also on the very cabinet that employs him. My careful and cordial expressions on the alliance of the two nations, and the relations of the two governments, extracted from him no reply. Neither could I obtain any to my assurances of sincere and sustained efforts to establish a perfect understanding with him. His features and tone alone responded. His external politeness had not concealed from me his vexation at being no longer alone on this theatre, and at seeing his influence disputed. Let me repeat that I fully adopted this impression and formed this judgment previous to the incident which has occurred." M. de Salvandy's impressions were just, but extreme, and he attached to them, as was his frequent

practice, consequences too important. Mr. Aston's dispositions were not more favourable than he interpreted them; accustomed to represent and practise the policy of suspicion and hostility between France and England in Spain, the minister of Lord Palmerston had more taste for the inspirations of his old chief than for those of Lord Aberdeen, and in all probability, he troubled himself very little as to the disagreement that sprang up between the new French ambassador and the Spanish government; but his attitude was embarrassed and weak rather than clear and active; he did not guide the regent Espartero and his counsellors in the quarrel in which they engaged; he merely followed them, writing to London, that, according to his idea, they were in the right, and even striving to hold his ground in Madrid by not opposing them. He might have employed a favourable influence which he did not seek, and that which he exercised was bad though feeble. The instincts and passions of the extreme party, at that time dominant in Spain and with the Regent, were the true springs of the movement. That party felt shocked at the secondary position to which the demand of the French ambassador reduced their chief; shocked that, during the legal inaction of hereditary power, elective authority should not count for everything under all circumstances of government. The party did not contemplate the abolition of monarchy, but it held monarchical considerations in little value, and was ruled by radical sentiments. It believed the judgment and

honour of the constitution to be engaged in the quarrel. It was neither the action of the English minister, nor the plots of intriguers who sought their personal fortune in hostility to France, but the general and deeply rooted disposition of the party then in power that decided the obstinacy with which the Regent and his advisers persisted in their refusal to accede to the demand of our ambassador.

Whatever might have been the causes and authors of the event, we entirely approved the conduct of M. de Salvandy, to whom I wrote thus, on the 22nd of December, 1841: "The King's government has not learnt without lively astonishment the unexpected obstacle which has retarded the delivery of your credentials. The pretence set up by the Spanish minister is totally inadmissible, and contrary to all known precedents. Excepting the very few cases in which the regency has been exercised by a royal personage, the father or mother of the monarch, letters of credence have always been delivered to the sovereign to whom they were addressed. You have quoted an apt instance in what occurred in France during the minority of Louis XV., and on the presentation of the Spanish ambassador himself. This example carries irresistible weight in the present case. Another instance, by its recent date and circumstances, applies even more specially to the difficulty which has so unexpectedly sprung up; I allude to what took place in Brazil, a few years since, when M. Feijo was elevated to the regency. He also demanded that

letters of credence should be delivered to him; but the King's government refused to consent, and M. Feijo ultimately gave in. In Greece, during the minority of King Otho, the question was not even raised. The usage of which we claim the maintenance has been uniformly adopted until now, and is founded on motives so powerful that it would be superfluous to detail them. Evidently, when the sovereign is incapacited by non-age from exercising the active functions of monarchy, it is most important, in the interest of the monarchical principle, to leave him the external appurtenances, and thus to preserve in the mind of peoples those habits of respect which a complete eclipse of royalty might impair. We cannot even catch a glimpse of the arguments that might be opposed to considerations of so much weight. It is, therefore, I repeat, impossible for us to admit the pretensions of the Spanish government. Inasmuch as we have no idea of modifying to its prejudice the established practice of the law of nations, so are we equally called upon not to fail in a sacred duty by sacrificing, to gratify it in a matter in which it has not thoroughly calculated its situation and interests, those tutelary forms, the abandonment of which might entail serious consequences. We incline to think that mature reflection will lead to a more just estimate of the question, and that reducing its demands to the literal sense of the letter of M. Gonzalès, the Spanish government will confine itself to requiring what we find perfectly natural,—the

presence of the Regent at the delivery of the credentials, which would immediately pass from the Queen's hands into his. If we are deceived in our hopes, if, notwithstanding the observations I now forward to you, the Spanish government persists in its pretensions, the King desires you to quit Madrid at once; and M. Pageot, who has never lost his character as chargé d'affaires, as you have had no opportunity of assuming that of ambassador, will, in due course, resume his functions."

Before my dispatch reached Madrid, the controversy there had continued with increased irritation. The Cortes were opened without the presence of the French ambassador or any member of his suite. In the embarrassment caused by the non-delivery of his credentials, he had been invited to attend in an awkward and unbecoming manner, by merely sending him a simple note in his personal name, which he immediately returned with this brief formula: "The ambassador of France returns, to the official introducer of ambassadors, the enclosed letter, which is not suitably addressed to him." On both sides, feelings of wounded dignity and personal jealousy mingled themselves with the interchange of arguments. Sustained by the formal approbation of the two Spanish Chambers, by the Senate as well as by the Cortes, the Regent and his advisers entrenched themselves from day to day more strongly behind their constitutional scruples. Under the shadow of these scruples, the faction hostile to France vigorously

prosecuted its intrigues against us. The English minister lent a cold and embarrassed concurrence to insignificant attempts at conciliation. My dispatch of the 22nd of December reaching M. de Salvandy in the midst of this tightened and warm position, scarcely satisfied him. In the effervescence of his imagination, ever inclined to exaggerate all matters, he had dreamt of everything as a consequence of the incident in which he was involved, except his recall. He wrote to me without delay, on the 29th of December, 1841; "If I do not obtain the result I seek for, and which your dispatches, once more, urge me to prosecute more vigorously, I see only two measures for adoption;—to wait, or strike.

"To wait; relations with Spain being suspended, and the interests of France, in which I include those of the Spanish royalty, placed under the safeguard of certain *vetoes* so clearly expressed as to command the attention of all the world, and so legitimate as to arm no one in opposition. This is a policy which compromises nothing, and, in the end, assures all. The Spanish government, which you see, with knees on the ground, soliciting the recognition of distant monarchies, will understand the value of amicable relations with ours, when it feels, as it instantly will, the consequences of their interruption. The monarchical party resuming its consequence and arms, the revolutionists their exactions and firebrands; an importunate protectorate menacing all the vital interests of the country, and, above all, wounding its

pride; the established power everywhere encountering resistance and speedily competition; that of the theoretical republic imagined by Arguelles, or quite another matter, the armed republic represented by Rodil; concession and violence becoming the two resources in which that power would rapidly engulf itself. Such would be the consequences, if France, opening her hand to civil war to allow it a free passage, and reducing Spain to bankruptcy by enforcing her lawful claims, as I have heard you so often say, does not take upon herself to hasten the period of an inevitable reaction.

"This reaction would so rapidly make itself felt, that to avoid the consequences I enumerate, and which would appear from the commencement, I feel it to be beyond dispute that an admissible and becoming return would on the instant be offered to French action.

"England would be the first to desire and second this.

"The other plan would be more prompt and clear. There was a time when, to put an end to the dangers to which the revolutionary state of this country exposes our peace and monarchy, the King's policy would have accepted the legitimate opportunities which the folly and audacity of this government offered to it. At that period I should have felt uneasy at such a policy. Your Excellency remembers this. I should have wished that, with all the complications of events and the accusations emanating

therefrom, the lawfulness of the opportunities had been less evident, so as to induce us to leave Spain, offensive through parties and revolutionary government, to her own strength. It is my duty to add, that, from a distance, I believed in that strength; I spoke of a second Africa on our frontiers. To-day, with firm and prompt decision, I believe neither in an Africa nor a Europe. I persist in my opinion that the present Spanish government may be made to last, with laborious care, with good counsels if they are listened to, with good intentions if they are appreciated, and with favourable chances, if God sends them. This is the difficulty. The facility lies in beating down the scaffolding of a revolution which does not rest on a people, of a usurpation which does not depend on a man. . . . I know not the future in reserve for the King's policy, nor the weight that may be attached to my words; but right or wrong, at the risk of deceiving myself, knowing all that an error might produce, and owing to the government of my country what appears to me the truth, I declare, that to put an end to all this, in my opinion, we require scarcely twenty thousand men, twenty days, and a pretext. The pretext you are already furnished with.

"I pause here, Sir and Minister; I came with the ambition, since such was the King's desire, of reconquering this kingdom for France by policy; others have rendered this work impossible of accomplishment, by rendering it impracticable for me to make

the attempt. I think I see other means of reconquering Spain to our alliance, maxims, and civilization, to our constitutional liberty, to the blood and policy of Louis the Fourteenth. I have indicated to you two, to wait or march on. I do this safely, for the King will decide the question, and you are his minister."

I adopted neither of M. de Salvandy's propositions. I found them both violent and chimerical, exceeding the exigencies of the position, and calculated to bring on consequences totally opposite to those he foresaw. The King and the council thought with me, and on the 5th of January, 1842, I replied to the ambassador: "The King's will, which I have already announced to you by telegraph, is, that if the misunderstanding in which you are engaged with relation to the delivery of your credentials has not terminated in conformity with our just requirements, you will, on the moment of receiving this dispatch, demand your passports, and leave Madrid immediately for France.

"You express to me your opinion that for the dignity of France, as also in the interest of Spain, your recall should be followed by one of these two measures—the dispatch of a French army beyond the Pyrenees, or at least the absolute rupture of diplomatic relations between the States. The King's government, after having maturely weighed the considerations you urge in support of these alternatives, considers it impossible to accept either. On the one hand, in what relates to the dispatch of a French

army to Spain, it seem to it that the incident which causes your recall, would not sufficiently justify, in public opinion, such an extreme measure, the consequences of which, near or possible, appear more serious than the inciting causes. On the other hand, it is evident that between two contiguous countries which have continually to discuss so many essential interests, entirely unconnected with politics, the total interruption of all diplomatic relations could not assume a permanent state, nor even a position of any considerable duration; and that we could not reasonably assume such an attitude, except, so to speak, on the eve and in the form of a declaration of war already certain.

"The King and his council have therefore not thought it practicable to adopt either of the determinations you suggest. Meanwhile, we have equally recognized that after the notoriety which has taken place, matters could not be replaced purely and simply on the footing they occupied formerly, and that the King's government is bound to signify, in an unequivocal manner, its just displeasure. They refused at Madrid to allow the Queen to receive the ambassador accredited to her by the King of the French. The King will not receive near himself any Spanish agent accredited to Paris with a title superior to that of chargé d'affaires. M. Pageot will remain as our chargé d'affaires to the Spanish ministry, and I request you to deliver to him the accompanying dispatch, which instructs him to make this declaration to M. Gonzales."

When this final dispatch reached him, M. de Salvandy was still in Spain, but had left Madrid; he departed from that city on the 6th of January, leaving as chargé d'affaires, not the first secretary to the embassy, M. Pageot, himself deeply engaged in the quarrel, but the second secretary, the Duke de Glücksberg, "whose precocious maturity, sound judgment, self-restraint, and reserve," he wrote to me, "give me the fullest confidence as to all that the situation may embrace of delicacy and difficulty." I shared the confidence of the ambassador in his young official, and confirmed the arrangement. He had not yet quitted the Spanish soil, when Lord Cowley came on the 9th January, to communicate to me a letter from Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Aston, dated the 7th, and forwarded to Madrid by a courier, who, he said, had not stopped in passing. I had duly informed our ambassador in London of all the incidents of our dispute with the Spanish cabinet, instructing him at the same time to communicate fully to Lord Aberdeen the facts and documents. From the first moment, Lord Aberdeen said to him, "that in such a matter precedents had great authority and ought to be carefully verified; that *à priori* he was disposed to agree with us and to consider the demand of Spain as highly impolitic; that if Mr. Aston had encouraged it he was much to blame, but that nothing justified such a supposition." "I asked Lord Aberdeen," added M. de Sainte Aulaire, "whether he would not make known at Madrid his opinion on this incident; he replied that a dispatch from him

would probably arrive too late to exercise any influence on the solution; that nevertheless he was disposed to write it after conferring with Sir Robert Peel, and with this object he requested me to leave with him the documents I had just read."

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of inserting here this letter to Mr. Aston, which at the request of M. de Sainte Aulaire, Lord Aberdeen instructed Lord Cowley to communicate to me; a brilliant testimony of the steady equity and perfect loyalty, which in spite of prejudices, suspicions, and national routines, and while maintaining the English policy, he evinced from that moment in the relations of England with France in regard to Spain. "It is necessary," he wrote to Mr. Aston, "that I should speak to you with the most perfect frankness on the subject of the quarrel between the Spanish government and the French ambassador. You know without doubt that it is imputed exclusively to your influence. This is not alone the conviction of M. de Salvandy and of the French government. I have seen letters from Madrid, written by persons who have no relations with them, but filled with the same persuasion. I need not tell you that I attach no credit to these reports, and that I believe you have endeavoured, by conciliatory measures, to accommodate this misunderstanding. But at the same time, as you have acted under the idea that the Spanish government was well founded in its pretensions, it is clear that your advice, in whatever mode you may have given it, and you have not explained this

to me in detail, was not calculated to produce much effect.

"No one can be more disposed than I am to support the Spanish government when in the right, especially against France. But in this case I think it decidedly wrong, and I much regret that your judgment, usually so sound, should have arrived at any other conclusion. The justification that the Spanish government pretends to find in Article 59 of the constitution, is a mere cavil, and such a sophism suffices to inspire serious doubts of its sincerity. Consider it certain that if the present course is persevered in, it must bid adieu to all hope of the recognition of Queen Isabella by the Northern powers. They would see in it, and very naturally, only an adroit attempt by the revolutionary party to lower the monarchy, an attempt supported by English jealousy at the aspect of French influence.

"I am not surprised that the Spaniards regard with suspicion every step of France, and that they see in all some intention of slighting the Regent and his authority. In the present case, I believe this suspicion to be unfounded, and that the French mission has been undertaken in an amicable spirit and urged by our desire. The natural proceeding, simple and quite obvious, was, without any doubt, that the ambassador should present his letters of credence to the Queen, to whom they were addressed; and though I attribute the difficulty which has arisen to an ill-founded suspicion of the Spanish government, others see in it

a premeditated abasement of royalty and a determination to quarrel, at any risk, with France.

"I do not hear that M. de Salvandy set forth any pretension as a family ambassador, or that he attempted to revive ancient privileges of communication with the Queen of Spain, beyond the rules which the Spanish government might consider it necessary or convenient to establish. Any attempt of this kind would call for firm resistance. As the family compact has ceased to exist, the French ambassador ought to be on the same footing with all the others.

"I need not tell you that this affair has been the source of much embarrassment and displeasure. If M. de Salvandy has not yet left Madrid, I do not despair of your being able to bring about an accommodation. There will be violent harangues in the Cortes; the two governments will be more and more compromised, and each day will aggravate the difficulty. It is not improbable that within a short time from the present, very serious consequences may manifest themselves. At present, we look upon the Spanish government as entirely in the wrong; but this incident will be energetically resented in France, and the course of things may perhaps lead the French to aggression. Our position then will be extremely difficult and complicated. Even though in the end the Spanish government might be right, the origin of the quarrel would be always wrong.

"In recommending to you prompt and energetic efforts to bring the Spanish authorities to more tract-

able dispositions in this unfortunate question, I leave you the choice of means to be adopted with this view; you must know, better than any one else, how success may be obtained, and I affirm that you could not render a greater service to Spain and to the public interest."

As Lord Aberdeen anticipated, his letter reached Madrid too late to exercise any influence on the question in agitation there; but for me, it furnished a leading and valuable evidence of the elevation and equity of mind he carried into the relations of the two governments. I communicated it to M. de Salvandy, who had halted at Bayonne; he returned immediately to Paris, reassured and even satisfied with himself as Lord Aberdeen had approved of his conduct. I addressed on the 5th of February, 1842, to the various representatives of France in Europe, a circular intended to explain thoroughly in all quarters the attitude we had assumed with the Spanish government, the principles which had governed us, and the adhesion we had received from all the great cabinets; and the incident concluded without detriment to our position in Spain, and without producing any embarrassment in Europe.

Amongst the cabinets which testified their complete approbation of our principles and attitude in this occurrence, I abstained in my circular from naming St. Petersburgh. We had, at this precise moment, entered with the court of Russia into a personal and straitened position. It is well known that the Emperor Nicholas had never in his correspondence given

to King Louis Philippe, as he was accustomed to do with other sovereigns, the title of *Sir, my Brother;* and that the King had appeared to hold no account of this tacit offence between the two sovereigns, in the bosom of peace between the two States. It was the custom every year, on the 1st of January and also on the 1st of May, the fête-day of King Louis Philippe, for the diplomatic corps, with the various national authorities, to offer to the King its homage, and he amongst the foreign ambassadors who found himself, at that epoch, the oldest of the body, spoke in the general name. Several times this mission had fallen to the Russian ambassador, who acquitted himself of it without embarrassment, as any of his colleagues would have done. On the 1st of May, 1834, amongst other periods, and also on the 1st of January, 1835, Count Pozzo di Borgo, at that time the senior ambassador in Paris, had been, with the King, and in strict propriety, the interpreter of their sentiments. In the autumn of 1841, Count d'Appony, at that time senior of the diplomatic body, was absent from Paris, and his return was not to take place until after the 1st of January, 1842. Count de Pahlen, Russian ambassador, and next to Count d'Appony the oldest of the ambassadors, was invited to replace him in the ceremony of the 1st of January. On the 31st of October, he called upon me and read a dispatch, dated the 12th, which he had just received from Count de Nesselrode, expressing the regret of the Emperor Nicholas at not having been able to invite his ambas-

sador from Carlsbad to Warsaw, and his desire to converse with him. As no important affair required his presence in Paris, at that moment, the Emperor ordered him to repair to St. Petersburgh, without otherwise fixing precisely the moment of his departure. Count de Pahlen neither gave me nor did I ask any explanation, and he set out accordingly on the 11th of November following.

On that same day, the 11th of November, I forwarded the following instructions to M. Casimir Périer, who happened to be chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh during the absence on leave of our ambassador M. de Barante: "The Count de Pahlen has received a very unexpected order to repair to St. Petersburgh, and left Paris this day. The motive alleged in Count de Nesselrode's dispatch, which he read to me, is that the Emperor, not having been able to see him at Warsaw, desires to converse with him. The real cause, which is a mystery to no one, is, that in consequence of the absence of the Count d'Appony, the Russian ambassador, as the eldest of the diplomatic corps, found himself called upon to compliment the the King, on New Year's day, in the name of the whole body. When he waited on the King to announce his departure, his Majesty said to him, 'I always see Count de Pahlen near me with pleasure, and I regret his removal; beyond this, I have nothing to say.' To the ambassador he addressed not a word."

"Although we are accustomed to the strange proceedings of the Emperor Nicholas, this last step has

caused some sensation. More astonishment is expressed by the diplomatic corps than by the public, at this puerile obstinacy in the exhibition of useless ill-temper, and if we could have been hurt by it, the sentiment it inspires would have amply satisfied us. One answer alone suits us. On St. Nicholas's day,* the French legation at St. Petersburgh will confine itself to its hotel. You will assign no serious motive to explain this unusual retirement. You will simply name indisposition in reply to the invitation which according to custom you will undoubtedly receive from M. de Nesselrode."

On the 21st of December, M. Casimir Périer replied as follows:—"On the 18th of this month, I conformed exactly to the orders your Excellency had delivered to me, carefully avoiding at the same time all that might increase irritation. The day following, the 19th, on the occasion of the ball at the palace to celebrate his Imperial Majesty's *fête*, and at which I considered that my absence from the circle on the preceding eve, prevented me from appearing, and during these forty-eight hours, I confined myself within the hotel of the embassy. This year, there was no dinner at the Vice-Chancellor's. Up to this moment, the official relations of the embassy with the Imperial cabinet or court have experienced no alteration. I have ascertained, however, that the absence of the French legation was much remarked, and pro-

* The 18th of December, in the Russian calendar; the 6th, according to ours.

duced a great sensation. No one entertained any doubt as to the cause. The Emperor exhibited much excitement. He has declared that he looks upon this demonstration as personally directed against himself, and, as might be expected, his own intimate circle have not failed to exceed the imperial disposition. I could not avoid thinking, and have already been given to understand, that my relations with society would undergo visible modifications."

Three days later, on the 24th of December, M. Casimir Périer added: "The French Embassy has been interdicted and placed under ban in society at St. Petersburgh. I am thoroughly convinced that this order proceeds from the Emperor. All doors are closed against us. No Russian will appear here. Evening parties and dinners to which I had been invited with Madame Périer have been postponed; persons whose houses were open to us and who had fixed days of reception, have requested us, through intermediaries, to spare them the embarrassment of our presence, and allege, under a promise of secrecy, the orders they have received." On the 4th of January, 1842, I replied to M. Casimir Périer: "I have received the dispatch in which you tell me that you conformed implicitly to my instructions. You will perhaps know before this reaches you that M. de Kisseleff and his legation absented themselves from the Tuileries on the 1st of January. A few hours before the reception of the diplomatic body, M. de Kisseleff wrote to the introducer of ambassadors, to

say he was ill. His absence did not surprise us. Our intention was to signify that we warmly respect the dignity of our august sovereign, and that unbecoming proceedings towards his person find us neither blind nor indifferent. We have fulfilled this duty. We see now, as far as you are concerned, no obstacle to the resumption of the usual course of consideration and politeness. In this idea, I authorized you, as far back as the 18th of November last, to wait upon the Emperor and pay your duty to him, according to custom, on the first day of the year. You seem to think that the cabinet of St. Petersburgh may wish to signify other tokens of its discontent. As long as this dissatisfaction does not extend so far as to withhold what is officially due to you as head of the French mission, you have no occasion to perceive it; but if they should affect to disavow the rights of your position and rank, you will remain within your hotel, confine yourself to the dispatch of current business, and wait my instructions."

Nothing of this kind occurred. The official relations of the French legation with the cabinet of St. Petersburgh continued perfectly regular and becoming. As often as public affairs called M. Casimir Périer to the Count de Nesselrode, he ever found the same politeness,—the same moderate and rational dispositions. At the court, M. and Madame Casimir Périer, invited on the ordinary occasions, were received by the Emperor without any affectation of coldness, and even with a shade of friendly feeling. "How

have you been since we last saw each other?" said the Emperor to M. Périer when passing him at the first ball where they met; "better, have you not?" The Empress asked him with some earnestness when M. de Barante would come back, and if he knew anything of his return. But the interdict proclaimed in Russian society against the French envoy was maintained and practised; and when, either in the Imperial family or on the part of his most confidential advisers, some conciliatory insinuations were suggested to the Emperor, he repulsed them, saying, "I shall make no advance; let M. de Barante return, and my ambassador will set out for Paris." On our side, we were fully decided not to lend ourselves to this return, until the relations between the two sovereigns became what they ought to be. At the end of seven months and at his own request, I gave M. Casimir Périer a leave of absence which the health of Madame Périer required. M. d'André, second secretary of the embassy, replaced him at St. Petersburgh. In July, 1843, M. de Kisseleff came to communicate to me a dispatch from Count de Nesselrode, particularly courteous as regarded myself. I took the opportunity of entering into explanations, without subterfuge or reserve, as to our attitude, its original cause and incidental motive, and on our intention of continuing it, while that cause subsisted. "We do not see, in general," I said to M. de Kisseleff, "as regards the respective interests of France and Russia, anything but reasons for good intelligence between the two

countries; and if, during the last twelve years, their proceedings have not always presented that character, it is that the relations between the two sovereigns and courts are not in perfect harmony with this essential fact. The regularity of these relations, and M. de Nesselrode may remember that we have often forewarned him of this, is of itself an important question, seriously implicating the policy of the two States. The King's government has accepted the opportunity offered to it of a frank explanation. According to my opinion, what I have done and said ought to have been done and said twelve years ago. In questions where dignity is concerned, we cannot explain ourselves too clearly or too soon; they ought never to be left to doubtful chances or placed at the mercy of any one. Without the re-establishment of good and regular relations between the two sovereigns and courts, the return of the ambassadors would want truth and consistency. The King prefers confining himself to chargés d'affaires."

Neither of the ambassadors returned to their posts. Chargés d'affaires only, continued to reside at Paris and St. Petersburgh. To judge by appearances, the relative position of the two sovereigns remained unchanged; but, in reality, it was materially altered. The Emperor Nicholas appeared to be embarrassed in his obstinacy, and King Louis Philippe firm in his moderation. Instead of enduring in silence an unbecoming attitude, we openly declared our sentiment, and determined the form and measure of relations be-

tween the two monarchs. The mutual affairs of both countries suffered nothing; dignity was maintained without any compromise of policy. This was the object I seized the opportunity of pursuing, and which I congratulated myself on having accomplished.

CHAPTER V.

VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS.

(1840—42.)

INTERNAL POSITION OF THE CABINET OF THE 29TH OF OCTOBER, 1840. —PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS RECOGNIZED AND POWERFUL AS MEANS OF OPPOSITION.—SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THOSE IDEAS.—IN WHAT THEY ARE FALSE, AND FROM WHAT CAUSE.—HOW THEY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN COMBATED.—INSUFFICIENCY OF OUR ARMS FOR THAT STRUGGLE.—OUTRAGE COMMITTED AGAINST THE DUKE OF AUMALE AND THE PRINCES HIS BROTHERS, ON THE 13TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1841.—ENTRY OF THE DUKE OF AUMALE AND OF THE 17TH REGIMENT OF LIGHT INFANTRY TO THE COURT OF THE TUILERIES. —PLOT CONNECTED WITH THE OUTRAGE.—M. HÉBERT IS APPOINTED ATTORNEY-GENERAL TO THE ROYAL COURT OF PARIS.—TRIAL OF QUÉNISSET AND HIS ACCOMPLICES BEFORE THE COURT OF PEERS.—LEGISLATIVE DEBATES.—LAWS ON THE LABOUR OF CHILDREN IN MANUFACTURES;—ON EXPROPRIATION ON ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC UTILITY;—ON GREAT PUBLIC WORKS;—ON THE GENERAL NETWORK OF RAILWAYS.—PROPOSITIONS OF M. GANNERON ON PARLIAMENTARY INCOMPATIBILITIES, AND OF M. DUCOS ON ELECTORAL REFORM.—DISCUSSION AND REJECTION OF THESE PROPOSITIONS.—OPERATION OF THE CENSUS FOR PERSONAL AND HOUSE TAX, AND ALSO FOR THE TAX ON WINDOWS.—DISTURBANCES ON THIS QUESTION.—UNEASINESS OF M. HUMANN.—HE IS FIRMLY SUPPORTED.—HIS SUDDEN DEATH.—HE IS REPLACED BY M. LACAVE-LAPLAGNE.—GENERAL BUGEAUD IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF ALGERIA.—HIS RELATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME.—HIS FIRST CAMPAIGNS.—CLOSING OF THE SESSION OF 1841-1842.

THE Cabinet was formed on a question of foreign policy, and throughout the whole course of its duration,

from 1840 to 1848, matters of foreign policy filled and animated the scene: the Egyptian affair, the right of search, the occupation of Otaheite, the war in Morocco, the fate of the Christians in Syria, the establishment of the constitutional system in Greece, the Spanish marriages, the Jesuits in France and Rome, political reforms in Italy, the Sunderbund, and the civil war in Switzerland. Entrusted with the direction of this portion of the affairs of France, I entertained a profound conviction and a constant sentiment that the power and success of the State depended, above all things, upon good internal government. In a perfect harmony of the great constitutional powers, in public order, and prosperity, in a judicious administration of the finances, in authority controlled by liberty, and in liberty restrained by law;—on these conditions only is sound foreign policy practicable. It is at home that we must seek for the just and decisive causes which produce influence abroad and establish the solid greatness of peoples.

The position of our internal government in 1840, was at the same time extremely similar to and different from that which had prevailed from 1830 to 1835; better on the surface, but at the bottom ever difficult and dangerous. Insurrections, seditions, and conspiracies with a defined and approaching object, had ceased; order reigned in Paris and throughout the country; power exercised itself without obstacle; but the hostility of the republican and legitimate parties remained without change; they had neither

renounced their hopes nor their designs; we were constantly in presence of an active and continued attempt at subversion, which pursued its work by means of the press, the elections, the tribune, and all the arms of liberty. Tranquil on the surface and for the moment, the government was ardently attacked by the opposition of minds and ideas, and with reference to the future.

It would be indeed an unintelligent and frivolous authority which contented itself with actual and material order, without also aspiring to govern minds and to control the future. No one is more convinced than I am of the important part acted in the life of peoples by the ideas which ferment in their bosoms, and of the necessity of impressing on them faith in the duration as also in the right of the power which rules them. It implicates the dignity and honour of men not to attach themselves to their government until their thoughts are satisfied, while their interests are secured, and to be necessitated to believe that that government will last when they themselves have departed. But free governments, in this respect, are very differently situated from absolute power; and when the question arises, either to give a new idea its place and part in the conduct of public affairs, or to impress on men's minds confidence in the future, they have very opposite difficulties to surmount, and very complicated duties to fulfil.

We lived and acted from 1840 to 1848 in presence and under the fire of several ideas which I am anxious

to recapitulate and characterize to-day, by the light of the trials they have undergone, and of my own personal experience in the arena in which I encountered them.

The universal right of men to political power;—their common claim to social prosperity;—democratic unity and sovereignty substituted for monarchical unity and sovereignty;—rivalry between the people and the citizens, succeeding to rivalry between the citizens and the nobility;—the science of nature and the worship of humanity assuming the place of religious faith and the worship of God:—such were the ideas which, under different names, republicans, democrats, socialists, communists, positivists, political partisans, philosophic communities, secret associations, and isolated writers, all enemies to the established government, assumed as fundamental maxims, and ardently struggled to propagate.

I do not propose here to enter on a theoretical examination of these ideas; I merely wish to mark their common character and the essential cause of their fatal influence on our society and times. They have all this radical vice, that, containing a small quantity of truth, they isolate, inflame, and exaggerate it to such a point as to elicit from thence a huge and abominable mass of error.

Without any doubt, the end and the result of sound social institutions ought to be to elevate progressively a greater number of men to the degree of intelligence and independence which renders them capable

and worthy of participating in the exercise of political power; but between this principle of free government and the universal suffrage asserted as the first and fundamental law of human society, what an abyss exists! What an oblivion of an infinite number of facts, rights, and truths, which demand on just grounds their place and part in social organization!

Nothing can be more evident or more sacred than the duty of government to aid the classes least favoured by fortune, to solace them in their privations, and to second them in their ascending effort towards the advantages of civilization. But to establish that the misery of so many human beings flows from the vices of social organization, and to impose on government the charge of rescuing them therefrom, and of distributing prosperity equitably, is to ignore absolutely the condition of humanity, to abolish the responsibility inherent in human liberty, and to excite evil passions by false hopes.

M. Royer-Collard said, in 1822: "I admit that democracy flows with full banks in France, such as ages and events have made it. It is true that, for a long time, industry and property never ceasing to fertilize, to increase, and to elevate the middle classes, they have thrust themselves into public affairs; they find themselves neither guilty of curiosity nor of rashness in this action; they know that these affairs are theirs. This is our democracy, such as I see and conceive it; yes, it flows with full banks in our

beautiful France, more than ever favoured by Heaven. Let others afflict or irritate themselves at this; for myself, I return thanks to Providence for calling so great a number of its creatures to the benefits of civilization." Truth flows with full banks in these noble words; but to conclude, from the great fact thus summed up, that democracy is now the sole element, the only master of society, that no power is legitimate or salutary unless it emanates from that source, and that it alone is authorized to unmake and make governments, is to disavow frivolously the diversity of situations and rights which co-exist naturally, though in very unequal degrees, in all society; it is to substitute the insolence and tyranny of numbers for the insolence and tyranny of privilege; to enthrone, under the name and mantle of democracy, to-day, anarchy,—to-morrow, despotism.

In common with all associations of men which similarity of position brings together, the middle classes have their faults, errors, want of foresight, obstinacy, and egotism; and it is easy to distinguish them; but it is a calumnious effort to attribute to these imperfections a bearing they possess not, and to exaggerate them beyond measure, to produce from thence, between the citizens and the people, a rivalry, an active and deeply seated hostility, analogous to that which for so long a time existed between the citizens and the nobility. Modern citizenship does not contradict its history; it is in the name and for the advantage of all that it has conquered the rights it possesses and

the principles which prevail in our social order; it neither exercises nor demands any domination of class, and exclusive privilege; in the vast space which it occupies in the bosom of society, the doors are always open, and places are ever ready for those who desire and know how to enter. It is often said, and truly, that the English aristocracy has had the merit of learning how to extend and renew itself by recruiting largely from the other classes, in proportion as the latter increase around it. This merit belongs more completely and infallibly to the middle class in France; it forms its very essence and public right; sprung from the people, it feeds and nourishes itself continually at the same source which flows and rises without cessation. Diversity of situation and aspirations of passion subsist and will continue to endure for ever; they are the natural fruit of the social movement and of liberty; but it is a gross error to take advantage of these moral observations on nature and human society to induce from thence, between the citizens and the people a political war which has neither serious nor legitimate motives. "The infantry is the nation of camps," said General Foy: but he did not therefore conclude that it was in natural and permanent hostility against the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff.

What shall I say of another idea still obscure and almost imperceptible in 1840, but now active on the scene, and in course of becoming expanded and notorious? It is true, by the side of the advantage and

honour they have conferred on human society, religious faith and ecclesiastical influence have often been a source of error and oppression. They have alternately misled and fettered man's liberty and thought; now, a liberal and scientific spirit has emancipated itself from their yoke, and in its turn renders immense services to humanity, but will be equally mingled with error and mischief. What do M. Auguste Comte and his disciples conclude from this social evolution?* That faiths and religious influences have had their day; that they are no more than a worn-out relic, an uninhabitable ruin, a sterile fragment. In place of the fantastic and impenetrable world of theology and metaphysics, the real world, they say, is opened and delivered to man; the knowledge of nature has killed the supernatural; science will henceforth occupy the throne of religion; God makes man will be replaced by man makes God. Is it possible to falsify and mutilate humanity and history more strangely? Can we descend into and enclose ourselves in a horizon more narrow and more stripped of all great light upon the grand problems and facts which invincibly preoccupy the human mind?

I touch slightly and in the name of simple common

* I here consider it a duty to correct an error which has crept into a former statement. I said that before my ministry of public instruction (1832–1836), I was unacquainted with M. Auguste Comte. This was, on my part, a forgetfulness. Long before 1830, M. Auguste Comte paid me several visits, and I had conversations with him, the remembrance of which in 1860 had completely escaped me. In his work, entitled 'Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy,' M. Littré has rectified with equal propriety and foundation this involuntary error.

sense on questions of deep importance; but I feel confident that on this as on all other occasions, the most profound and free philosophy confirms the general data of sound reason, and I return to what I said at first: it is through allowing themselves to be dazzled by a slight ray and inebriated by a minute dose of truth, that just and sincere minds, exaggerating beyond measure, ideas which if they had remained within their proper place and scope would have proved just and useful, have thus transformed them into enormous and detestable errors.

Powerful errors also, for under the mantle of the modicum of truth they contain, they evoke disorderly interests and evil passions. More powerful under a free government than under any other, for there they have at their service all the arms of liberty. More powerful at the opening of a free government, lately sprung from a revolution, than at any other epoch of its duration, for to their natural and personal influence is added the long-continued gust of the revolutionary wind. It was against these hostile powers that, in spite of the national order re-established, we had still, in 1840, to defend society and government.

In this struggle we employed only two arms, liberty and the laws. Legal and judicial repression when errors engendered crimes; free, public, and continued discussion of our policy and its motives.

I have already recorded, in another place, what I thought of the actions against offences of the press, and of the indifference which government ought almost

always to oppose to excesses which by prosecution attain celebrity of more importance than the check that may be imposed on them. But such indifference is scarcely practicable except by old and firmly established governments. From 1840 to 1848 we were exposed to direct and flagrant attacks against the vital principles and very existence of the constitutional monarchy of 1830; the law imposed on us the duty of defending it; our political friends, the entire conservative party, in the Chambers and with the public, called on us to execute the law. On the 17th of December, 1840, two days after the obsequies of Napoleon at the Invalides, the '*National*' was summoned before the Court of Assizes of the Seine, for having said in its number of the 9th of December, when speaking of M. Thiers and myself, "What signify to us your empty quarrels? You are all accomplices. The chief culprit, oh! we know well who he is, where he is; France also knows it thoroughly, and posterity will proclaim it; and you, you have all been accomplices." On the 23rd of September following, this journal was acquitted by the jury, and the next day, announcing its triumph, declared, "Yes, it is the King at whom we pointed; our idea was evident; our expressions conveyed it faithfully. To deny it would have been an insult to the sense and intelligence of the jury; it would have been on our part an unworthy falsehood." The same day I wrote to the King, then at the Castle of Compiègne: "The '*National*' was acquitted yesterday. The article in which it boasts this

morning of its acquittal seems to me more guilty than that which had been the object of the prosecution. MM. Duchâtel, Martin du Nord, and Villemain, entertain the same opinion. We have therefore seized it again, and it will be cited with little delay. The attorney-general will conduct the prosecution himself. I have made him feel and I think he thoroughly understands the necessity of acting and speaking, in this and in the analogous trials, with sustained energy. He is a man of talent who understands his duty, and intends to engage personally in this affair. We shall see the impression he makes upon the minds of the jury. In any case, I persist in thinking that as often as there is crime and danger, the government ought to prosecute, and place the jurymen in a condition to do their duty, by doing its own."

Prosecuted a second time on account of this new article, even more scandalously aggressive than the preceding one, the '*National*' was again acquitted.

At this same epoch, on the 13th of September, 1841, the Duke of Aumale, returning from Algeria with the 17th regiment of light infantry, of which he was colonel, and accompanied by his brothers the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours, who went to meet him, entered Paris at the head of the regiment which had served in Africa with distinction for seven years. In the street of St. Antoine, the group of princes and especially the Duke of Aumale were aimed at by an assassin almost within reach of the muzzle of the gun. At the moment when the shot was fired, the horse of

the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, M. Lavaillant, who rode by the Duke of Aumale's side, threw up its head, received the ball intended for the colonel, and fell dead before him. The concourse of people was great and joyously eager to hail this brave regiment, whose number and deeds of arms had, for seven years, resounded in the journals. From Marseilles to Paris, throughout the entire march, it had received tokens of popular satisfaction and goodwill; the attempt at assassination furnished a revolting contrast to the public sentiment. It was with difficulty that the murderer was rescued from the indignation of the crowd. I was at the Tuileries when, about two o'clock, the 17th light infantry entered the court of the Château, its young colonel at its head, under the shouts and acclamations of an entire people who filled the square of the Carrousel and the adjacent streets. Officers and soldiers had the aspect at once grave and animated of veteran troops who return to their hearths after having long fought, suffered and conquered. Their clothes were worn, their countenances sunburnt, their looks calmly content, with some expression of fatigue. The regimental standard waved to and fro, blackened and torn. I have seldom witnessed a more animated movement than that which displayed itself round the Tuileries when King Louis Philippe presented himself in front of his son and embraced him in the centre of the court, while the regiment formed in two lines by a rapid and silent evolution. Overflowing with military sympathy, with family emotions, and honest

anger, the entire population seemed bent on loudly giving the lie to factious attempts.

The first inquiries for the prosecution indicated clearly that the assassin was not isolated, and that a plot had prepared the attempt. The matter was referred to the Court of Peers. We wished to make no change in the legislation of the press. We respected the independence of jurors, and we could do nothing to give them more intelligence and firmness; but we were able and bound to secure to the legal action of the magistrates its full efficacy. It is the first condition of a free government that all who concur in it, ministers, magistrates, administrators, and military chiefs, all within their proper limits, should be suited to and fully suffice for the special functions confided to them; for on the harmony and energy of these different actions the general success depends. I felt convinced that in political trials, the public magistracy of Paris had often been deficient in skill and vigour. I recommended that M. Frank Carré, who filled his post more honourably than effectively, should be called to the first presidency, then vacant, of the Court of Rouen, and that M. Hébert should replace him as attorney-general in the Royal Court of Paris. A member of the Chamber of Deputies, M. Hébert had won notice and distinction there by the frankness and firmness of his ideas and conduct; as attorney-general in the Court of Appeal, he had promptly acquired the reputation of a skilful lawyer, precise and powerful in debate; both as politician and

magistrate he inspired serious confidence. The King and council approved this choice; he was appointed on the 12th of October, 1841, and commissioned to conduct in the Court of Peers the trial of the assassin of the Duke of Aumale, Quénisset called Pappart, and his accomplices.

On the day after this appointment, I had, on this subject, a moment of anxious solicitude. At seven in the morning I saw Madame Hébert enter my cabinet, sad and agitated. Her husband, she told me, was so impressed and disturbed by the weight of his new functions and the responsibility they imposed on him that, despite his official and public acceptance, he could not resolve to undertake the burden, and requested to be relieved from it. I went to his house immediately, and found him, in fact, a prey to extreme perplexity, excited by the scruples of an exacting conscience and the uneasiness of an impassioned pride unable to endure the prospect of a check in a great position and a lofty duty. We talked together for a long time; I combated his presentiments of failure; I urged the motives which had led to his being selected. He reassumed confidence in himself, promised me to proceed at once to his task, and though a little surprised at his fit of hesitation, I left him with increased esteem, and satisfied that in him we should find the energetic and effective attorney-general of whom we stood so much in need.

My expectation was not falsified. Called at the

outset of his new functions to prosecute in the Court of Peers the authors and accomplices of the attempt and plot directed on the 13th of September against the Duke of Aumale and his brothers, M. Hébert displayed throughout this important process a vigour of mind and character equal to the most difficult trials, and worthy of the most eminent magistrate. Not suffering himself to be disturbed, embarrassed, or irritated by the violence and subtleties of the debate, and only arming himself against the accused with the ordinary law, the penal code, as reformed in 1832, and the liberal legislation of 1819 in affairs of the press, he placed in brilliant light the plot as well as the attempt; not by alleging a simple moral complicity, as the friends of the accused pretended, but by demonstrating a real and legal participation of the inciters to the act and conspiracy, whatever might be the mode and instrument of aggression. While his attitude was firm and conscientiously animated, his reasoning was simple, precise, adapted to place the true character of the facts in face of the true sense of the laws, and equally exempt from exaggerated emphasis or false circumspection. The Court of Peers, with leniency in the application of penalties, returned a sentence in conformity with the conclusions of the attorney-general, and the King's clemency extenuated still further, in the cases of several of the condemned, the decisions of the court. No one, not more the journalists than the affiliated sections of the secret societies, succeeded in elud-

ing the responsibility of their acts and the justice of the laws.

On the occasion of several political prosecutions instituted during the course of 1842, before the Court of Assizes in Paris, M. Hébert gave proofs of the same talent and courage, and in various instances with similar success.

But these partial triumphs of judicial resistance supplied a very insufficient remedy for the evil by which we were assailed. You punish and intimidate assassins and conspirators, for a moment, by sentences; but such means fail to change the state of minds and the course of ideas: it is in the intellectual region itself that you must combat the mischievous currents that spring up there; it is truth that you must oppose to error; sound spirits must be brought into collision with diseased ones. Carried away and overwhelmed by the affairs of every day, the depositaries of power often lose sight of this portion of their task, and content with victory in the political arena, they think too little of the moral sphere in which they have also so many and such arduous struggles to encounter. We were not all exempt from this fault; we neither took sufficient care nor made adequate efforts to sustain in the press, in the journals, and in public instruction, by all available means, a vigorous struggle against the false ideas I have recently enumerated, and which attacked without intermission the government confided to our care. A fact explains, and in some degree, excuses

this gap in our action. We wanted champions for such an encounter. Contemporaneous with our great revolution, born in its cradle or nourished by its breath, the ideas to be combated were still, in the greater number of minds, implicitly admitted into and attached to that cause. Some regarded them as necessary to the security of its conquests; others as the natural consequences and pledge of its future progress; others again, clung to them without reflection, from routine and prejudice. We know not to what point have extended, or to what depths have penetrated, the roots of the mischievous philosophical and political theories which, in our present day, so deplorably shackle the regular progress of free governments and of a sound social condition. But amongst the men who, from 1830 to 1848, perceived both the end and the danger, and who, in the practice of every day, while contesting with us the consequences, the greater part, and some of the most eminent, failed to trace the evil to its source, and paused before reaching it, either from hesitation of thought or through fear of aiding a reaction towards the old system and absolute power. The young generation also, educated in the ruts or seduced by the new prospects of the revolution, was little disposed to enter on the more laborious and slower paths of liberty restrained by law. Philosophers, equally with politicians, surrendered themselves to the same doubts and perturbations; the spiritual school, which had so brilliantly and profitably disputed the errors of

the last age, honourably sustained its flag, but without rallying the masses under it, and unable to prevent many distinguished minds from falling into a pretended scientific materialism, at one moment openly declared, at another disguised under the name of pantheism. In such a position of facts, how could we find, in adequate number, spirits sufficiently confirmed in their own thoughts, and resolute enough to proclaim and develop, every day and on every point, the true, rational, and moral principles of the free government, which, in the political field, we were labouring to establish?

In this scarcity of the necessary arms for philosophic and moral combat, the political tribune was our principal and constant organ of action. This characteristic fact of our position and entire government from 1830 to 1848, has been and still continues to be strangely misrepresented. People alternately magnify or calumniate speech, or as they express it, when they wish to add compliment to insult, eloquence. Under the parliamentary system, they say, eloquence is the ruler, and power belongs to the ablest speakers, who, to lower their pride, they style rhetoricians. They pay too much honour to eloquence. Even in times of free discussion, when it becomes somewhat necessary, it is far from being sufficient; and neither in fact nor in right, does power incline to or endure with eloquence alone. Eloquence may, at a given moment, under special circumstances, decide a passing success; it is not, in the bosom of political liberty, the first

condition of the art of government. The value of thought and action is much superior to that of speech, and in the parliamentary system as under every other, sound judgment, good conduct and courage are much more indispensable and efficacious than the gift of words. It is to the honour of free government that she requires the same qualities, and a much greater union of them, than any other form of legislation; and it is precisely this powerful exigency which guarantees the good management of public affairs and the enlightened satisfaction of the public sentiment.

During our first session, from the 5th of November 1840, to the 25th of June, 1841, the position of the cabinet in the Chambers was extremely animated and laborious, but in reality little dangerous. Important allies joined us from different ranks, and our adversaries themselves, not eager to fill our places, made no serious attempt at our overthrow. Between peace or war, the crisis was urgent, and the responsibility heavy; either from conviction or prudence they voluntarily resigned to us the burden. In the great questions of foreign policy, MM. de Lamartine, Dufaure, and Passy lent us their support; embarrassing subjects of internal legislation were not raised. We took advantage of these tolerant dispositions to entertain and settle other questions more social than political, and extremely difficult though not stormy. During the short existence of the cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839, two of its members, Messrs. Cunin-

Gridaine and Dufaure, had presented to the Chambers two bills indisputably opportune, one on the labour of children in the manufactures, and the other on the expropriation of property for the public service. The cabinet of M. Thiers, accepted the inheritance of these; but, being still more transient than its predecessor, left both questions at the point where it found them. On an understanding with us, MM. Renard and Dufaure demanded from the Chamber of Deputies, on the 16th of November, 1840, and the 4th of January, 1841, the reintroduction of the two bills; we fully sanctioned the idea and took an active part in the debate. It was long and scrutinizing. All the objections of the manufacturers in the first case, all the difficulties raised by the lawyers in the second, were set forward and discussed; the questions were considered under their different aspects without any complication of political dissent, with the sole view of social benefit, and the debate ended in two laws essentially practical, promulgated, one on the 22nd of March, the other on the 5th of May, 1841. The question of the labour of children in the factories has been resumed, and will again be argued more than once; there are implicated in it moral and material interests, rights of liberty and authority difficult to reconcile, and the conciliation of which must vary according to the diversity and mobility of industrial facts. But the principles laid down in the law of the 22nd of March, 1846, are not and never will be abandoned. The paths into which it has introduced pub-

lic power cannot be deserted. The problem of political economy and morality laid down by the condition of children in the factories, has been frankly accepted and decided according to sound judgment and humanity. As to the law for the expropriation of property for the public advantage, it has vanished. We know the system which succeeded it. I do not hesitate to affirm that it will reappear. In administration as in policy, dictatorship has but its day, and property will endure the absence of guarantees even less than privation of liberty.

We did not confine ourselves to this settlement of the question bequeathed to us by preceding cabinets; we introduced, at the same time, to the Chambers new subjects which excited public interest. M. Humann, who had not resigned himself without regret to the undertaking of the fortifications of Paris and its charges, was not the less eager to propose, on the 18th of January, 1841, to the Chamber of Deputies, in accordance with the wish of the King and the cabinet, a great combination of extraordinary public works for the different services of the bridges and roads, and of the army and navy. "For ten years," he said, on presenting the bill, "the government has advanced daily in this career of useful enterprises. From 1830 to 1832, in the midst of the greatest embarrassments, nearly twenty millions were annually assigned to extraordinary works. From 1833 to 1836, this class of expense was carried, on the average, to thirty millions a year. Between 1837 and 1840, the same service

obtained a medium dotation of fifty millions. It will exceed sixty millions for 1840, and the bill we now propose will elevate the sum to seventy-five millions for six consecutive years beginning with 1842." M. Humann assigned for this service a sum of 450 millions, to be raised by way of loan; and soon after the promulgation of the bill adopted in both Chambers by strong majorities, a first instalment of this loan, amounting to 150 millions, with interest at three per cent., was subscribed at the rate of 78 francs 52 centimes, 1/2. The administrative measure and its financial operation were at the same time extensive and comprised within prudent limits, thus seconding public prosperity without weighing heavily and precipitately on the treasury.

In the following session, from the 27th of December, 1841, to the 11th of June, 1842, the cabinet undertook and accomplished a much more important and more difficult work. For several years the question of the railways had strongly prepossessed the government and the public. Both sides hesitated and lingered as to the lines to be carried out and the system to be adopted in their construction. Of the two opposing schemes, construction by the State and at the public expense, or by commercial companies to whom concession of the lines would be granted, the cabinet of M. Molé had, in 1837 and 1838, adopted the first, and proposed the execution, by the State, of four great lines; but his bills and the principle on which they rested were rejected by a numerous majo-

rity. A step was made in 1840, under the ministry of M. Thiers; some railroads, and amongst the number two important ones, that from Paris to Rouen, and another from Paris to Orleans, were voted. But the general question, the question of the great lines to be constructed, with their mode of construction, throughout France, was still unsettled. On these two fundamental points minds and measures were still in suspense. We resolved to end this uncertainty, and on the 7th of February, 1842, presented a bill to the Chamber of Deputies which authorized the construction of a general network of railways formed by the six great lines from Paris to the frontiers of Belgium, from Paris to the coast of the British Channel, from Paris to Strasbourg, from Paris to Marseilles and Cette, from Paris to Nantes, and from Paris to Bordeaux. The execution of these lines was to take place by a co-operation between the State, the departments and townships interested, and private speculators, in the proportions determined by the bill, which placed two-thirds of the indemnities for land at the charge of the departments and townships; the remaining third of these indemnities, the embankment and artificial works, to the account of the State; the iron rails, the materials and expenses of working and maintaining them, at the cost of the companies to which the con cession would be granted. In the midst of many difficulties and special objections, this bill and its general principles were received with signal approbation; and after two months employed in its investigation, M.

Dufaure, reporter of the committee, when proposing the adoption with certain amendments, concluded his report by saying: "Your committee owed you a faithful account of its researches and labours; it has exposed even the disagreements which sprang up on some portions of the bill, and it has authorized its reporter to tell you that on many important points it formed part of the minority. But it declares in conclusion that it has been ardently and constantly unanimous in desiring that the bill should have a useful result; that all opinions of detail, after having sought to obtain a legitimate triumph by discussion, should be submitted to the sovereign judgment of the Chamber; that the creation of a network of railways is considered by us all as a great national undertaking; and that at the moment of delivering our definitive vote on the bill now presented, each of has been governed by the general ideas and convictions of public advantage which elevate our debates and make them profitable, instead of yielding to local considerations which would degrade and render them barren."

The debate continued for fifteen days, and the two fundamental principles of the bill,—the establishment of a general network of railways, and the division of the expenses between the State, the departments interested, and private speculators,—triumphed over all local jealousies and systematic objections. But when we came to consider the actual execution of the network, a question arose, not of principle, but of conduct. Several members, M. Thiers at their head, de-

manded that instead of dividing, from the commencement of the works, the co-operation and funds of the State between the different lines of which the network was to be formed, they should be concentrated on a single line, the most important of all, as they said, the line from Paris to the Belgian frontier on the one side, and to the Mediterranean on the other. This was almost to destroy the vote already given in favour of a general network, for it amounted to postponing for a long time the application of the equitable principle which had determined the government to make the different districts of France participate simultaneously in the fertilizing advantage of the railways. It seriously compromised, moreover, the fate of the bill, which required to collect, on many points of the ground, the elements of the majority. The reporter, M. Dufaure, had, in the course of the general debate, foreseen and combated this amendment in advance, by saying: "If you confine yourselves to a single line, you continue the incomplete and incoherent work you have commenced during the last years; you do not determine beforehand the employment of the resources which the government may be able, in five, ten, or fifteen years, to apply to the great work of the railroads. This is what we ought to do, and what urgently presses on us. It is not only a theoretical satisfaction we shall give to the country; it is the end we shall assign to our efforts; it is a destination we shall give to our resources. This classification has difficulties; we cannot effect it without animated dis-

cussions; we ought to prepare for them; it will cause great emotions in the country; nevertheless, we are bound to carry it through if we wish to accomplish anything great or complete in the enterprise of the railways." A lively debate sprang up on this subject. M. Thiers on one side, and M. Duchâtel on the other, were the principal actors. It was pre-eminently on financial considerations that M. Thiers supported the amendment in favour of a single line. M. Duchâtel opposed it in the name and state of our finances, of the great future of the railroads, and of the distributive justice which formed at once the rational principle of the bill and the practical condition of its success. M. Billault and M. de Lamartine seconded M. Duchâtel; the Chamber agreed with them; the amendment was rejected by a powerful majority; the Chamber of Peers united its vote to that of the Chamber of Deputies; and experience, in due course, fully justified this conduct of the government and the Chambers. From 1842 to 1848, the simultaneous execution of the general network was carried on without any confusion of the public finances; and since that epoch, in the midst of all our political and administrative revolutions, the act of the 11th of June, 1842, has continued to be the base on which the general edifice of railroads in France is erected; it did that which has accomplished the rest.

In matters of political legislation, the cabinet saw spring up, in the session of 1842, questions more delicate and more strongly in opposition than those it had

encountered during the preceding year. The serious disquietudes of 1840 had vanished; peace was secured; the public ceased to occupy itself exclusively with foreign affairs; the allies, which for the moment those affairs had rallied round us in the Chambers, no longer considered it their duty to give us the same support, and resumed by degrees their distinct and middle position between the government and the opposition. The two questions which in 1840 the cabinet of M. Thiers had studied to elude, that of parliamentary incompatibilities and of electoral reform, presented themselves anew. Two members of the third party, Messrs. Ganneron and Ducos, made them, on the 10th and 14th of February, 1842, the object of formal propositions. M. Ganneron, interdicted to a great number of public functionaries, entry into the Chamber of Deputies, and demanded that, with some exceptions as to the superior duties of political order, no member of that Chamber who was not a salaried public officer on the day of his election should become one while he retained his seat, and for a year after the expiration of his summons. M. Ducos proposed that all the citizens inscribed, in each department, in the jury lists, should be electors.

I had no objection of principle, or of any permanent nature, to either of these propositions. Several parliamentary incompatibilities were already established by law; and in virtue of the act passed in 1840 on my own motion as minister of the interior, every member promoted to public office was subjected to re-election.

Neither did I think that the introduction of the entire jury list of a department into the electoral body menaced the safety of the state, nor that the privilege of voting should not be extended progressively to a greater number of persons. But, under the circumstances of the time, I looked upon the two propositions as totally inopportune, not in the slightest degree called for by serious or pressing facts, and much more injurious than profitable to the consolidation of free government, the first of national interests.

In fact, on the 1st of February, 1842, out of 459 members of which the Chamber of Deputies was composed, there were 149 salaried functionaries. Of this number, 16 were ministers or great political officers, which the proposition of M. Ganneron for the extension of parliamentary incompatibilities would still leave eligible. Of the remaining 133, 53 were magistrates for life. The Chamber therefore contained only 80 removable functioned members placed, on this ground, in dependence on power. With respect to the deputies promoted, since their entry into the Chamber, to salaried public offices, a table was drawn up of the appointments of this nature made by the different cabinets from the 1st of November, 1830, to the 1st of February, 1842; their number amounted to 211, and in the list were 72 ministers or great political officers, whom no one wished to exclude from the Chamber. Out of 1400 members elected within the space of these twelve years, there were thus only 130 who had been called to functions, to whom the

required incompatibilities could be rendered applicable.

On this first view, and looking only at the figures, there was nothing strange in the number of official deputies, nothing calculated to inspire legitimate doubt as to the independence of the resolutions of the Chamber, none of those startling abuses which demanded indispensable and prompt reform. Messrs. Villemain, Duchâtel, and Lamartine, while pointing out these facts, brought other considerations of more weight to bear against the proposition of M. Ganneron; they described the actual state of French society in which the public functionaries hold such an important position, that when that society calls for representation, it naturally demands that its representatives should also fill a prominent place; they insisted on the necessity of not reducing by law the number, already so restricted in all democratic associations, of men practically and experimentally enlightened, and ready to comprehend, in the bosom of political liberty, the conditions of government. But just and profound as they were, these considerations would not have sufficed to surmount the old prejudices and ardent passions which had provoked and supported the proposition; it was not, to speak truly, a question of principle and organization that was in debate; the attack was directed more against the prevailing policy of the Chamber than against the functioned deputies, and it was, above all, to change the majority by mutilating it that they demanded the reform of an abuse the

extent and gravity of which was greatly exaggerated. M. Duchâtel adroitly confined the discussion to these points; the Chamber understood the true meaning of the assault, and the proposition was rejected, though by a weak majority.

On the motion of M. Ducos for electoral reform, the debate was at the same time more easy and more extended. The law of elections, a change in which was demanded, had only been in existence eleven years. When it passed in 1831, the opposition itself proclaimed that it fully satisfied the requirements of liberty. Through the lowering of the electoral rate from 300 to 200 francs, and by the natural progress of free institutions as of public prosperity, the number of electors had rapidly increased. Starting at 99,000 in 1830, it had, by 1842, reached 224,000. When, under the ministry of the 1st of March, 1840, the Chamber of Deputies had to deliberate on petitions the greater number of which demanded universal suffrage, and some only required modifications analogous to the proposition of M. Ducos, M. Thiers, in the name of the cabinet, and also in his own, formally declared against electoral reform, and on all the petitions, moved the order of the day, which the Chamber had in fact pronounced. Such a reform was assuredly not more urgent or seasonable on the 15th of February, 1842, than on the 16th of May, 1840. But I did not confine myself to rejecting it on these previous and accessorial considerations. I penetrated the heart of the question, and

entered into an examination of the motives in the name of which electoral reform was demanded. It required no great sagacity to perceive that universal suffrage was in the essence as at the end of the movement, and that its partisans were the true instigators, and constituted the real force of the attack directed against the electoral system in operation. I have no prejudice against universal suffrage, systematic and absolute; I acknowledge that in certain conditions and within specific limits of society it may be practicable and useful; I admit that under extraordinary and transient circumstances it may serve sometimes to accomplish great social changes, at others to rescue the State from anarchy, and to beget a government. But in a great community, for the regular course of social life, and for continued duration, I regard it as a mischievous engine of legislation, as alternately a dangerous implement either for prince or people, for order or liberty. I did not discuss directly or fully the theory of universal suffrage which we had only before us in perspective; but I attacked, as false and worn-out, the principal idea on which it rests, the necessity of a great number of voters at political elections. "Society," I said, "was, in former times, divided into different classes, varying in civil conditions, interests, and influences. And not only different but opposed, in contest with each other, the nobility with the citizens, the proprietors of land with the labourers, the inhabitants of the towns with those of the country. There were amongst

them profound distinctions, conflicting interests, and continued struggles. What then became of the division of public rights? The classes who had none, suffered much from this privation; the class which possessed them used them against the others; this was their great weapon of force in their combats. Nothing of the kind exists with us in these days; much is said, and with reason, of the unity of French society; but it is not only a geographical unity; it is also a moral and internal unity. There are no more struggles between classes, for there are no longer interests profoundly divided or opposed. Who now separates electors at 300 francs from those at 200, 100, or 50? They are in the same civil condition, they all live under the dominion of the same laws. The elector at 300 francs represents perfectly the elector at 200 or 100; he protects, he covers him; he speaks and acts naturally for him, for he partakes and defends the same interests. What never before happened in the world, similarity of interests, at the present day, with us, allies itself to diversity of profession and inequality of condition. Herein lies the great fact, the new fact of our society. Another great fact results from the first: those who look upon a great number of electors as indispensable to truth of representative government deceive themselves. A great number of electors was important formerly, when classes were profoundly separated and placed under the empire of opposing interests and influences, when each demanded a considerable share. Nothing

of the kind, I repeat, exists at present with us; parity of interests, the support they naturally lend each other, permit the number of electors to be limited, without any detriment to those who do not possess the right of suffrage. In an aristocratic society, in face of an ancient and powerful aristocracy, democracy defends itself by numbers; numbers constitute its principal strength: to the influence of great, powerful, and accredited lords, it must oppose its number and even its noise. We are not now called upon to provide for such a necessity; democracy, with us, has no longer to defend itself against an old and influential aristocracy. Remember, gentlemen, that innovation is only improvement when it applies an effective remedy to a real want. In my opinion the electoral reform proposed to you is not at present an actual necessity. Do you know what you would do by adopting it? Instead of applying a remedy to a real evil, instead of satisfying an actual necessity, you would only allay (I do not wish to use too coarse a word) the itching for innovation which irritates us. You would compromise, you would weaken our social system, so sound and tranquil, to please for a moment the small, sickly section which agitates itself and us. Turn your thoughts, I entreat you, towards the practical side of our affairs and the totality of our position. We have a hard task to fulfil, harder than any that has been imposed at other epochs; we have three great points to establish: a new society, the great modern democracy, until now unknown in

the history of the world; new institutions, representative government hitherto a stranger in our country; finally, a new dynasty. Never did it happen to a generation to have such a work assigned to it. Nevertheless, we closely approach our object. The new society is to-day victorious, preponderant; no one contests it; it has had hard trial and experience; it has gained for itself civil laws, political institutions and the dynasty which suit and serve it. All the great conquests are accomplished, all the great interests are satisfied. Our actual, predominant object should be to secure the steady enjoyment of what we have won. To succeed in this, we only require two things, stability in our institutions, and judicious conduct in the daily and naturally incidental affairs of the country. This is at present the task, the great task of the government, the responsibility which weighs equally on you and on us. Let us make it a point of honour to be found equal to it; we shall find it difficult. Be cautious in adopting all questions which may be placed before you, in entering into all affairs to which you may be invited. Do not consider yourselves obliged to do this to-day, and that to-morrow. Do not encumber yourselves too eagerly with the burdens which the first stranger may have a fancy to place on your shoulders, when the loads we are necessarily compelled to bear are already so heavy. Settle obligatory questions; transact indispensable affairs which the time naturally brings forward, and reject those which are hurled at your heads lightly and without necessity."

The Chamber was convinced and rejected the electoral reform of M. Ducos by a stronger majority than that which threw out the parliamentary incompatibilities of M. Ganneron. I succeeded in impressing on the minds of that majority the idea which governed my own, the necessity of applying ourselves, above all and before all, to the consolidation of the free and regular government which was still a novelty with us. This policy has been called the policy of resistance, and the name has been employed to represent it as hostile to the social movement and the progress of liberty. An accusation singularly unintelligent; for, beyond doubt, it is the mission and duty of government to second the progress of the public strength and destiny; and all policy would be blameable which tended to render society sterile and stationary. But what is more important to the progress of liberty, is the practice of liberty. It is by exercising itself at the present that it prepares and secures its conquests for the future. As in 1830, under the ministry of M. Casimir Périer, resistance to material disorder was the first condition of liberty, so in 1842, it was from the mobility of laws and political fantasies that we had to preserve the newly-born system of liberty. What there was of resistance in our policy had no other object and could produce no other effect. Let the roots of the tree be firmly planted, and the branches will not fail to extend; if, at the moment of planting, the tree too frequently shaken, instead of growing, it falls. The duration

of a free government guarantees to a people much more liberty and progress than they can derive from revolutions.

Once only, between 1840 and 1842, we had to resist material disorder. The financial law of the 14th of July, 1838, had decreed that "in the session of 1842, and every succeeding ten years, there should be submitted to the Chambers a new plan of assessment between the departments, equally of the personal and house tax, and of the tax on windows. With this object, the collectors of taxes on property and persons will continue to supply the information necessary to ascertain the number of individuals liable to the personal tax, the amount of renters of houses, and the number of rateable windows." In 1841, to execute this provision of the law of 1838, and to put himself in a position to submit to the Chambers in 1842, the new assessment announced. M. Humann ordered a census throughout France, of all taxable persons and matters. Perhaps he expected, at some future time, to obtain by this measure, a notable augmentation of the public revenue by transforming the house and window taxes, until then assessed imposts of which the sum total was annually by the Chamber, to contingent duties susceptible of indefinite increase. A report spread abroad that such was in fact the object of the census, which rendered it, from the first moment, suspicious and unpopular. M. Humann contradicted the report and declared that he had no other design than that of arriving at

a more equal assessment of these taxes without in any degree augmenting the amount. But the effect was produced; and, moreover, independently of all augmentation of the sum total of the two taxes, the result of the measure would impose payment on persons who had hitherto evaded it. Amongst other points, it was ascertained, on the 15th of June, 1841, that 129,486 houses had not hitherto been rated. M. Humann, whose general ideas on government and finance were extremely sound, did not always thoroughly foresee the political effect of administrative measures, thought too lightly of them beforehand, and was not sufficiently careful to have a clear understanding with his colleagues. He communicated with them seldom and acted alone. The census, ordered by him as a simple and easy operation, encountered at several points of the country, amongst others in some great towns, Toulouse, Lisle, and Clermont-Ferrand, resistances, which either through the weakness of the authorities, or the ready complicity of factions, became actual rebellions, requiring armed force for their suppression. This was everywhere effective, but the ferment continued, and M. Humann was shaken by it. On the 14th of August, 1841, the King wrote as follows to me from the Château d'Eu: "M. Humann draws a gloomy picture of our position, and he adds (I quote his own words):—'My convictions with regard to the census are that it concerns my honour not to draw back. The measure, meanwhile, excites extreme difficulties; these difficulties may become in-

surmountable, and there is reason to inquire whether it is prudent to incur the risk. To-day, my retirement, induced by the state of my health, would pacify minds and entail no inconvenience; if, on the contrary, it should be compelled at a later period by circumstances, the moral authority of the King's government would be compromised. I submit this reflection to your Majesty; I entreat you to consider whether your consent to my retirement would not be, under the actual circumstances, an act of good policy.' "I shall not reply to M. Humann until this evening," the King added; "I shall explain to him how highly I value his services, and how anxious I am to avoid anything that might shake the present ministry, I so ardently wish to retain; but I shall add that the circumstance is so important that I must transmit to the president of the council the communication he had made to me, that he and his colleagues may deliberate, and assist me with their advice."

I replied to the King immediately: "I have just seen the Marshal, M. Duchâtel and M. Humann. The marshal, who is still unwell, will, however, I believe, carry to the King in the course of the evening the result of our deliberation. That result is not doubtful. M. Humann has placed his retirement at the disposal of the King and council to acquit his conscience. He has no wish to retire; he feels that his honour is engaged in the operation of the census; he wishes to remain and carry it out to the end. If his offer were accepted, he would consider himself as

a victim sacrificed, and sacrificed through weakness. In my opinion, he would be right. The difficulties of the position are real, but neither insurmountable nor threatening; we have not yet been called upon to fire a shot. The resistances, even when they exhibit themselves with animation, fall rapidly and easily. The chief part of the great municipal councils declare for the legality of the act. We have not reached the term of embarrassments, but I see no danger in any quarter. The abandonment of the census would be the abandonment of the government. There would be no longer law, administration, or cabinet, and power would voluntarily court its own ruin; for, in truth, there is nothing in what is passing of sufficient weight to inspire serious uneasiness. M. Humann understands that in carrying out the act, it is necessary to temper and soften it, to show ourselves easy as to the forms, and to arrive promptly at the end. He has for several days given, and will continue to give, orders in consequence. I do not therefore hesitate to tell the King that the advice of the council will be to reject all idea of the retirement of M. Humann, and to follow up the census, while rendering the law as flexible and indulgent as possible, but at the same time by securing obedience to the law."

The King felt more obliged by our firmness than it deserved. "Your letter," he wrote in reply, "has given me the most lively pleasure. You have assuredly said and written many beautiful and good things in the course of your life; you have honourably pro-

claimed great truths, and defended those precious principles which can alone preserve the morality and secure the prosperity of human associations; but you have never said or written anything better than the letter I have just received from you, and it is, on all points, the expression of my own thought and desires. As soon as I have seen the Marshal, or heard from him, I shall write to M. Humann, and, while repeating how anxiously I wish him to remain, I shall signify how entirely I approve the course he is pursuing. With this perfect understanding the clouds of the moment will dissipate, and our political sun will shine with more brilliancy than before. I have had no other anxiety than that of the consequences which the retirement of M. Humann might have entailed in the midst of this crisis. Once re-assured on this point, I am also easy as to the issue; and you may tell him, before I write, how much I am gratified by the resolution you announce to me on his part."

M. Humann being thus fortified, the operation of the census terminated without fresh troubles, and ceased to be a check for him. But, eight months after, on the 25th of April, 1842, at the moment when he was preparing to take part in the debate on the bill for the general network of railroads, M. Humann, stricken by an aneurism of the heart, died suddenly, seated in his cabinet, before his desk, with his hand on his paper. His death, if he felt himself die, surprised him less than it did his friends; ten days before, talking with one of his clerks, he said:

"I feel that I am going; the life I lead wears me out; I shall not be here long." He was a man of elevated mind and serious habits, a great financial authority, laborious, suspicious, susceptible, silently anxious, extremely solicitous as to his personal consideration, carrying into public life more dignity than force, and more prudence than tact; a conservative by taste as well as by position, too enlightened not to be liberal as far as was consistent with the interests of order, and holding his general position well without giving himself up entirely to any particular point. I had no intimate ties with him, but I regretted his loss sincerely; it was at my request and from confidence in me, that, on the 29th of October, 1840, he entered the cabinet; he proved to be a real strength there and in the Chambers, and was held in considerable estimation by the public. The void his death occasioned amongst us was immediately filled up. On the following day, we offered the ministry of finance to M. Hippolyte Passy, who refused it without hostility; a man of mind and acquirement rather than of action, having more self-love and dignity than ambition, fearing failure more than he desired success, pleasing himself with criticism, and preferring independence to responsibility. The finances were given on the same day to M. Lacave-Laplagne, who had filled the department with capacity under the presidency of M. Molé, and was eager to accept it. Thus were successively rallied round the cabinet all the fractions of the conservative party divided in 1839 by the coalition.

By the side of these external and internal affairs we had still another of considerable importance, which, without being foreign, was not altogether domestic, and in which, a few days after the formation of the cabinet, we took a great step;—I allude to Algeria. I had always given serious attention to this point; I had taken part in all the debates of which it had been the subject; I had expressed, at the same time, a firm resolution that France should preserve her new possession, and the intention of not hurrying on our establishment, except step by step, according to the exigencies and chances of each succeeding day, without premeditation of war, and without impatience of aggrandizement. This, in my opinion, was the judicious course, and the disposition of the Chambers made it our law. Not only in the bosom of the conservative party, but also of the opposition, many persons had little faith in the utility of this conquest, feared its extension, and resisted the accompanying expenses; others even went so far as to propose formally its relinquishment. We found in 1840 the affairs of Algeria in a state at once of crisis and languor. The peace concluded, in 1837, at the Tafna, with Abd-el-Kader, had been broken; after employing the interval of leisure in rallying the scattered tribes, in organizing his regular battalions, and in procuring supplies, the Arabian hero had recommenced war in all quarters. Marshal Valée, Governor-General since the taking of Constantine, sustained it worthily, but without decisive results;

partial expeditions succeeded; princes, officers, and soldiers acquired much honour: our journals resounded with the defence of Mazagran, the taking of Cherchell, the passage of the Atlas, the occupation of Medeah and Milianah; but the general situation remained the same, and Abd-el-Kader, always beaten, still maintained or rekindled the insurrection. There was a general feeling amongst those who took most interest in the affairs of Algeria, that, of all our officers, General Bugeaud was the fittest to superintend effectually this difficult warfare. He explained his ideas on this subject, on all occasions, with abundant and powerful eloquence, and with confidence in himself, which had much more the appearance than the reality of presumption; for, while he expected success, he fell into no error as to the difficulties, and neglected no means of surmounting them. Already employed more than once in Africa, he had given rapid proofs of ability and influence. The army looked on him with reliance and partiality; the Arabs dreaded him. The cabinet of M. Thiers, if I am rightly informed, intended to make him Governor-General; but, from his rough ardour in the policy of resistance, his attitude in the Chambers, and his various antecedents, General Bugeaud was held in antipathy by the party of the Left, and M. Thiers abandoned the appointment. We had not the same motives for hesitation; I had faith in the military talent of General Bugeaud, and in his political firmness; the King, Marshal Soult, and all the council

seconded my opinion. On the 29th of December, 1840, he was named Governor-General of Algeria, and after having undergone, with complete success, in his arrondissement, the trial of re-election, he entered, towards the end of February, 1841, on the active duties of his government.

From his opening, in the two campaigns of spring and autumn in 1841, he fully justified our expectation. Abd-el-Kader was not destroyed; a great man at the head of his nation is not destroyed until he is killed or taken prisoner; but he was everywhere beaten, followed up, and reduced to the defensive. Several amongst the leading Arab tribes sent in their submission. Some of the most important points of the regency were taken and strongly occupied. Our dominion resumed its course of consolidation and steady progress. General Bugeaud, on leaving Paris, explained to me his plan of conduct; since he had been in Algeria he supplied me with regular intelligence of his operations, complaining a little that he had received no letter from me in return,—a reserve I practised to avoid offending the susceptibility of Marshal Soult, to whom the affairs of Algeria were officially entrusted. On the 21st of September, 1841, I wrote to the Governor-General: "If I were to enumerate all my reasons for not writing to you before, I am sure that, amongst the number, you would find some quite satisfactory, and that you would forgive my silence. I break it now without wasting time in explanation. I should feel bitter re-

gret if I could think it had given you a moment's doubt as to my sentiments towards you. Be assured, my dear General, that no one entertains for you higher esteem or more sincere friendship. We have seen and proved each other in moments never to be forgotten.

"You have met with real success. You will meet with still more. Your impending campaign will secure and develop the results of the first. It is evident that above and before all other considerations, we must re-establish our moral ascendency in Africa, and impress a deep and permanent conviction of it on the Arabs; and if we cannot hope for their complete and lasting submission, we must throw amongst them, at least, disorganization and despondency.

"This is the question of the moment. You are in the course of settling it. I admit that it is not finished, that you have yet efforts to make, that for these efforts you require means, and that we must furnish them. For my own part, in the council and in the tribune, I shall support you with my utmost power. Even strongly upheld, your burden is still extremely heavy. We owe it to you to sustain our due share.

"But I suppose the question of the moment settled, the Arabs intimidated, the confederacy which surrounds Abd-el-Kader disunited. The grand point still remains,—our establishment in Africa, and the conduct to be held to render it solid. If solid, it will become useful.

"In my opinion, the first consideration is the settle-

ment of a clear and rigorous frontier between the territories; one directly occupied by France and given over to European colonists, the other indirectly governed in the French name and left to the Arabs.

"The separation of the two races appears to me the fundamental rule of the establishment, the condition of its success.

"What ought to be, in the different provinces of the regency, the territory reserved for our direct sovereignty and for European colonization? You alone can furnish the information necessary to determine this question. Collect it, I entreat you, with care. Arrive at distinct propositions. We shall do nothing rational or durable on this point, until a course is well determined on and thoroughly investigated, in Africa and at home.

"In the selection and limitation of the European territory, we ought to be governed by the idea that it must be found sufficient, at some future time, to support our establishment, whether of the population that cultivates, or of the army that defends it. This will be a result very slowly ascertained; but from this moment we ought to have it in view, and regulate, in consequence, the extent of our direct occupation.

"This boundary being fixed, we must next determine, within the European territory, the portions to be first delivered over to colonization, and procure positive security for the colonists, whatever they may be, military or civil, companies or individuals. By what means is this security to be acquired? To what extent of ter-

ritory should it be, in the first instance, applicable? Of these details I am ignorant. What I know is, that we require a European territory; that in that territory we must have colonists, and that the colonists must have protection.

"All the other questions springing from colonization are secondary, and need not be touched upon until the previous ones are solved.

"As to the Arabian territory, while interdicting it absolutely to European colonists, we ought evidently to occupy in it certain military points, where our rule may be visible, and whence we may exercise it in case of need. The more I consider, the more I feel convinced that these points ought to be few and strongly garrisoned.

"Beyond these points, the farming and administration of the country ought to be left to the Arabs, their chiefs, laws, and customs, under the sole condition of tribute. Our action there should confine itself to constant efforts of sound judgment and diplomacy, so as to live on good terms with the scattered tribes, to prevent them from coalescing against us, to attach some to our interests specially, to have a favourable understanding with all, and to maintain amongst them the conviction of our strength without meddling with their affairs.

"Here, as with the European territory, I pass over secondary questions. You alone can propose and solve them.

"I equally lay aside other important but specific

matters, such as maritime works to be executed at certain points of the coast, the assessment of public property, and the administrative organization. At present, my dear General, I only write to make clearly known to you the state of my mind on the general view and conditions of our establishment, to ask you whether your ideas accord with mine, and thus to lay down the bases of the understanding which should exist between us, that I may be able to aid you effectually when I have to discuss at the Palais Bourbon and at the Luxembourg, your proceedings in Africa."

In the plan I thus submitted to General Bugeaud, there was, as experience has taught me, a slight infusion of a preconceived and utopian system. I believed too much in the possibility of regulating, according to justice and by peaceful means, the relations between Frenchmen and Arabs, Christians and Mohammedans, colonists and natives. I did not sufficiently estimate the difficulties and propensities which would inevitably spring up from the juxtaposition of races, religions, territories, authority, and property. Previous reflection does not always see things exactly as they are, and reason cannot divine all that experience may reveal. But it is precisely the mission and honour of the human mind to take, in worldly affairs, a salutary initiative, despite the errors that may be mingled with it; and practical policy would sink into a deplorable prostration and torpor, if fancy did not summon it from time to time to participate in her generous ex-

pectations. I aspired to introduce into the government of conquered Algeria, a large measure of equity, humanity, and respect for rights, and I pointed out to General Bugeaud, according to my views, the means and conditions.

He replied to me from Mostaganem, on the 6th of November, 1841: "I find here your admirable letter. It requires a serious answer, well considered, which I have not time to forward at this moment, but which you shall have as soon as I am disembarrassed from the accumulated arrear of business occasioned by fifty-three days of a campaign just concluded. I feel the importance of satisfying your questions.

"You ask in what you can assist me; this is my reply. The greatest service you can render me at this moment, is to reward my army reasonably. After having been prodigal to Marshal Valée, who obtained all he asked, upon the most trifling claims, they have become extremely avaricious towards me. I have been unable to get anything for a great number of well-deserving officers, despite my reiterated demands. The army of Africa, from which I have required much this year, compares its services and is not satisfied. It compares epochs also, and the comparison is not in my favour, since I exact more fatigue and obtain much fewer rewards. I thought it my duty to bring back the bulletins to the truth and modesty they ought to contain with an army which, to render it capable of great achievements, ought not to be glorified for small ones. I am tempted to believe that this

has been turned against us. People think that we have done little because we have not drawn up pompous reports of trifling engagements. But they ought to know that we cannot have battles of Austerlitz in Africa, and that the great merit of this war consists not in gaining victories, but in sustaining with patience and firmness fatigue, inclemency of climate, and privations. In this respect, I think we have surpassed all that has hitherto taken place here. The war has been urged on with unheard-of activity, while sparing the troops as much as circumstances permitted, which they fully acknowledge. The care I take of them and the vigour of our operations console them in some degree for the scarcity of rewards: but if that parsimony continues, the present feeling may change. It concerns the interest of the country that my moral authority should not be weakened.

"I fully comprehend the delicacy, on your part, of touching this chord in the council. Nevertheless a favourable and natural opportunity may present itself of saying your word. You might, moreover, have a private conversation with the King. I hope his Majesty bears me no illwill for having had some trifling ebullitions with the Duke of Nemours, whom, in other respects, I have treated extremely well. I wish to Heaven that all the servants of the monarchy were as devoted to it as I am, and possessed the same ardour."

I accomplished, with the King, what General Bugeaud wished; several of his officers obtained the dis-

tinctions he had asked for them, and no one rendered him, in various conversations, more justice than the Duke of Nemours, sensible above all others to simple merit and well-performed duty. On his return to Algiers, General Bugeaud wrote to me on the 27th of November, 1841: "Having nearly worked off my arrear of two months and impressed fresh activity on all branches of the service, and on all labours, I read again your letter of the 21st of September, which I did not receive until the 5th of November, and to which I promised you an answer.

"I might confine myself to sending you, as I do, a copy of a memoir, in form of a letter, which I addressed to the minister of war in reply to a series of questions proposed to me at the beginning of September. You will find there the greater portion of what you ask. But certain passages in your letter call for something more, which I shall endeavour to satisfy.

"First, I remarked with much pleasure that you thoroughly understand the position, for which reason your questions are generally well put. You admit that, 'above all, we must re-establish our moral ascendency in Africa, and impress a deep and permanent conviction of it on the Arabs.' Then you add, 'and if we cannot hope for their complete and lasting submission, we must throw amongst them, at least, disorganization and despondency.'

"In the first part of this paragraph we are perfectly agreed; my system of war has had this object, and, I believe, to a great extent this effect. On the second

point we differ, inasmuch as you seem to doubt complete subjugation, and I feel assured of it, provided we know how to persevere in our impolitic enterprise.

"If we are in the road, as I feel convinced, to a complete disorganization and despondency,—with tenacity we shall infallibly accomplish the conquest and control of the Arabs. What should we profit by disorganization and despondency if we abandon the game? Discouragement would soon give place to the confidence and arrogance which characterize this people. They would think, and with reason, that if we have not completed our work it was because we were unable to do so, and before six months, we should have to re-commence war.

"But I am wrong in dwelling on your doubt; it is evident that you only suggest it should things be at the worst, as you add immediately, 'You are in the course of settling the question; I admit that it is not finished, that you have yet efforts to make, that for these efforts you require means, and that we must furnish them, etc. etc.'

"No, all is not finished, and there is yet much to do; but the most difficult work is accomplished; the first stones of this Arabian edifice, much more solid than was supposed, are torn away; a few more, and the demolition will go on quickly. We have destroyed nearly all the depôts of war. We have overrun the finest districts. We have amply supplied the places we possess in the interior. We have profoundly studied the country in many directions, and

we know the manœuvres and retreats of the tribes to escape us, so that at the approaching campaign we shall be in a condition to inflict much mischief on them. But what is still more important, we have singularly weakened the prestige which Abd-el-Kader exercised over his people. He had persuaded them that we could not leave the coast; 'they resemble fishes,' he said; 'they can only live by the sea; their war has a short range and they pass like clouds. You have retreats and they cannot reach you.' We have this year penetrated to their most remote haunts, which has stricken the populations with consternation. We are also beginning to find allies and auxiliaries; we have reason to believe that the defection of the South will spread; the submission of that portion of the Douars and Smelas which had always remained faithful to the Emir, and was composed of the most fanatical families, is an important event, since in addition to four hundred horsemen which we have gained, it is an excellent symptom of the enfeeblement of the Arab chief. This example must be contagious, and as soon as we win over a certain number of tribes, the ball of snow will augment rapidly, if we push it on with energy, and keep it rolling until we have gathered and subdued all. Half-measures obtain only half-results; the work has always to be done again. Our policy and war in Africa ought to be what yours should have been at home. You have been three times attacked with arms in hand, and three times you have conquered; but three times also you have paused

as if in fear of being too victorious. Look at the conclusion at which the factions have arrived; see them to-day more audacious and eager than ever; do they give you any credit for moderation and clemency? No; they have declared that you were afraid of them, and you have only discouraged your friends. And this is why you are now obliged to say, 'We shall have no rest, we are condemned to be indefatigable.' (Expressions in your letter.)

"Let us not do the same in Africa; let us not content ourselves with half-submission, with a light tribute, which would infallibly be precarious. Since we have been mad enough to engage in the struggle, let us triumph completely and quell the Arabs. *Let us meddle with their affairs*, and demand a heavy tribute, for this is, according to their habits, the most signal proof of power on the one side and submission on the other. All the diplomacy you name to me is not worth this, and this does not prevent skill elsewhere.

"I do not mean to say that we ought to give to the Arabs in every quarter French commanders and legislators, although several tribes of the province of Constantine have demanded both; no, we should govern them for a long time by natives; but these chiefs of our selection should be vigorously restrained and rule only in our name. General Negrier* manages them excellently; he has thus considerably augmented the revenues and will continue to increase them every year

* Commandant in the province of Constantine.

"You wish to know my opinion on the mode of establishing ourselves in this country and of maintaining our power here so that the conquest may not be a perpetual charge on the metropolis: I shall now communicate it to you.

"You will see, in my letter to the minister of war, that I agree with you that there should be an Arabian and a French territory; that is to say, that we ought not to interfere with the rural farming of localities, and that fusion is not possible except in a certain number of towns; but I think, at the same time, that we should not be divided by great geographical masses, for such a division would not permit us to exercise the governmental action, the necessity of which I have endeavoured to demonstrate, to render our establishment durable.

"In the election of our stations, we should always have revolt in view, the war which accompanies it, and military strength before agricultural and commercial conveniences. We must therefore occupy the military positions, the centres of action, and you deliver a sound maxim in war when you say that these points should be few in number but strongly garrisoned. When points of occupation are numerous, we cannot fail to be weak in some, and hence arises paralysis of all strength. Points of occupation have in general no other power than that of the facility of moving the troops stationed there. When they are only sufficient to keep the post, they are commanded by it; but when they can move out in

strength they command a radius of from thirty to forty leagues.

These self-evident truths appear to have been ignored, and the scattering of posts still paralyses, at this moment, more than a third of the army of Africa.

In this point of view, I would place civil colonization by the side of military occupation in the interior, at well-selected stations, and on our most important lines of communications. Thus, civil colonization round Oran, Arzew, Mostaganem, Cherchell, Algiers, Philippeville and Bona: military colonization at Tlemcen, Mascara, Milianah, Médéah, Sétif and Constantine; and from post to post on the communications from these points with the coast. On some points of the coast and of the military colony there should be placed small reserves of regular troops to be furnished and relieved from home, but the expense to be reimbursed at a fixed time from the budget of the colony. Civil colonization should be militarized as much as possible.

"This system would enclose the country, once subdued, so effectually, that serious revolts would become almost impossible. Policy and enervating civilization would complete the work. The European race, more favoured, better constituted, and more industrious than the native Arabs, would increase, I think more rapidly, and form, in the course of time, the great mass of the population.

An important question still remains, which, though

late, demands solution: what advantages will the mother-country derive from its conquest?

"It would be vain to look for advantages proportioned to the sacrifices already mentioned and still to be made, to the dangers and embarrassments which this conquest has caused. But we may find many sources of consolation. In this respect my ideas are more favourable than they were before I traversed Algeria, as I have done this year. Judging of the whole from certain portions, I believed that Algeria was far from meriting its ancient reputation for fertility. I think now that it is productive in corn; that it may become so in fruit, oil, and silk, and I have acquired a certain knowledge that it nourishes, without labour, a vast stock of cattle and horses. It also possesses much more fuel than was supposed; only this fuel is badly distributed.

"Our colonists and the Arabs, when no longer at war, may therefore live in abundance, and have an excess of produce for commercial purposes. Under actual circumstances, in spite of their bad administration, their incessant wars, and the barbarism of their agriculture, the Arabs rear more corn and cattle than they require for their consumption.

"I judge of the fertility, not only from the products I have seen on the Chélif, the Mina, the Illel, the Habra, the Sig, etc., but still more by the population, and of that by the great number of horsemen. I am certain that the province of Oran has 23,000 men, mounted on horses belonging to themselves. Four

similar surfaces in France would not yield an equal number. Such a country is not poor; well governed it can easily pay the taxes necessary to cover administrative expenses, and to procure the mother-country advantageous returns. She will find there excellent horses to mount light cavalry; she may even form modern Numidians, who would render her good service in her European wars. She will create an outlet for her increasing population and manufactures, if she has the good sense to concentrate the Algerians in agriculture. Finally she will find employment for those restless capacities amongst our lower orders who obstruct us and constitute one of the most formidable dangers of our society.

"Algeria will also be a source of activity to our marine, and some of its ports improved will be useful in a war in the Mediterranean and to extend our influence in that sea.

"I might name other equivalents of less importance. I might say that in Algeria will be formed men fit for war and legislation; that it contains lead, copper, and other minerals, etc. etc. But I have confined myself entirely to leading points."

General Bugeaud was too modest when he classed at the end of his list, and as a *postscript*, men of war and legislation amongst the possible products of Algeria; events have assigned them a higher rank. He was more eager than I to prosecute by force the complete rule of France over the Arabs, and more sceptical as to the advantages and future of our establish-

ment in Africa. But I troubled myself little on these points of difference in our views. I felt confident that he would carry on the war well, and that in doing so he would not exceed his instructions. He was more brave than rash, and more intemperate in speech than in action: "I want a government," he said in the midst of the crisis of 1848, when France seeking one in every direction, he might have been tempted to offer her his own. But he estimated himself correctly. He was more adapted to serve and defend the government of his country than ambitious to assume and sustain the burden himself.

Some months after the date of the letter I have just quoted, he wrote to me again from Algiers, on the 3rd of March, 1842:—"Once more a confidential and expansive communication. Letters from Paris speak of the retirement of Marshal Soult on account of health, and add that the choice of his successor vibrates between Marshal Valée and me. I should regard the removal of Marshal Soult as a great misfortune; and if my return from Africa were the consequence, it would be in my eyes doubly to be regretted. Not that I have the vanity to suppose they could not replace me here with ample talent and adroitness, but because I have acquired an ascendency over the Arabs, which another, however able he might be, would have to establish before he could be equally useful.

"I will add, as a very secondary consideration, that I have at present a most ardent desire to finish my

work before I quit it, and this you will readily comprehend without further explanation.

"Assuredly you are, of all living politicians, the one I would prefer being associated with in the government of the country; but I should be loath to leave Africa at the moment when I believe I am approaching the end of the war.

"Perhaps I am combating a phantom. There may have been no shadow of this idea, but, in all cases, it cannot be injurious to let you know beforehand my opinion on the point."

I believe, and General Bugeaud's letter authorizes the conclusion, that the idea he repudiated was not disagreeable to him, and that he would willingly have consented to conduct the affairs of Algeria with the entire department of war, from Paris in place of Algiers. But he combated, as he said, a phantom. At that epoch, there was no question of the retirement of Marshal Soult; the great difficulties of our foreign relations were surmounted; those of the interior, while plainly foreshadowing themselves, presented no very formidable aspect. When the session of 1842 closed, and the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, on the 13th of June, 1842, the cabinet, firmly established, had before it, in perspective, a probable success in the elections, and a future more ominous of labour than storms.

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